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(Abstract)
THE EXPLORER, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE APPROACHES TO SANTA FE:

GOVER.~!IENT

A STUDY OF AMERICAN

POLICY RELATIVE TO THE SPANISH SOUTID'lEST, 1800 - 1819
Lee Francis Brown

Loyola University, Chicago

Historical literature on the Spanish Southwest has
made much of the lure which this vast region has held for
Americans.

It has been a lure of trade, of wealth, of ad-

venture and of expansion.

Few single places in the South-

west could rival the particular attraction of Santa Fe,
variously referred to as the "gate way" to the rich mines of
Mexico, and as a "port of call" on the western edge of the
Great Plains.

To some historians the objective of trade

with Santa Fe can explain in large measure the whole Manifest Destiny movement.

The fact that seventeenth and

eighteenth century geographic concepts placed this village
close to the Mississippi and Missouri River systems heightened American interest as well as Spanish fear of approaching
foreigners.
The importance of the approaches to Santa Fe for individual Americans in the early nineteenth century cannot be

' neglected.
denied and· should not be

When one examines the in-

terests of the United States Government, however, it becomes
I

quite obvious that the statesmen of this nation were not as
Vitally interested in bringing the Santa Fe region into the
fold of the American system.

In fact, official America, at

times, discouraged and forbade its citizens to move toward

the Rocky Mountains.

Such a fact becomes all the more inter-

esting when one notes that Thomas Jefferson, is considered
this nation's first "expansionist" President.
Jefferson has been regarded often by historians as
western-minded;

the evaluation has merit.

His moves towards

securing the Mississippi Valley and the Territory of Orleans
following the Purchase attest to his western-mindedness.

For

regions much farther west, however, Jefferson seemed less vitally concerned to encourage American expansion or settlement.
His reasoning is examined in this study.

He spoke with de-

termination when addressing the Spanish about America's right
to land as far west as the Rio Grande, but a closer examination of his actions would reveal a Chief Executive perhaps
more a clever diplomat playing at brinkmanship rather than an
active expansionist.

James Madison was even less vitally in-

terested in the approaches to Santa Fe.

Therefore, an at-

tempt is made to show that the active and positive expansionist programs of the United States Government, beginning with
the military expeditions of 1819, were not a part of the policy or plans of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
Another aspect of American interest in the Southwest
which bears heavily on this study is an evaluation of the
cartographic development and the role it played in determining
outstanding issues.
two-fold:

Accordingly the purpose of this study is

to examine the policy of the U.S. Government rela-

tive to the Spanish Southwest during the period 1800-1819 and
to evaluate the extent to which cartography shaped America's
interest and attitudes towards this region.
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PREFACE
The purpose of this study is twofold:

to examine the

policy of the United States Government relative to the Spanish
Southwest during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, and to evaluate the extent to which cartography
shaped America's interest and attitudes towards this region.
The specific area of the Spanish Southwest which is of vital
concern to this study is the Lower Rocky Mountain region, or
what may best be termed, the ap9roaches to Santa Fe.

American

interest in other areas of the Southwest such as California
and the Texas-Louisiana border area was motivated by a different
set of forces and is only of secondary concern here.
Historical literature on the Spanish Southwest has made
much of the lure which this vast region has held for Americans.
It has been a lure of trade, of wealth, of adventure and of
expansion.

Few single places in the Southwest could rival the

attraction of Santa Fe. ,This small village, variously referred
to as the "gateway" to the rich mines of Mexico, and as a "port
of call" on the western edge of the Great Plains, has been the
destination of many an American trader and trapper.
iii

To some

iv
historians the objective of trade with Santa Fe can explain
in large measure the whole Manifest Destiny movement.
The frontier town of Santa Fe, located well to the north
and west of the more settled areas of New Spain, was also highly
valued by the Spanish.

They considered it necessary to pro-

tect their silver mining areas of northern Mexico from foreign
encroachment.

The fact that seventeenth and eighteenth cen-

tury geographic concepts placed this village close to the
Mississippi and Missouri river systems heightened Spanish
alertness to anyone approaching Santa Fe.

American and Spaniard

alike obtained his concepts of the approaches to Santa Fe largely
from the same cartographic sources, sources steeped in geographic myth and legend.

As the nineteenth century dawned states-

men of the United States and Spain were basing their claims and
making policy supported by maps generously filled with errors.
The cartographer etched-in details for the Southwest that often
bore little resemblance to what actually existed.
The importance of the approaches to Santa Fe for individual Americans in the early nineteenth century cannot be denied,
and should not be neglected.

The picture seems quite different,

however, when one examines the interest of official America -the United States Government.

The Executive leadership of this

country in the hands of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison did
not evidence an interest or a desire to bring the Santa Fe

v

region into the fold of the American system equal to that of
individual traders, trappers and adventurers.
Of the two Presidents examined in this study, Jefferson
has been regarded by historians as the more western-minded,
a man of expansion.

The evaluation has merit.

His desire to

coordinate scientific and geographical knowledge for use in
planning domestic and diplomatic programs has been the subject
of considerable research.

His moves towards securing the

Mississippi Valley and the Territory of Orleans following the
Purchase attest to his western-mindedness.

For regions much

farther west, however, Jefferson seemed less vitally concerned
to encourage American settlement.
. this study.

His reasons are examined in

James Madison was even less vitally interested in

the approaches to Santa Fe.

An

attempt will be made to show

that the active and positive expansionist programs of the
United States Government, beginning with the military expeditions
of 1819, were not a part of the policy or plans of Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison.
Very special thanks are due Dr. Robert

w.

McCluggage

who suggested the research into the subject of this study.

His

interest in the topic, his patience and expert guidance, have
been invaluable.

A special note of gratitude must be given to

the late Dr. Joseph

w.

Schmitz, S.M., without whose

vi
encouragement and faith in the writer this dissertation would
never have become a reality.
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CHAPTER I

THE SPANISH SOUTHWEST BEFORE 1800

Although organized and directed activity by the United
States Government in the Southwest began with the advent of the
nineteenth century, that vast region had drawn the attention
and interests of individual Americans for many years.

This

was only a natural continuation of the western interests exemplified by the English settlers from the early Colonial days
to the War of Independence.

If one accepts the premise that

·exploration in colonial times was an integral part of Indian
trade, the whole westward advance of the English as well as the
French during their periods of colonization orr-the North American continent can be readily understood.

1

Even if the commer-

cial or economic thesis is denied as a sole motive for exploration; if it is placed alongside other motives such as imperial
rivalry, scientific advancement, or simple adventure, a study

'
1

Abraham P. Nasatir (ed.), Before Lewis and Clark:
Documents Illustrating the History of the Missouri, 1785-1804
(2 vols.; St. Louis: St. Louis Historical Documents Foundation,
1952), I, vii.
1

2

of the Southwest clearly indicates that all three major powers
--France, England and America--cast longing eyes towards what
Spain claimed as her own, west of the Mississippi River.
The story of Spain's conquest, exploration and settlement of the Southwest (the northern provinces of
of New Spain) has been told numerous times.

~~e

Viceroyalty

The names of

Coronado, Onate, Kine, Garces, and Escalante alone reflect
many chapters of Borderland history familiar to students of the
Southwest.

While the accounts of the numerous colonization

efforts by Spain in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries are not pertinent here, it is important to consider
briefly that period of Spanish occupation when foreign intruders
first began to appear at the gates of Santa Fe, capital of the
northern province of New Spain.

Not only was Santa Fe the

provincial capital, it was the key frontier outpost from which
Spanish military and commerical expeditions set forth to protect
and expand the rights of His Catholic Majesty in the Southwest.
Situated near the valley of the Upper Rio Grande, Santa
Fe had come along an arduous road since its beginnings in the

'

first decade of the seventeenth century.

2

2

In 1680 the famous

Hiram Martin Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the
Far West (2 vols.; New York: The Press of the Pioneers, Inc.,
1935), II, 484. France v. Scholes, "The Supply Service of the

3

Pueblo Revolt had forced the Spaniards to abandon the settlement and retreat to El Paso.

Reoccupation took place by way

of a military invasion in the 1690's, and from that time on
the Spaniards preserved a durable, though at times, precarious
control.

The annals of New Mexican history are resplendent with

accounts of daring individuals of the cross and of the sword
•

who extended the control of Spain over vast western territory.
Likewise these men added to the world's knowledge of the land,
knowledge which Spain fought to keep within the confines of
her own court, but which eventually helped traders and explorers
of non-Spanish origin as well.
Somewhere to the east of the Spanish settlements in New
Mexico were the French.

Just where Spanish control ended and

the French flag could be securely planted remained vague for
several centuries.

Spain and France were not explicit as to

the boundaries separating their respective domains, and this
situation caused innumerable difficulties, not only for the
two respective powers, but the Americans as well at a later

New Mexico.Missions in 'the Seventeenth Century," New Mexico
Historical Review, V (January, 1930), 93. A full study of the
founding and colonization of New Mexico can be found in Charles
W. Hackett (ed.), Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico,
Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1775. Collected by
F. A. and Fanny R. Bandelier (3 vols.; Washington: Carnegie
Institution, 1937).

EARLY FRENCH AND SPANISH EXPLORATION IN THE SOUTHWEST

Source: Hawgood, John A. America's Western Frontiers.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, pp. 19, 31.

4

-5
date.

From the latter part of the seventeenth century until

1762, the area generally referred to as the Mississippi Valley
was under French control.

During that period the French, be

they voyageur, trader or explorer, had penetrated most of the
country watered by the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.
had been done much to the chagrin of the Spanish.

This

Frenchmen

had set foot on most of the territory between the Mississippi
and the vague border separating French Louisiana from the
Provincias Internas.

3

As early as 1703 some French traders, advancing south
and west from their bases in Illinois, entered the present
state of Oklahoma on a general line towards New Mexico.

Other

Frenchmen were approaching the same area from the Lower
Louisiana settlements by way of the Red and Arkansas rivers.
All of these traders and trappers, however, found their going
difficult due to the presence of certain hostile Indian tribes.
The Apaches along the Red River, and the Comanches along the
Arkansas and Platte rivers posed formidable obstacles.

The

Spanish took advantage of any and all animosities between the

'
3 Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , I, 55, 12.
When discussing the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase
and the negotiations relative to the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819,
it will be seen that Spain and France, not being explicit, as
to the boundary separating their respective domains, caused
unending trouble for American statesmen.

6

red man and the foreigners: any tribe which would help prevent
the advancement of the intruder could be assured of gifts and
supplies from the Spaniards.

4

Such a procedure did not always

prove successful.
In spite of the efforts to keep New Mexico and the
surrounding territory the exclusive domain of the King of Spain,
in the year 1739 a party of Frenchmen led by the Mallet brothers reached Santa Fe.

Pierre and Paul Mallet, with a party of

eight or nine, arrived in the New Mexican capital on July 22,
1739.

They succeeded in getting through the Comanche barrier,

remained for about nine months and then returned.

5

These sons

of France brought back to the Illinois region news that the
Spaniards in Santa Fe would welcome commerce.

6

It is inter-

esting to note that regardless of what the official policy of
the Spanish Crown was relative to trade in the colonies, nonSpanish traders who reached Santa Fe did not always find

4

Alfred B. Thomas, "Spanish Expeditions Into Colorado,"
The Colorado Magazine, No. 7, I, (November, 1924), 202. Alfred
B. Thomas, "Spanish Exploration of Oklahoma," Chronicles of
Oklahoma, VI, (June, 192~), 188-213.
5Thomas, "Spanish Expeditions Into Colorado," p. 202.
Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , p. 28.

7

themselves unwelcome.

The strict regulations concerning the

entry of goods into New Spain set down by the Casa de
Contratacion was doubtless a major factor here.

Goods were

scarce on the frontier, and when brought in through legal
channels prices were exorbitant.

It is little wonder that the

inhabitants of Santa Fe welcomed contraband trade.
Thus in spite of the distances which separated the
Spanish northern frontier from French Louisiana, and the
dangers involved, French traders were very much attracted toward contraband trade with New Mexico, as well as along the
Louisiana-Texas border.

The extensive French activity within

the latter region is an episode in American history well
investigated by others.

7

It is believed that other Frenchmen

found their way into the New Mexico region also, but the evidence is scarce.

Certainly the founding of St. Louis brought

to the Mississippi Valley numbers of men longing to penetrate
the Spanish Borderlands.

The Mallet expedition had proved the

Missouri-Platte-Arkansas route a more easily traveled highway
than the Red River approach, where the Spanish with their

'

Indian allies were more successful in blocking the path of

7
The many works of Herbert E. Bolton and Issac J.
Cox are of great benefit in relation to this subject.

8
intruders.

8

In view of the fact that throughout this study much
will be made of the role geographical information played in
the formulation of American policy relative to the Southwest,
it should be emphasized that charts and maps from French
sources were most important.

Since the French did, in fact,

explore much of the land also claimed by Spain, and French
cartographers were rather prolific in recording the inferrnation furnished by their fellow countrymen, a brief survey
of French cartography in the Southwest is in order.

Actually,

French cartographers were at work using information acquired
from other explorers long before the French were active in
the Mississippi Valley and the Southwest.
The list of French cartographers is long, but one of
the first whose work played a key role in mapping the Southwest was the celebrated Jean Baptiste Louis Franquelin.

Of

his several maps, the one published in 1688 is of prime
importance.

Franquelin indicated a river of great extent

corning in from the west above the mouth of the Ohio, after

'
8

Issac J. Cox, "Opening of the Santa Fe Trail,"
Missouri Historical Review, XXV (1931), 30. Nasatir, Before
Lewis and Clark. • • , I, 27-28.

pt

9

flowing through the "land of Les Panimaha [Pawnees ] • "9

The

river is named "La Grande Riviere des Missourites, ou
'tt'is. ,,10
.
Emissouri
Platte.

In actual fact the river so named is the

It seems that the Franquelin map with this major

geographical error, although it remained in manuscript form,
became known to numerous map makers in subsequent years; his
representation of the Missouri Valley held sway with cartographers for a long period.
The outstanding work in the field of cartography for
the eighteenth century was by the French and has been extolled
by Carl I. Wheat in his monumental study Mapping the Transmississippi West.

He considers the efforts of the Frenchman

Guillaume Delisle as "towering landmarks along the path of
Western cartographic development."

11

Considering that the

seventeenth century was relatively barren of cartographic
progress with respect to the Southwest, his maps became even
more important.

The general map maker of the day simply

9

carl I. Wheat, The Spanish Entrada to the Louisiana
Purchase, Vol. I of Mapping the Transmississippi West (5 vols.;
San Francisco: The Institute of Historical Cartography, 19571963), 51.
lOibid.
11 L.!_.,
b'd p. 59.

10

exercised his imagination, and his "lack of knowledge, if
fairly reflected, would have left such vast blank areas on

. . . maps "

th ey wou ld h ave b een o f l'1ttle use or 1nteres
.
t . 12

On the Delisle map of 1701, the Missouri River is
indicated in a form relative to its importance.

Farther to

the west, just north and east of the province o.f New Mexico
there is written, "par icy [sic] Commerce avec !es Espagnols;"
this gives the

impr~ssion

that French traders and trappers had

at this very early date, penetrated the Spanish preserve. 13
Delisle's most celebrated map, and the one which was copied
and reprinted throughout the century, was his Carte de la
Louisiane et du Mississippi, published in 1718.

On this map

the Rio Grande is indicated as rising far in the north, just
south of what Delisle labels the Missouri River.

Legends

give evidence that the Spanish had been fording the river
to trade with the Indians, possibly for "yellow iron

14

11
•

Since it is clear the Spaniards were fording the Platte and
not the Missouri a repetition of Franquelin's idea of the
Missouri-Platte basin is evident.

'
12
13

rbid.

I

pp. 34-35.

rbid., p. 56.

14 !_2;_.,
b'd
pp. 66-67.

F
11

A good summary, both descriptive and informative, of
Louisiana as well as the lands farther west, is the Histoire
de la Louisiane by Le Page du Pratz published in Paris in
1758.

These small volumes contain a map which is rather

accurate for lower Louisiana, but as the cartographer traced
his designs farther west, his accuracy declined. 15

The

Missouri River is drawn in a fashion giving the appearance
that its headwaters were near the sources of the Rio Grande.
Taking such indications as being accurate, it is little wonder
that French traders, as well as their Spanish, English and
American counterparts, saw in the Missouri-Platte system a
direct highway connecting Illinois with New Mexico.

Reference

to a modern and accurate map of the region in question would
lead one to suspect that the South Platte was the stream which
probably "became" the Missouri for these early French cartographers.

An accurate delineation of the South Platte, like

that of the Red River of Texas, would have to wait until the
nineteenth century.
With the end of the French and Indian War the Spanish

' thrust eastward to the Mississippi.
borderlands.were suddenly
lS Le Page du Pratz, H1sto1re
.
.
d e 1 a Lou1s1ane
. .
( 3 vo 1 s.;
Paris: 1758). Newberry Library in Chicago has a copy of this
work in their rare book collection. See also Nasatir, Before
Lewis and Clark • • • , I, 56.

p
12

II.

SECTION OF DELISLE MAP OF 1718

Source: Paullin, Charles O., and Wright, John K. Atlas of
the Historical Geoqraphy of the United States. Washington:
Carnegie Institutions and American Geographical Society of New
York, 1932, Plate 24.

p
13
In order to keep Louisiana out of British hands, France, in
a treaty previous to and separate from the Treaty of Paris
of 1763, ceded Louisiana to Spain.

In that treaty the granting

words are:
His Most Christian Majesty cedes in entire
possession, purely and simply, without exception, to his Catholic Majesty and his
successors in perpetuity, all the country
known under the name of Louisiana, as well
as New Orleans and the island in which that
place stands.16
The French threat to Santa Fe thus came to an end,
although rumors of French traders among the Indians continued
to filter into Santa Fe.

The main attention of the officials

in Spanish Louisiana was now focused on the upper reaches of
the Mississippi and Missouri rivers where the British were
becoming more of a threat.

Encroachment from Canada into

Spanish Illinois and Louisiana was not a new problem for
Spain, but the latter part of the eighteenth century saw renewed activity on the part of the British to spread their
economic interest, operating from such towns along the
Mississippi as Natchez.

'

17

Although the British did give the

16 s'
. .
1nger Hermann, Th e Lou1s1ana
Purchase an d Our
Title West of the Rocky Mountains, with a Review of Annexation
by the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1898) I P• 17.
17

Noel M. Loomis and Abraham P. Nasatir, Pedro Vial
and The Roads to Santa Fe (Norman: University of Oklahoma

p
14
Spanish just cause for alarm and did encroach upon the latter's
domain, and though it was believed they might one day seek out
Santa Fe as "compensation of their southern colonies, if they
escaped from them," the threat of the British did not immediately concern the Lower Rocky Mountain region. 18
The transfer of Louisiana to Spain necessitated some
hard thinking about the future administration of New Spain,
especially the frontier region.

Political organization in

northern New Spain during the eighteenth century was closely
linked to frontier defense, military organization, and boundary
expansion.

Indians had been taking advantage of the feeble

presidia! garrisons which could strike no effective retaliatory blows.

To the Indian problems came added threats of

encroachment upon Spanish territory, as indicated above, by
European rivals such as England and France.

The humiliating

defeat which Spain suffered at the hands of the English in
the Seven Years' War prompted the energetic Charles III
(1759-1788) to take a closer look to the unsettled conditions
in his northern borderlands and embark upon a program of re-

'
organizing and strengthening
this region.
Press, 1967), p. 93. A. P. Nasatir has written numerous articles
on the Anglo-Spanish frontier in addition to his lengthy introduction to the collection of documents in his Before Lewis and
Clark •
18

Loomis, Pedro Vial • • • , p. 98.

p
15
The last detailed report of the defense system on the
frontier had been made around 1730, and since that time no
comprehensive inspection had been ordered by the government.
The result was an expected decrease in efficiency.

Accordingly,

· · 1765, the king commissioned the Marques de Rubi "to report
. in
on the status of each presidia, its location, condition of its
garrison, • • • and to make suitable recommendations. 1119

The

Marques de Rubi arrived in Mexico in early 1766 and immediately
set out to complete his review of Spanish frontier defense
from Texas to California.

The report of Rubi was to have far-

reaching consequences for the future development of the northern
frontier.

He was highly critical of existing conditions,

singling out presidia! commanders and accusing them of contributing largely to the poor conditions.

He found the presidios

to be haphazardly scattered across the frontier with no thought
to a co-ordinated defense program, and among his recommendatios
was a proposal to reduce the northern outposts to fifteen along
a line drawn from the coast of the Gulf of California to the
mouth of the Guadalupe River in Texas, following the thirtieth
parallel.

Santa Fe was 'thus being left well outside the defense

cordon as such; Rubi felt the cost of including the town would
19

Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New Mexico
(Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 4.

p
16
.
20
be proh i'b'itive.

He obviously could not leave the town with

no protection so the presidia at Santa Fe was to remain, but
more than ever it would be a lone bastion far to the north
of other points of military strength.
It had been indicated that Spanish officials on the
frontier were continually trying to secure the area against
hostile Indians.

Pacification of the Indian was a major

objective, and the governors in the remote town of Santa Fe
did not have an easy time of it.

It seems that they seldom

had enough soldiers at their command.

Help from Chihuahua

21
.
.
.
.
was o ft en s 1 ow in
coming,
an d t h e t erritory
was immense.

While the Marques de Rubi was inspecting the military
organization of the frontier provinces, Charles III dispatched
a Visitador General to New Spain with authority to make major
reforms in administrative and financial affairs.

Jose de

Galvez, the man appointed by the king, came to New Spain and
by 1776 major political changes had been implemented.

The

entire northern frontier of New Spain was reorganized into
the Provincias Internas.

Long recognizing that Mexfco City

'
20

.
d
. 1 . • • , p. 64 • Simmons,
.
s panis
. h
Loomis,
Pero
Via
Government in New Mexico, pp. 4-8. A more detailed discussion
on this point can be found in Alfred B. Thomas, Teodoro de
Croix (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941).
21 Loomis,
.
d
.
Pero
Vial
• • • , p. 16 •

p
17

could not properly handle the problems of areas so remote,
and due to the multitude of duties and responsibilities of
the viceroy, sweeping reforms were initiated.

New Mexico was

included in the western section of the Provincias Internas.
There was to be a governor in Santa Fe, but he was now directly
under the authority of the Comrnandante-General located in
Chi'h uah ua. 22
It has been pointed out by one historian of the West
that most American explorers of the nineteenth century had
to rediscover the Southwest, as the details of Spanish exploration had been all but forgotten.

23

As indicated earlier,

one of the reasons for this was the policy of the Spanish
government to keep all geographical knowledge of its
territories from the public eye.

Since the early American

explorers did use maps and charts based in large measure on
what cartographers could ultimately extract from Spanish
sources as well as from French cartographers, a brief survey

22

Philip Coolidge Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands:
The Adams-Qnis Treaty o~ 1819 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939), pp. 30, 43-44. For a more developed study
of the work of Jose de Galvez see Herbert I. Priestly, Jose de
Galvez (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1916)
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of Spanish exploration and mapping of the Provincias Internas
. 1 o f th e Americans
.
. or d er. 2 4
before th
.e arriva
would be in
Only a few of the many Spanish expeditions which set
out from Santa Fe are pertinent to future American interest
and advancement.

Foremost among these efforts was the famous

Dominguez-Escalante expedition of 1776.

For a number of years

previous to this date New Mexican traders had traveled from
Santa Fe into present day Colorado and Oklahoma as well as
into the Southern Rockies.

Subsequent Spanish traders deepened

the trail, not only to the north and east, but also the northwest.

As tales of profit and adventure found their way to the

adobe capital more traders set out.
of these treks are unknown.

The particulars of most

The Spanish government had

definite restrictions on trade, and most of the individual
trappers found it better to speak little of their work when
the ears of officials might be too keen.

Most often details

as to their respective areas of operation remained a secret.

25

24

. h'is maJor
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Carl I. wh eat in
wor k a 1 rea d y ci' te d a b ove
has an extensive section,on early Spanish maps and cartographers.
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Joseph J. Hill, "Spanish and Mexican Exploration
and Trade Northwest from New Mexico Into the Great Basin, 17651853," Utah Historical Quarterly, III, No. 1 (January, 1930), 4.
Herbert E. Bolton, "Pageant in the Wilderness: The Story of
The Escalante Expedition to the Interior Basin, 1776." Utah
Historical Quarterly, XVIII (1950), 6-7. David J. Weber,
"Spanish Fur Trade from New Mexico, 1540-1821," The Americas,
XXIV (1967), 126-27.
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At any rate by 1776, most of the region east of the Colorado
River and as far north as the Gunnison was well known to
Spaniards trading out of New Mexico.

Several reasons can

be cited for continued Spanish interest in this region.
continued reports of Frenchmen in the Pawnee country (present
day Kansas and Nebraska) , and rumored mines gave a certain
impetus to trader and government official alike.

Foremost

among the reasons for Spanish forays, however, was the
continued Indian menace.

26

The road westward to the Pacific was blocked by
Indian resistance, namely the Hopi and Apaches.

Because of

the advance of the Russians down the California coast, the
Spanish had colonized Alta California.

This had largely

been done by a water approach around the peninsula of Baja
California.

Officials felt, however, that an overland route

should and must be found, hence the organization of an
expedition under the leadership of two Franciscan Friars-Francisco Athanasio Dominguez and Silvestro Velez de
Escalante.

27

The aim of the expedition was two fold:

to

'

open communication between Santa Fe and Monterrey, California
26
27

.:...,,

Thomas, "Spanish Expeditions into Colorado," p. 289.
Bolton, "Pageant in the Wilderness," p. 1 •
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by way of the land of the Yutes; and, as far as the two

Franciscans were concerned, to find an overland route to the
missions of California.

The expedition was sponsored by the

Governor of New Mexico and was under the military command of
Don Bernardo Mier y Pacheco.

28

The route of the expedition took the party into
territory which had apparently never before been explored by
white men -- deep into the Rockies to the White and Green
rivers and into the Great Basin.

It has been called "the

most fantastic exploring venture of all those the Spanish
conducted in the Southwest."

29

It was the presence of Mier y Pacheco, a retired
captain and resident of Santa Fe, that makes the expedition
pertinent to this study.

Experienced at mapping other

portions of the frontier of northern Mexico, the Spanish
gentleman charted the entire region traversed by the Escalante
party.

It was the first attempt by any European to map the

Ibid., p. 9. ~erbert s. Auerbach, "Father
Escalante's Route," Utah Historical Quarterly, IX (1941), 73.
Hill, "Spanish and Mexican Exploration • • • ,"pp. 7-13.
28

29
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Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire
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p. 69.
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. 30
colora d o Ri. ver Basin.

Unlike other early cartographers he

did not have the work of others to guide him; his map was
based solely upon notes and observations made by him on the
journey.

A quadrant was used for determining latitude, but

it seems that westerly and easterly positions were calculated
by distances traveled and compass observations. 31

Carl I.

Wheat believes that Mier y Pacheco scored many "firsts" on
his great map, especially in his charting of the rivers and
mountains near the Great

B~sin •32 William Goetzmann refers

30

aolton, "Pageant in the Wilderness • • • ," p. 12.
Mier y Pacheco arrived in America in 1743, and went to El
Riso as a soldier; he took part in campaigns against the
Apaches. In 1745 he went east from El Paso with Captain
Ruben de Solf s to map the banks of the Rio Grande and Conchas
rivers. The young soldier arrived in Santa Fe' in 1754, where
he served as alcalde and captain of the frontiers of Galisteo
and Pecos. He subsequently made campaigns against the Comanches on the eastern border of New Mexico and mapped the
regions covered in his forays. A map which Mier y Pacheco
drew in 1760 was sent to the king, who turned it over to
the engineer accompanying the Marques de Rubf to America in
1766.
31

J. Cecil Alter, "Father Escalante's Map," Utah
Historical Quarterly, IX (1941), 64-67.
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Wheat, The Spadish Entrada • • • , I, 115-16. No
map drawn prior to Escalante's tour de force offered even a
fraction of the broad and remarkably accurate coverage the
Mier y Pachecho map did. The river on which Mier placed the
words "puede ser el Misuri" is in reality the south fork of
the Platte, but this notation does indicate that the Spaniards
had some idea that the Missouri rose from what he termed the
spine or backbone of North America, not far n'' ,. th of the
Arkansas River •

...

,
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to the map as a "rather fanciful version of the country ••
1133

Nevertheless this map became the basis of all maps of

the New Mexican region for many years including the more
famous map by Alexander von Humboldt which appeared in 1811.
Authorities seem to feel that von Humboldt must have had
access to the Mier map even though it remained unpublished for
over a century.

34

Pike's map of 1810 and William Clark's

maps of 1810-1814 also give evidence that the Spaniards concepts had not been forgotten.

Specific references to cartog-

raphic errors and geographic misconceptions will be indicated
as they become relevant.

It would be of interest to note here,

however, that no mention is made in the Escalante journal, nor
is there any indication on the accompanying map of English,
French, or American settlements.

No trappers, traders or

explorers of these nations were apparently roaming that part
of the Spanish Southwest.

As observant as the members of the

expedition were in relation to other matters, the absence of
such references leads one to conclude that non-Spanish
intruders were not yet active northwest of Santa Fe as they

'
33 Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire •
34

. .,

p. 69.

Wheat, The Spanish Entrada • • • , p. 96. The use of
Mier's material by Alexander von Humboldt left a stamp on the
representation of the West that was not erased until the time
of Fremont •

....
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were to the east of that Spanish outpost.
commanches on the warpath caused another expedition
to be sent north in 1779.

The Governor of New Mexico, Juan

Bautista de Anza, led the party.

While attempting to quell

the Indian disturbance he recorded some items which throw
more light on geographical information for the period.

35

concerning the Rio Grande he noted,
This river, as is known, empties into the
North Sea [Gulf of Mexico] and the Bay of
Espiritu Santo. It has its source fifteen
leagues in the Sierra de la Grulla . • . .
The Yuta nation accompanying me, who reside at the same source • . • tell me it
proceeds from the interior of a great
swamp, which is formed • • • by the constant melting of the snow on some mountain
peaks that are very near it.36
His small but important map also indicated the headwaters of the Canadian and Arkansas rivers under different
names.

Although Anza cannot be credited with the birth of

the idea, the concept of a central height of land and a
"great central reservoir of snows and fountains" began early
35

Thomas, "Spanish Expeditions Into Colorado," p. 300.
Hill, "Spanish and Mexican Exploration • • • ," pp. 14-15.
Anza led a military force north into the San Luis Valley and
east over the mountains. The purpose was to punish some
Commanches who, under their leader, Cuerno Verde (Greenhorn),
had been murdering Spanish settlers.
36

Ibid.,p. 14.
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and remained in vogue well into the nineteenth century.

37

Even when cartography became more perfected, old myths
continued to hold their own.

This situation was aptly

described by one writer when he asked, "Why is it that the
mind of man is so constituted that when alternatives are
presented he will almost always choose the one that is most
incorrect?

1138

Thus far emphasis has been placed on Spanish activity
radiating from Santa Fe to points largely within the western
Provincias Internas.

Such activity was natural since all

official trade and communication with that frontier capital
had been carried on from Mexico City through Chihuahua,
headquarters of the Commandante-General.

In other words Santa

Fe's only official connection with the outside world was along
what might be termed the Chihuahua Trai1.

39

37
Wheat, The Spanish Entrada • • • , I, 12, 117-119.
This map now in the Archives of the Indies is a small manuscript. It delineates the upper Rio Grande Valley to a point
near 40° north latitude, and east of the mountains bordering
the valley appears the R. de Mora and the Nacim.to del Rio Roxo
-- actually the headwaters of the Canadian. The Arkansas and
Huerfano rivers are also indicated.
38

Henry R. Wagner, The Cartography of the Northwest
Coast of America to the Year 1800 (2 vols.; Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1937), I. 75.
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The situation was abruptly changed in the 1790's
when one Pedro Vial opened new roads from Santa Fe eastward
to San Antonio, Natchitoches and St. Louis.

The third road

he opened in the years 1792 and 1793 was to St. Louis, and
it became the important connection with Santa Fe from the
Mississippi-Missouri region.

It could well be called the

precursor of the later famous Santa Fe Trai1.

40

It was the

speed with which Vial made his third trip that made the
Spanish officials realize Santa Fe was not as far from the
restless Americans as they would prefer.
The Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Louisiana, Zenon
Trudeau, informed the Baron de Carondelet, Governor and
Intendent of Louisiana, that Vial was certain the journey
between St. Louis and Santa Fe could be made in twenty-five
days.

It was only delay by hostile Kansas Indians that made

his initial trip somewhat longer.

41

Three years later

40

1bid., xv-xvi. Pedro Vial, or Pierre Vial, was a
native of Lyons, in the southeast part of central France.
Although it is not too clear it seems that he was on the
Missouri River before the Revolutionary War. He appears
actively on the scene in '1786 as an explorer who was directed
to open a trail from San Antonio to Santa Fe. For about
twenty years Vial traveled around Santa Fe, San Antonio,
Natchitoches and St. Louis, quite a feat considering the hostile
territory he crossed and recrossed.
41 zenon Trudeau to Baron de Carondelet, St. Louis,
October 7, 1792, Louis Houck (ed.), The Spanish Regime in
Missouri (2 vols.; Chicago: R. R. Donnelley and Sons company,
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correspondence between the same two Spanish officials indicated that Vial (according to his own statement) made the
trip from the New Mexican capital to the Panis towns on the
Kansas River in eight days.

Trudeau further stated that

traders from St. Louis had made the journey to those same
villages in about ten days.

42

Bernard de Voto in his work

The Course of Empire is most skeptical of such statistics.
Noting that Vial could not have made his journey from Santa
Fe to St. Louis in less than fifty days, he attributes to
this man a large responsibility of offering further evidence
to the Spanish that Santa Fe was most vulnerable to foreign
.

.

intrusions.

43

1909), I, 351,

Loomis, Pedro Vial . • • , p. 90. Zenon
Trudeau was born in New Orleans in 1748. He was well educated
and became a lieutenant colonel in the Louisiana Regiment.
He was appointed lieutenant-governor of the Upper Louisiana
in 1792, serving until 1799, when he was succeeded by Carlos
du Hault de Lassus. Ibid., p. 68. The Baron de Carondelet
was born in 1748 in Flanders and was a colonel in the Spanish
army and governor of San Salvador when he was appointed to
succeed Estevan Miro as governor and intendent of the provinces
of Louisiana and West Florida in 1791.
42

Trudeau to Car~ndelet, St. Louis, July 4, 1795,
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , I, 329-30.
43 Bernard Devoto, The Course of Empire ( Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 360-61. As late as
1847 the best recorded time from Santa Fe to Independence, Mo.
(250 miles west of St. Louis) was twenty-five days. This was

by forced riding, which Vial would have had neither reason nor

27
Vial drew two maps of his wanderings that are not only
documents of interest for the information they contain, but
also for the fact that they stayed hidden from cartographers
for so long.

His first map dated October 18, 1787, purports

to show the Mississippi watershed and a portion of the Rio
Grande with the intervening territory.
was his charting of the Red River.

Of especial interest

His calculations are

fairly accurate for the region in which this river has its
source.

44

In view of the fact that explorers and cartog-

raphers, European as well as America, confused the sources
of the Red River with those of the Canadian for the next
sixty years, it would be interesting to speculate what effect
accurate information of this area would have had on future
Spanish-American rivalry.

Somewhat of a mystery surrounds

the 1787 map as to how Vial could have traced the Upper
Missouri River as he did, indicating the great bend at the
Mandan villages.

How could this unlettered Frenchman at

equipment and preparation to do. Two months from Independence
to Santa Fe was good traveling time for a wagon train after
the trail was well established and all the watering places
known. Three men on horseback would normally take more time,
not less.
44
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Santa Fe have known of the Mandans?

45

It has been noted that pacification of the Indian
tribes was a major (some say the major) concern of Spanish
officials in the Western provinces.

In the Provincias

Internas the Spanish Government still largely used the mission
system plus military expeditions to handle the problem.

In

Louisiana, however, the Spaniards had adopted the French
policy of sending traders among the various tribes keeping
the natives friendly through trade and gifts.

Although the

Louisiana story as such does not concern the subject under
study, mention must be made of the Missouri Company.

This

company and the many men connected with its various enterprizes continued to operate when the United States purchased
the Louisiana Territory in 1803.

St. Louis, the headquarters

for the company under the Spanish, was also the major entrep~t
for the Americans.

Because of its position relative to trade

and defense St. Louis gained for itself a monopoly of all
important activity between the Mississippi-Missouri basin and
the Rocky Mountains.

Hiram Chittenden states, "it is doubtful

'
if history ·affords the example
of another city which has been
45

Ibid., pp. 127-128. It was not until 1854 that the
Red River's course was charted in detail, even though it was
known after Major Long's exi;edition in 1820 that the Red and
Canadian were different streams.
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the exclusive mart for so vast an extent of country ••

,,46

The Missouri Company was a response to British
competition on the Upper Missouri as well as a defense against
further Anglo encroachment.

Even before official sanction

was received the merchants of St. Louis led by one Jacques
clamorgan, organized the Compagnie de Commerce pour la
oecouverte des Nations du haut de Missouri, May 12, 1794. 47
The merchants later obtained the right to exclusive trade
for ten years with the nations on the Missouri River living
above the Poncas, who were located along the present day
Nebraska-South Dakota border.

Of those men who originally

took part in the Company's activities, the names of Clamorgan,
Charles Sanguinet, Laurent Durocher and Regis Loisel seem most
prominent, and continued to be so when the Americans acquired
the Louisiana Territory and began to look in earnest towards
the Pacific.
The driving force of the Company in its early years
was Jacques Clamorgan.

His personal motives are not always

clear, though it is certain the chance to get rich helped

'
46
47
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H. T. Beauregard (trans.), "Journal of Jean Baptiste
Trudeau Among the Arikara Indians in 1795," Missouri Historical
Society Collections, IV (1912), 9.
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drive him on.

Regardless, he did have the confidence of

Governor Carondelet, and managed to combine commercial and
political activities for the betterment of the Spanish Empire.
In addition to opening trade with the Indians and ousting the
British from Spanish territory, the Company was to attempt to
discover a route to the Pacific, joining the Missouri with
.
48
Mexico an d Ca l 1' f ornia.

It will be remembered that a common

belief of the day was that the Missouri River had its source
a little to the north of the source of the Rio Grande.

Such

an effort as planned by Clamorgan would only help to defend
"rich" Santa Fe from British and American intruders.
In the 1790's the Company sent out three important
expeditions, the first being under the leadership of an

.

ex-sc h oo 1 master Jean Bap t iste Truteau.

49

This expedition

48

A. P. Nasatir, "Jacques Clamorgan: Colonial Promoter of the Northern Border of New Spain," New Mexico
Historical Review, XVII (April, 1942), 106-07. Of his early
life little is known; he emerges into history as a merchant
in the West Indies. As early as 1780 he became associated
with Thompson and Company of Kingston, Jamaica, probably in
the slave trade between that island and New Orleans. He was
back in Spanish Louisiana by 1783, and in the latter part of
that year, or very early' in 1784, he ascended to Upper
Louisiana. Clamorgan himself tells us in 1793 that he had
been a resident of Illinois for more than ten years. Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • . . , I, 83. Annie Heloise Abel
(ed.), Tabeau's Narrative of Loisel's Expedition to the Upper
Missouri, translated from the French by Rose Abel Wright
(Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), p. 19.
49
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Beauregard, "Journal of Jean Baptiste
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set out for the Mandan villages high on the Missouri River
at the "great bend" located today in the state of North
Dakota.

Truteau was given ample authority for the regulation

of trade, and was instructed to obtain information concerning
the distance to the Rocky Mountains "which were located to the
.

. ,,50

West o f t h e Source o f t h e Missouri.

Another order, which

was curiously struck out by Carondelet, instructed Truteau
to determine the distance from the Mandan villages to the
Spanish settlements of New Mexico.

51

In actuality Truteau did

not ascend the Missouri much above the Arikara villages
located to the south of the Mandans, but he did manage to
secure a great deal of valuable geographical information.

He

seems to have learned that the Comanches roamed the banks of
the Platte River and south toward the Arkansas.

52

Trudeau • • • ," Truteau was born at Montreal, December 11, 1748.
From the profession he afterwards adopted, it is to be inferred
that he received more schooling than was usual in those days.
He came to St, Louis in 1774, and was the first school master
of the village. He did not find teaching a lucrative business,
and when his needs began to be exigent, he replenished his
finances by a trading trip to the Indians. The spelling of
the name varies between "Trudeau" and "Truteau." The latter
spelling is used in this text.
50
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Ibid.

rbid., p. 91. Beauregard, "Journal of Jean Baptiste
Trudeau. • • • , " pp. 32-33.

32

The second expedition of the Missouri Company in
1795, early got into trouble with the Ponca Indians.

53

Later

in the same year, not being able to find a native Spaniard
capable for the job, a Scotsman turned Spanish citizen led
an expedition up the Missouri.

James Mackay, accompanied by

thirty-three men, set out from St. Louis in August.

The object

of the expedition was to "open commerce with those distant and
unknown Nations in the upper parts of the Missouri and to
discover all the unknown parts of his Catholic Majesty's
Dominions • • • as far as the Pacific Ocean."

54

Mackay himself

was unable to complete ti1e journey, but he sent his assistant,
John Evans, overland to the Mandans.

Mackay's instructions

to Evans were more imaginative than those of previous Spanish
explorers and were the prototype for the instructions Thomas
Jefferson later issued to Lewis and Clark.

On January 28,

1796, Mackay issued his lengthy instructions to Evans.

The

latter was to cross the continent in order to discover a
passage from the source of the Missouri to the Pacific Ocean.
He was to keep a daily journal making notations on latitude_

'
Furthermore
he was to "take care to mark down

and longitude.

53
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[his] route and distance each day. 1155
Claiming all the land he traversed for King Charles
III of Spain, Evans set out but got no farther than the
Mandan villages.

Mackay did keep a journal and submitted it

to authorities in Louisiana.

This journal was later sent to

the mother country, and in light of what has been mentioned
relative to geographical concepts and American interest in
the Southwest, it would be advantageous to quote from the
letter accompanying the journal.
The relation of Mackay confirms the previous information of the introduction of the
English from Canada into the domains of the
King, both among the Mandan tribe who are
located on the south shore of the Missouri
River • • • and on the Chato River [South
Platte] which flows into New Mexico, to the
point where they have erected a blockhouse,
in order to assure their clandestine trade
with our Indian tribes, and perhaps even,
with the natives of Santa Fe. The letter
written to me by the Commandant of the Post
of Natchitoches, . . • agrees with the relation of Mackay. In respect to the fact
that, notwithstanding that the said letter
attributes to the Americans the construction of the blockhouse above mentioned, it
is a fact that the latter have not allowed
themselves to be seen as yet on the Missouri
and its neighborhood.56
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.

55 A. p. Nasatir I "John Evans I Explorer and Surveyor,"
Missouri Historical Review, XXV (1931), 228-29.

56 aaron de Carondelet to Prince of Peace, June 3, 1796,
........____ Printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • . • , I, 354-55 •
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The Spanish from New Mexico had explored northwest
and northeast from Santa Fe, and had coursed the Missouri
from St. Louis at least as far as the Mandans, but by the
end of the eighteenth century most of Louisiana north of the
Red River was still a vast unknown and uncharted haunt for
Indians and buffaloes.

The few clusters of settlements, such

as St. Louis, and Natchez, clung to the banks of the
Mississippi.

Except for an occasional river settlement, the

character of Upper Louisiana to the Rocky Mountains had
changed little since the first French and Spanish explorers
prodded their ways during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.

57

New forces, however, were brewing.

Americans

along the eastern banks of the Mississippi were anxiously
looking toward the West.

Some were not just looking, but

were already penetrating the Spanish Borderlands.
By the close of the War for Independence Americans
had become firmly established on the east side of the
Mississippi River.

What had been a possible threat to Spain

before now became more of a reality.

The eight years of the

'
war had given fresh impulse
to the expansive tendencies of
57 Arthur Preston Whitaker,
.
. . . . Ques t 'ion,
Th e Mississippi
1795-1803: A Study in Trade, Politics, and Diplomacv
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1962), p. 36.
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the Anglo-Americans.

One need only to look at the events

of the Confederation and Early National periods for conclusive
evidence of a definite westward movement.

All the events

surrounding the negotiation of the Jay and Pinckney treaties
in the 1790's, especially the latter treaty, are indicative
of the expansive nature of the young Republic.

The intrigues

involving Citizen Ge~t and George Rogers Clark, as well as
the machinations of James Wilkinson, which will be investigated later, clearly indicate that the frontiersman was (at
least to some extent) turning a deaf ear to the advice of
America's first Chief Executive.

In his Farewell Address

George Washington, after discussing the events of the preceding years relative to the so-called Mississippi Question,
expressed the hope that the frontiersman would in the future
be deaf "to those advisers, if such there are, who would sever
them from their brethern and connect them with aliens.

1158

It has been said that the economic system and social
ideals that carried the English colonists from the Atlantic
coast across the mountains into the Mississippi Valley emerged

'
58 James D. Richardson,
.
.
A Comoi· 1 ation
o f t h e !-iessa9es
and Papers of the Presidents (10 vols.; Washington: Bureau
of National Literature, 1897-1907), I, 217.
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with undiminished vigor from the Revolution.

59

The treaty

which brought the war to a close was silent on factors vital
to the two powers now facing each other.

Most historians,

however, see American advancement and Spanish retreat as
inevitable, a mere process of destiny, no matter what treaties
would have been signed or arrangements made.

Some Spaniards

were also fatalistic about their nation's future in America.
Manuel de Godoy, the Prince of Peace, is reported to have
said in relation to Louisiana, "no es posible poner puertas
al campo."

(You can't lock up an open field).

60

Whether

one accepts the fatalistic concept or not, there is little
doubt that Spain had just cause to look with great alarm at
her advancing neighbor.
The statement that the Mississippi had now become
the "frontier between the conservative and bigoted of monarchies, and the youngest of republics, 1161 is perhaps an
historical view too prejudiced to be valid.

It is indicative,

however, of the mind-set of many Americans during the period

Arthur Preston' Whitaker, The Spanish-American
Frontier: 1783-1795 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1927)' p. 4.
59
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under discussion.

Traders, trappers, explorers and many

.American government officials seldom held Spain in high
regard.
Within the last decade of the eighteenth century a
little known official American attempt to learn what lay
beyond the river took place.

The effort was secret and did

not succeed, but it did result in two manuscript maps which
were to prove useful at a later date.

In December 1789,

Secretary of War Henry Knox wrote to General Josiah Harmar at
Fort Washington, a post recently constructed at the mouth of
the Little Miami River, instructing him to
Devise some practicable plan for exploring the branch of the Mississippi
called the Messouri [sic] , up to its
source and all its southern branches,
and tracing particularly the distance
between the said branches and any of
the navigable streams that run into the
Great North River which empties itself
into the gulf [sic] of Mexico.62
Before this letter could reach its destination the
Secretary dispatched another indicating that the party

'
62 colton Storm, "Lieutenant Armstrong's Expedition to
the Missouri River, 1790," Mid-America: An Historical
Quarterly, XXV (N.s. Vol. XIV), (1943), 180. This seems to
be the only study of the Armstrong expedition.
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selected for this assignment should "be habited like indians
in all respects, and on no pretence whatever, discover any
connection with the troops

,.63

General Harmar subse-

quently ordered Lieutenant John Armstrong to undertake the
journey.

Doubt as to the practicality or advisability of

such a venture was present from the outset.

Armstrong was

carefully instructed to get the approval of Arthur St. Clair,
Governor of the Northwest Territory, before proceeding upon
his mission.

General Harmar thought the proposal too

"adventurous."

64

In yet another letter to the Secretary of War, Harmar
expressed fear it was a "very difficult dangerous undertaking. 1165

Cognizant of the caution felt by his commander,

Armstrong left the Rapids of the Ohio on February 27, 1790, to
undertake his assignment.

Governor St. Clair, faced with

serious Indian problems, could be expected to be equally
cautious about such an enterprise as was General Harmar.

63

On

Ibid., p. 181.,

64

Harmar to Armstrong, Ft. Washington, February 20,
1790, ibid.
65

Harmar to Secretary of War Knox, Ft. Washington,
February 20, 1790, ibid., p. 182.
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May 1, 1790, St. Clair wrote to Secretary Knox,
It is, sir, I believe at present, altogether impracticable. It is a point
on which some people are feeling alive
all over, and all their jealousy awake.
Indians to be confided in, there are none:
and if there were, those who would be most
proper, and others, are now at war; • • • 66
A similar note to General Harmar was penned the following
day.

67
In light of President Jefferson's moves at a later

date, and in view of the character of the Lewis and Clark
expedition, it would be of interest to quote from a portion
of Lieutenant Armstrong's official Report dated June 2, 1790.
Having communicated to the Governor of
the Western Territory the business on
which I was detached after exercising
his mind on the occasion he observed it
was not only a difficult task, but one
that in his opinion could be executed
in the character of a trader onlv [italics mine] and even in that there is difficulty, as there are by Government
[Spanish] fixed Posts for Traders to assemble at and a certain quaintity [sic]
of goods permited to go to each Post.
The Spanish co~endent [sic] knows the

66

st. Clair to Secretary of War Knox, May 1, 1790,

~-, p. 184.

67

5 t. Clair to General Harmar, May 2, 1790, ibid.

40

quaintity [sic] of Firs [sic] that country produces yearly, and the quaintity
of Goods necessary for the Natives -- •
I have no doubt but in a Tour of eightteen months or two years the necessary
information might be obtained, • • • 68
Lt. Armstrong returned to the Ohio country from St.
Louis.

In that city he had traced a pencil sketch of the

western half of a 1750 map of French origin.

On this map the

.Missouri River is shown coming down from the northwest passing
the Panis villages which were actually to the west of the
Missouri along the Kansas River.

The Rio Grande is curiously

extended, rising near the Padouca villages of the Upper
Missouri.

Carl Wheat feels that Armstrong's tracing was

"undoubtedly the first map including any part of the Transmississippi West secured on-the-spot (so to speak) by an
.
69
official of the United States."

Apparently the Armstrong expedition was the only
official attempt made by the United States Government before
the opening of the nineteenth century to see what lay beyond
the Mississippi River.

Individual Americans, however, were

'
68

Armstrong's Report, Ft. Washington, June 2, 1790,
~-·pp. 184-85.
69

Wheat, The Spanish Entrada • • . , I, 150.
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far from inactive in their desire to learn more about the
roads West, be they to the Pacific or Mexico.

Motives varied

and much of the lure of the West was tied up with events
surrounding the whole Mississippi Question.
International tensions in the 1790's threatened to
embroil the United States in war, and our first Secretary of
state, Thomas Jefferson, had the difficult task of steering a
safe course for the new Republic.

As Dumas Malone points

out, "no one was more convinced than he that his country
required peace and time to grow in.

He had no thought of

letting it be hitched to the war chariot of any other nation. 1170
With respect to the Spanish, however, Jefferson, at times, gave
the appearance of moving contrary to his peaceful intentions.
It is during this period of controversy over American rights
to the Mississippi that Jefferson displayed an attitude toward
Spain that was typical of his dealings with that country
throughout his public career.

Moving cautiously and weighing

every word when dealing with the French or English he was
seldom hesitant to sound bellicose when addressing the Spanish.

'
70

oumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty,
Vol. III of Jefferson and His Time (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1962), p. 63.
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It seems clear Jefferson always considered Spain a waning
power that could be challenged with little danger, provided she was not allied with one of the major powers of
Europe.

More will be made of this idea later.

For the

moment the year 1793 affords an excellent opportunity to view
Jefferson's moves in relation to Spain, and to obtain an early
glimpse of his interest in exploring the land west of the
Mississippi River, an interest which became more intense
as the years progressed.
Thomas Jefferson as a member of the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, like his fellow members,
was deeply interested in the Western wilderness.

Acting in the

capacity of a member of the organization (not as Secretary of
State) he helped organize an expedition to explore Louisiana
in April, 1793.

71

The expedition was to be under the direction

of the French scientist (botanist) Andre Michaux, who had been
in America some nine years and had already made scientific
journeys from Florida to Canada.

71
72

72

Unfortunately for the

'
.
Devoto, The Course of Empire, p. 344.

rbid., p. 345. A talented botanist, Michaux had
been a resident of the United States for nine years and of
South Carolina for seven. He had made wilderness journeys
in the Blue Ridge and Great Smoky Mountains and the Florida
swamps. In 1792, entering another wilderness, he had followed
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scientific and geographical advantages this expedition may have
given the world, the proposed journey became involved with the
web of espionage being spun by that impetuous Frenchman,
Edmond Genet, and the whole project was aborted.
When Gen~t reached Philadelphia and found a fellow
countryman who, in the confidence of high American officials,
was about to enter the region where plans were already well
underway to "liberate" the Spanish possessions west of the
Mississippi, he could not let such a golden opportunity be lost.
By the latter part of June Michaux had been selected by Getiet
to be a French agent in the West.
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On July 12, 1793, Genet

wrote to his American partner George Rogers Clark
It is time that the citizens of Louisiana,
the descendants of France, enjoy the
blessings of liberty, • • • It is
to you General that this honorable
mission is confided, you will cover
yourself with glory and will merit
the thanks of the great number of
people you will have delivered from

his botanical specialties through northeastern Canada to the
vicinity of Hudson Bay. , Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of
Liberty, p. 104. He was a French botanist who had been sent
to America by the royal government years earlier (1785) on
an exploring expedition with a view to the introduction into
France of American trees, shrubs and plants.
73

Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, p. 104.
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Tyranny • • • . Citizen Michaux will
be commissioned as agent for the
French Republic for the administrative part of this affair. He is a
prudent man, reliable, active, intelligent and a friend of Liberty and
Equality.74
Meanwhile Gen~t tried to persuade Jefferson to appoint
Michaux as a consul in Kentucky, but to no avail.

The most

he could obtain from the Secretary of State was a letter of
introduction for Michaux to Governor Issac Shelby of Kentucky.
Jefferson further warned Genet that enticing officers and
soldiers from Kentucky to war on Spain was actually putting
a rope around their necks, for they would certainly be hung if
they commenced hostilities against any nation with which we
were at peace.

75

Such warnings did little to deter the

Frenchman.
Michaux set out for the West on July 15, 1793; he
eventually reached Kaskaskia but got no farther.

The details

74

Gen~t to Clark, Philadelphia, July 12, 1793,
"Correspondence of Clark and Genet," American Historical
Association, Annual Repdrt, 1896 (Washington, 1898), I, 986.
These documents are selections from the Draper Collection in
the possession of the Wisconsin State Historical Society.
75 b'd
I i . , p .984
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"

of the whole Genet-Clark effort do not concern this study,
but the original instructions to Michaux, when his journey
had the character of a scientific endeavor, are of importance.
According to Jefferson's instructions Michaux was to
find the shortest and most convenient
route of communication between the United
States and the Pacific Ocean, within the
temperate latitudes • . • • The Missouri,
so far as it extends, presents itself under circumstances of unquestioned preference. It has, therefore, been declared as
a fundamental object of the subscription
(not to be dispensed with) that this river
shall be considered and explored as a part
of the communication sought for.76
When Michaux reached the Missouri he was to "pursue such of
the largest [tributaries] as shall lead by the shortest way
and the lowest latitudes to the Pacific ocean. 1177 Success of
course depended upon the reaction of the Spanish.
In analyzing these instructions Bernard DeVoto notes
that in the thinking of Jefferson as well as his fellow
scientists, two problems remain that are unchanged since the
discovery of the Missouri.

'
76

Paul Leicester Ford (ed.), The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (10 vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 18971899), VII, 208-12.
77

Ibid.
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The possibility that the height of land
may be wide or may consist of difficult
mountain ranges is not imagined, and the
Atlantic and Pacific watersheds are
assumed actually to interlock.78
Thus we have Jefferson, a full decade before the
purchase of Louisiana desiring to learn about territory which
lay well within the domain of Spain.

The nineteenth century

arrived, however, with no real American penetration or
encroachment (depending on one's viewpoint) into the Spanish
Southwest.

No doubt individual American trappers and traders

had already penetrated the vast territory of the Spanish
Borderlands, just as their French counterparts had done at an
earlier date.

They did not represent "official" America,

however, and historical evidence of their deeds remains scarce.
As the year 1800 approached two "empires" faced each
other across the Mississippi: one determined to prevent encroachment upon its domain, the other looking with longing eyes
toward the Pacific.

Spain had the very difficult task of

defending such a long frontier -- perhaps an impossible task.
Spanish ministers sensed the danger of the situation and tried
to shape their policy accordingly.

78

They turned deaf ears to

DeVoto, The Course of Empire, p. 348.
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French assurances that the "bucolic Americans would never be
dangerous neighbors.

1179

If the idea that His Catholic Hajesty

considered Louisiana as a barrier to his more precious
possessions of New Spain is accepted, it would seem that
Spain's immediate concern for the former territory rather than
New Mexico was well founded.
from all sources.

Constant warnings were coming

For example, the Bishop of Louisiana

reported in 1799 that emigration from the western part of
America was bringing a "mob of adventurers • . • who know not
80
. .
God or re 1 igion. "

He further reported that these "adven-

turers" had spread throughout the territory and into Texas.
"They are furnishing their hunters and Indians with arms; they
hold conversations • • • in accord with their restless and
ambitious character,

• saying [to their listeners] , 'You

eil [sic] go to Mexico•. 1181

It has already been noted that

Baron Carondelet, Governor of Louisiana, warned his home

79 h' k
. h -American
.
.
9
W ita er, Spanis
Frontier
••. , p ••
.
to Antonio
Corue 1 , s an
Lorenzo, November 13, 1799, printed in James Alexander
Robertson (ed.), Louisiana Under the Rule of Spain, France,
and the United States, 1785-1807 (2 vols.; Cleveland: The
Arthur H. Clark Company, 1911), I, 355.
80 Jose, Antonio
.
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government of the danger of the approaching Americans.

He

feared the intruders would not stop at the Mississippi or
Missouri.
On the other hand, if the Spanish had such a fantastic
fear of military action against Santa Fe as most historians
indicate, their lack of immediate plans to defend that region
seems questionable.

True there was a cordon of military posts

from Texas to Alta California, but it will be recalled that
Santa Fe remained outside this line of defense.

Perhaps the

Spanish figured they could halt any American advance before
it reached the Lower Rocky Mountains.

When one considers the

size of the military contingents the Spanish maintained, and
the fact that foreign traders had slipped into the environs
of Santa Fe for years, such a hope seems ill founded.
Foreign economic infiltration would no doubt have been
impossible to shut out completely.

Efforts to eliminate illicit

trade obviously had not succeeded.

Spain had to act.

Americans were at the gate to the "open field."
whole West was fair game.

The

To many the

Fur bearing animals were waiting

' of wild horses were there to be
to be trapped; vast herds
tamed -- and horses were negotiable.
Fe was rising in the distance.

And, of course, Santa

The major question is:

did

Santa Fe and the Lower Rocky Mountain region have the lure
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for the United States Government as it did for individual
adventurous trader and trapper?

Were the riches which Santa

Fe supposedly guarded the primary objective of all Americans
who went West and South?

In 1800 the people of the United

states elected to the office of President the man Bernard

1182
· ·
oeVoto h as ca 11 e d our "f"irs t geopo l"1t1c1an.

To many

historians the election of Thomas Jefferson ushered in the
period of imperial rivalry between Spain and the United States
for the Southwest.

'
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DeVoto, The Course of Empire, p. 411.

CHAPTER II
LOUISIANA:

AMERICA EXPLORES ITS PURCHASE

Whereas by the article of the third of
the treaty concluded at St. Ildefonso the
9th Vendemiaire, an 9 (October 1, 1800)
between the First Consul of the French
Republic and His Catholic Majesty, it
was agreed as follows: His Catholic
Majesty promises and engages on his part,
to cede to the French Republic, • • •
the colony or province of Louisiana, with
the same extent that it now has in the hands
of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after
the treaties subsequently entered into
between Spain and other States. And, whereas, in pursuance of the treaty, and particularly the third article, the French
Republic has an incontestable title to the
domain • • • • The First Consul of the French
Republic desiring to give to the United States
a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede to the United States, in the name
of the French Republic, forever and in
full sovereignty, the said territory, ••
•1
The above passage is from the treaty which signifi-

' of American history.
cantly altered the course
1

It was a

charles w. Eliot (ed.), American Historical Documents, 1000-1904 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910), p. 268.
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treaty which had particular importance for the course of
westward expansion.

The Louisiana Purchase, considered by

many to be the crowning achievement of the Jeffersonian
administration, was accomplished within a few years after
our third President assumed office.

An event of such magni-

tude did not come about overnight, however, and the background to this acquisition is detailed and comf>lex.

As

several historians have so aptly pointed out, the Louisiana
Purchase was the result of an attempt to settle America's
domestic tensions as well as finding solutions to vexing
foreign problems.

2

When Thomas.Jefferson began his term as President in
March, 1801, any thoughts he might have had relative to the
vast Louisiana territory would have been considered in light
of that territory being under the flag of Spain.
ceded Louisiana to Spain in 1762.

Jefferson considered Spain

a weak power and had no cause for immediate alarm.
2

France had

Unknown

Martin Borden, Parties and Politics In the Early
·Republic (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), pp.
67-74. Marshall Smelsen, The Democratic Republic 1801-1815
(New York: ·Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), pp. 83-103. A
full account of the Louisiana Purchase may be found in E.
Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804 (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1934). An excellent account of
the effect of the Louisiana Purchase on the western problem
Of the United States can be found in Whitaker, The Mississippi
Question • • ••

~
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to him at the moment, however, was the fact that on October
1, 1800, under pressure from Napoleon, the Spanish monarch
had retroceded the Louisiana territory to France by the treaty
of San Ildefonso.

French possession of Louisiana made the

entire situation more pressing for America.

The united States

had agreements with Spain concerning the use of the Mississippi River and the right of deposit at New Orleans since 1795.
How were these agreements to be affected by the transfer to
France?

Spain was obviously less than a potent force on our

western border.

France would be quite a different story.

No

one more than the President knew what the change of severeignty meant to the United States.

Reliable but unofficial

news of the transfer began to reach Washington, D.C. in May,
1801.
Considering the strategic location of New Orleans and
the tense European situation Jefferson could only wish that
Spain would hold on until the United States was in a better
position to bargain for Louisiana or possibly take over.
Retrocession to France altered the situation substantially.
The presenc~ of French t~oops at New Orleans foretold trouble.
Jefferson expressed his reaction quite vividly in the often
quoted passage from his letter to James Monroe following the
latter's appointment as plenipotentiary to France, --

L
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If we cannot by a purchase of the country
insure to ourselves a course of perpetual
peace and friendship with all nations, then
as war cannot be distant, it behooves us
immediately to be preparing for that course,
without, however hastening it, and may be
necessary (on your failure on the continent)
to cross the channel.3

An

alliance with England was certainly not Jefferson's fondest

desire, but pragmatic decisions were sometimes necessary, and
he was not reluctant to make them.

Then in October, 1802, the

Spanish officials at New Orleans forced the President's hand
by suspending the privilege of deposit.

As Bernard Devoto has

so tersely remarked, Jefferson would not "become the prisoner
of events. "

4

He acted.

As to the details surrounding the Purchase, more will
be said later.

It is of more immediate concern to examine the

extent of knowledge and general concepts respecting Louisiana
at the time Jefferson took over the reins of government and

3

Jefferson to Monroe, January 13, 1803, Ford, The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 419. This is only one such
statement which shows Jefferson's realist or pragmatic approach
to diplomacy. One may'also cite the often quoted statement
of Jefferson to Robert Livingston in April, 1802: "The day
that France takes possession of N. Orleans • • • we must marry
ourselves to the British fleet and nation." See Ford, VIII,
145.
4

Devoto, The Course of Empire • • • , p. 393.
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was faced with the problems mentioned above.

These ideas had

a direct bearing on the Purchase negotiations as well as subsequent government policy and plans relative to the more
western reaches of the newly-acquired territory.

As indicated

earlier, Jefferson had been interested in the Transmississippi
region for quite some time, and had gathered to his library
all the books, maps, charts and miscellaneous information he
could acquire.

While in Europe he had purchased everything

he could lay his hands on concerning America.

By his own

admission he had "a pretty full collection of English, French
and Spanish authors on the subject of Louisiana."

5

Neverthe-

less, factual knowledge of what lay beyond the Mandan villages
on the Upper Missouri, the true location of the headwaters of
that river, the Platte, Arkansas and Red rivers, or the tribes
and actual number of Indians roaming the Plains, were facts
still largely hidden from the minds of official America.
Information forthcoming from the Michaux and Armstrong
efforts added little to what was already "known" about the
Southwest.

The journals and sketches of Evans and Mackay

'

would be furnished to Lewis and Clark at a later date, but

5

Jefferson to William Dunbar, March 13, 1804, H. A.
Washington (ed.) , The Writings of Thomas Jefferson ( 9 vols.;
Washington: Taylor and Maury, 1854), IV, 540.
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even these bits of information were vague when one looked
westward past the waters of the lower Missouri.

It was still

generally believed that the Missouri took its rise in the
"Stony Mountains" from which location it would be relatively
easy to descent to New Mexico.

The Missouri thus constituted

a highway between St. Louis and Santa Fe.

6

Such a concept

struck fear in the minds of the Spanish to the same extent it
must have kindled hope in the minds of American traders,
trappers and fortune-seekers.

Therefore, when Thomas Jeffer-

son began contemplating the Lewis and Clark expedition the
whole Southwest remained much of a terra incognita, although
it had witnessed "almost unbelievable feats of discovery by
small parties of clanking Spanish knights and zealous hardbitten missionaries, 117 not to mention traders and trappers,
for over three centuries.

In a real sense William Goetzmann

is correct when he speaks of Anglo-American exploration in the
Southwest as a "Rediscovery. 118
Whether or not the determination to send an exploring
party overland to the Columbia was fully matured in

'
6

See Chapter I.

7
Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire • • • , p. 37.
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Jefferson's mind when he entered the office of President is
a question subject to some historical debate; the fact does
remain that his message to Congress asking for funds for
such an expedition was presented less than a week after the
letter he penned to Monroe cited above.

It was in July, 1802,

that Jefferson asked Meriwether Lewis, his private secretary,
to lead the expedition, and on January 18, 1803, he secretly
asked Congress for an appropriation of $2,500 to further the
cultural and scientific knowledge of the Missouri.

9

Meanwhile Jefferson sounded out the Spanish on their
possible reaction to such a venture.

Jefferson knew, as did

the Spaniards, that American territory stopped at the Mississippi.

Spanish reaction to the proposed expedition can be

seen in a letter from Carlos Martinez de Yrujo, the Spanish
Minister to the United States, to his superior in Madrid, Don
Pedro Cevallos, dated December 2, 1802,
The President asked me the other day in a
frank and confident tone, if our Court would
take it badly, that the Congress decree the
formation of a group of travelers, who would

'
9 confidential Message on Expedition to the Pacific,
January 18, 1803, Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII,
192-201.
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form a small caravan and go and
explore the course of the Missouri
River in which they would nominally
have the objective of investigating
everything which might contribute
to the progress of commerce; but
that in reality it would have no other
view than the advancement of the geography. He said they would give it the
denomination of mercantile, inasmuch
as only in this way would the Congress
have the power of voting the necessary
funds; it not being possible to appropriate funds for a society, or a
purely literary expedition, . • •
I replied • • • that I persuaded myself that an expedition of this nature
could not fail to give umbrage to our
Government. [Italics mine]lO
Jefferson explained to the Spanish envoy that he
could not understand the concern of His Catholic Majesty's
Government that any such expedition could pose a danger to
the interests of Spain since the object would be an examination of territory found between 40° and 60° north latitude
to ascertain a continuous communication to the Pacific.

To

this Yrujo, exhibiting geographic knowledge beyond his actual
ability to know at that moment, remarked that the question of
a continuous communication was a point already determined by

'

fruitless attempts made with this objective by the Jesuits

lO YrUJO
. to Ceval 1 os, Was h'ington, Dece mb er 2 , 1802 ,
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 712.
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in Northern California, "as by surveys later made by the
captains cook, Maurelle, Martinez, Vancouver and Cuadra."

11

All their examinations proved there "does not exist this
passage of the Northwest.

1112

An interesting characterization of Jefferson is made
by Yrujo.

This Spanish diplomat, who was apparently on inti-

mate terms with the President and helped stock Jefferson's
wine cellar with fine wines and champagne, officially found
him to be "very speculative and a lover of glory. 1113

Yrujo

noted Jefferson might attempt to perpetuate
the frame of his administration not only
by the measure of frugality and economy
which characteriz.e him, but also by discovering or attempting at least to discover the way by which Americans may some
day extend their population and their
influence up to the coasts of the South
Sea.14

11
12

Ibid.
Ibid.

13 .
'
Yrujo to Jefferson,
February 9, 1801, March 18, 1801,
November 20, 1802, December 30, 1802, Jefferson Papers MSS,
Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo.
14

Yrujo to Cevallos, Washington, December 2, 1802,
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 737-40.
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Hoping against hope Yrujo expressed doubt that the
congress would approve the President's request.

15

Congress

did approve the expedition, and by June, 1803, Meriwether
Lewis had his official instructions.

Meanwhile, the diplo-

matic scene had changed greatly with the purchase of
Louisiana; Jefferson would now have more reason than ever to
pursue his desire to explore what lay beyond the Mississippi
River.

The details leading up to the Purchase and Napoleon's

true reasons for selling Louisiana have been discussed in
numerous works on the subject and are not of prime concern
here.

In light of the Spanish fear of American advancement

into the Southwest and the actual American desire to explore
the region, the immediate reaction of Spain to the purchase
and subsequent American activity do need examination.
Slowness of communication played a key factor relevant
to Spanish reaction concerning the Louisiana question.

News

of the retrocession to France had hardly reached Spanish
authorities on this side of the Atlantic when the sale of
that land to the United States also became known to them.

A

'
15

Yrujo to Cevallos, January 31, 1803, printed in
Donald Jackson (ed.), Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition
With Related Documents, 1783-1854 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 14-15.
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fear had now become a reality.

For the United States the

early months of 1803 proved to be tense.

Spanish garrisons

still occupied New Orleans, and the "right of deposit"
question was as yet unsettled.

In fact, President Jefferson

had initiated measures to alert American troops along the
Mississippi in the event relations with Spain worsened. 16

Even

a cursory examination of the documents would clearly indicate
that Spain did not take the sale of Louisiana to America
lightly.

Whether her reluctance to accept a fait accompli

was a move to "save face," delay the inevitable, or truly prevent the transaction is now a matter of academic debate.

To

those officials involved at the time, however, the probability
of trouble seemed quite real.

Secretary of State James

Madison was polite but firm in his correspondence with Spanish
officials.

Charles Pinckney, our Minister at Madrid, was

likewise directed to present our response to that nation's
protestations in a most straightforward manner.

Pinckney was

to indicate the "absolute determination of the United States
to maintain their right, with the propriety of avoiding

'
16

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, March 7, 1803,
National Archives, Records of the Office of the Secretary of
War, Record Group 107, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War
Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889 (Microcopy 6), Roll.l.
Future references will be cited as WD. Letters Sent-Military
Affairs.
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17
' d menace an d unnecessary irritation.
'
'
'
n
undigni' f ie

T o f ur th er

emphasize the position of the United States, Madison proposed
to question -- What is it that Spain dreads?

She dreads, it is presumed, the growing
power of this country, and the direction
of it against her possessions within its
reach. Can she annihilate this power?
No. Can she sensibly retard its growth?
No. Does not common prudence, then, advise
her to conciliate, by every proof of friendship and confidence, the good will of a
nation whose power is formidable to her;
instead of yielding to the impulses of
jealousy, and adopting obnoxious precautions which can have no other effect than
to bring on, prematurely, the whole
weight of the calamity which she fears?
Reflections such as these may, perhaps,
enter with some advantage into your

17

d'
. k ney, October 12 , 180 3, u.s.,
Maison
to C. Pinc
Congress, American State Papers: Documents Legislative and
Executive of the Congress of the United States (38 vols.,
Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1861), Foreign Relations,
II, 571. The correspondence between the Spanish Minister in
Washington and James Madison was quite heavy and heated during
the latter part of 1803. The perfidy of Napoleon and the
illegality of the sale of Louisiana to America were points
continually stressed. It is interesting to note that while
Yrujo was protesting loudly to Madison about the injustice
that had been dealt to Sijain, he was assuring Cevallos in
Madrid that he really didn't consider the alienation of
Louisiana as too much of a loss to Spain. The colony had
cost heavily and produced little. See especially Yrujo to
Cevallos, August 3, 1803, Robertson, Louisiana Under Spain,
France, and the U.S., II, 69-77. The correspondence between
our Secretary of State and Yrujo may be found in the
Arnerican State Papers: Foreign Relations.
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communication with the Spanish Government; • • • you will make that use of
them.18

It is interesting to note that while Madison was
extolling the growth and power of America as a formidable
adversary, Yrujo was explaining to his government that the
purchase of Louisiana would actually produce a diversity of
local interests which would ultimately have ill effects upon
the future growth of the United States.

He stated his ideas

thusly:
This diversity of local interests, which
manifests itself daily in the Congress of
the United States, will probably be the
germ of the dismemberment and division of
those states. So much the greater as is
the progress in each one of those states,
so much the greater will be felt the
results of those jealousies. One does
not need extraordinary wisdom to
anticipate that the acquisition of
Louisiana, far from consolidating the
strength and vigor of this nation, will
rather contribute to weaken it by its
greater extension, • • • 19

'
18

· k ney, Octa b er 12 , 1803 , American
·
Ma d"ison to c. Pinc
State Papers: Foreign Relations, II, 571.
19

Yrujo to Cevallos, August 3, 1803, printed in
Robertson, Louisiana Under Spain, France, and the u. s.,
II, 72.

63
Meanwhile the arrival of French troops in conjunction
with the formal take-over by that country of Louisiana could
pose a more formidable problem, especially if Monroe and
Livingston failed in their efforts on the Continent.

Accor-

dingly, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn sent appropriate
instructions to his military commanders along the Lower
Mississippi, among whom was the controversial James
.
20
Wilkinson.
As yet unaware of the retrocession, the Spanish commander of Upper Louisiana at St. Louis, Carlos du Hault de Lassus,
was attempting to stave off continued threats to Spanish authority by both the English and the Americans.

In April, 1803,

de Lassus asked Regis Loisel, an experienced traveler and
trader in the upper Missouri region to give him a report
respective to foreign intrusions in that region, as well as
the state of Indian relations.

21

Although the report was not

20 secretary of War to Wilkinson, March 7, 1803, WO.
Letters Sent-Military Affairs. See also letters dated October
31, 1803, July 19, 1803, November 29, 1803 and January 16,
1804, ibid.

'
21 Regis
. Loise
. 1 f'irst came upon t h e scene in
. par t nership with Jacques Clamorgan on the Upper Missouri. He ascended the Missouri with Tabeau in 1802, and apparently
reported disconcerting things to de Lassus, which led to a
commission in 1803-1804 to undertake a thorough investigation.
See Abel, Tabeau's Narrative of Loisel's Expedition • • • •
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submitted until May, 1804, after the Americans had formally
assumed control of Upper Louisiana, Loisel's concepts about
geography and the relative ease of travel toward the Southwest reflect ideas current in the minds of both Spaniard
and American at the time.

Noting how exposed the domains of

the King of Spain were to the undertakings of foreigners, and
how the Indians were being continually bribed to draw them
away from Spanish influence, Loisel further stated,
I have discovered, • • • that one may
travel by water in a certain manner,
from Hudson Bay to the chain of mountains in Mexico which surrounds Santa
Fe, with the exception of one-half
league, in order to cross the small
tongue or isthmus which separates the
river Blois Blanc [James or Dakota]
from the River Qui Parle [Cheyenne]
which empties into the Colorado [Red
River of the North] , • • • The Rio
Chato [Platte] which empties into the
Missouri at a distance of two hundred
leagues from the Mississippi must not
be passed in silence. It rises west of
Santa Fe, and flows between two mountains
bordering the new Kingdom of Mexico.
• • • It is impossible to open navigation
with the Mexican territory by means of
its channel, but there is no necessity
for it, tor transportation overland is
ea.sy and the distance but sligi<t, and
the road which is open so far as tha
savages are concerned, assures the
American of ease of penetrating without any trouble. [Italics mine]22
22 Mernoria
. l o f Regis Loisel, May 28, 1804, printed in

.

L

Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 737-40.
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Such information, while largely in the realm of
fanciful geography, could only add to Spanish apprehension
for the safety of its Mexican "treasures."

Loisel also drew

attention to another point, being somewhat prophetic in the
process.

Noting that the Americans accompany their "insidious

steps" with presents to bribe the Indian tribes, he advised
that no other means present themselves to the Spanish than
"the resistance of the tribes. 1123

He continued,

It is important that they be not allowed
to be bribed by a new people of whom they
know nothing more than the name; • • • Let
the government cultivate their affection by
the means by which men of all sorts may not
be separated if they are employed suitable,
and it may then immediately count on their
fidelity.24
Loisel considered the Americans as enterprising and ambitious,
and would avail themselves of every means to win the minds of
the savages.

This became especially dangerous considering the

American claim to the sources of all the rivers which flowed
. t o th e Mississippi.
. . . . 25
in

How concerned de Lassus must have

'

25

Ibid., p. 739.
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been when Lewis and Clark arrived in st. Louis in December,
!803, armed with French passports to ascend the Missouri
River.

26
Having acquired the whole of the Louisiana territory

by treaty dated April 30, 1803, Jefferson set about to organize
his expedition.

The President's instructions to Lewis are

dated June 20, 1803, and are quite detailed.

The object of

the mission was
to explore the Missouri river, and such
principal streams of it, as, by it's
course and communication with the waters
of the Pacific Ocean, whether the Columbia,
Oregon, Colorado or any other river [Italics
mine] may offer the most direct and practicable water communication across this
27
continent for the purpose of commerce • • • •
Within this directive so carefully spelled out for
Meriwether Lewis was one item which is of special interest
to this study.

Jefferson drew the attention of the explorer

26

De Lassus to Juan Manuel Salcedo and Casa Calvo, St.
Louis, December 9, 1803, printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and
Clark • • • , II, 719. Jefferson's Instructions to Meriwether
Lewis, June.20, 1803, Jackson, Letters of the Lewis and Clark
Expedition • • • , p. 61. Louisiana, having been ceded by
Spain to France, Jefferson did not believe a Spanish passport
would be necessary.

27
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to the fact that
although your route will be along the
channel of the Missouri, yet you will
endeavor to inform yourself, by inquiry,
of the character and extent of the country watered by it's [sic] branches, and
especially on it's Southern side. The
North river or Rio Bravo which runs into
the gulph [sic] of Mexico, and the North
river, or Rio Colorado which runs into
the gulph [sic] of California, are understood to be the principal streams heading
28
opposite to the waters of the Missouri • • • •
Lewis was also told that the character of the terrain between
these rivers and the Missouri would be well worth enquiry.

29

In these instructions Jefferson reflects the geographical
concepts current for his day.
Armed with his instructions Lewis contacted William
Clark, and began the organization of his exploring party.

30

The Secretary of War attempted to facilitate preparations,
and Jefferson set about to gather any information which would
possibly prove useful.

28
29
30

Among the items furnished to the

rbid., p. 63. '
Ibid.

Lewis to William Clark, Washington, June 19, 1803,
William Clark Collection, MSS, Missouri Historical Society,
St. Louis, Mo.
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explorers was a copy of Truteau's Journal, and a map first
made by the explorer Evans. 31

With such material, in addition

to a letter of introduction from the President to a M. Henri
Peyroux (the man whom Jefferson thought had taken command of
upper Louisiana after the transfer to France) Lewis set out
.
. .
. Dece mb er. 32
for St. Louis,
arriving
t h ere in

From this moment

it seems the major objective of the Spanish officials in New
Spain was to stop "Captain Meri."

Could the Americans be

prevented from becoming the "perfect masters of the river
(Missouri], and its navigation and traffic, and the wealth
of Sonora and Sinaloa? 1133
Subsequent events in and around St. Louis assured the
Spanish commandant that his worst suspicions were proving
true.

With the purchase of Louisiana Americans turned toward

31

Beauregard, "Journal of Trudeau • • • , " p. 18.
Washington, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IV, 521. Lewis
and Clark did not hesitate to secure information from any
source available in St. Louis.
32

Jefferson
printed in Nasatir,
Secretary of War to
of War to M. Lewis,
Affairs, Roll. 2.
33

to Peyroux, Washington, July 3, 1803,
Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 721.
Amos'Stoddard, July 2, 1803 and Secretary
July 2, 1803, WD. Letters Sent-Military

Juan M. Salcedo and Casa Calvo to Cevallos, August
20, 1803, printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • ,
II, 720.

70

the west as never before,· and st. Louis became a natural
emporium for perspective traders and trappers.

All trading

parties were organized and all outfits were made up there.

34

The beginnings of several American ventures into the fur
trade and other trading activities with Santa Fe as their
goal were witnessed by the last of the Spanish governors.

35

De Lassus was also in a position to listen, record and forward to his superiors much information relative to American
activity, a goodly portion of which was little more than
gossip.

Since he remained in St. Louis until late 1804, he

was in a favorable position to keep Spain well advised and
alert to the moves of her new neighbors.
It was in the Spring of 1804, just at the time when
Spanish officials were becoming intensely alarmed over the
Lewis and Clark expedition, that yet another move by the
Americans compounded Spanish concern for United States'
designs on her northern frontier.

Particular concern was

expressed relative to Santa Fe and the mines of Northern
Mexico.

As it turned out, however, the move had little or

' America.
nothing to do with official

A merchant of Kaskaskia,

34 h"
.
Fur Tra d e •
C itten d en, Th e American

~

., II, 4.

35 Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , I, 113.
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Illinois, William Morrison, sent Baptiste La Lande, a French
creole, in the direction of the Pawnee villages on the Platte.
La Lande was to see what kind of trade could be developed with
the Indians, and, hopefully, find his way to Santa Fe to ascertain the market there.

The Frenchman ascended the Platte

River to the mountains, made his way some distance south and
then sent a delegation of Indians into Santa Fe to seek permission to enter.

As a result the Spanish Commander dispatched

a few men to escort La Lande into the Capita1.

36

The goods which he carried with him found a ready
market, but La Lande decided not to return to St. Louis.

The

distance was great, but perhaps the offer of land by the
Spanish Government had something to do with his decision to
remain.

No doubt the Spanish were just as happy to have him

stay rather than return with reports that would bring still
more Americans.

There seems to be some confusion as to

whether another Frenchman, one Laurent Durocher, accompanied
La Lande or was sent out later by Morrison.

Nevertheless,

both men were sent to Chihuahua by Governor Real Alencaster

'
36 Issac J. Cox, "Opening
.
t h e Santa Fe Trai· 1 , M"issouri.
Historical Review, XXV (1931), 32. Chittenden, The American
Fur Trade • • • , II, 491. Goetzmann, Exploration and
Empire • • • , p. 40.
II
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in May, 1805.

37

If the frontier governor in Santa Fe hoped his
superior in Chihuahua would relieve him of the responsibility
for the two "Americans" his hopes were soon dashed.

In

September, 1805, after interrogating La Lande and Durocher,
who decided to remain in Mexico, Comrnandante Nemesio Salcedo
y Salcedo returned them both to Santa Fe with the following

directive:
I have instructed them to return and arrange
with you in this matter, since, in conformity
with the Royal decisions, I have authorized
you to hear, consider, and decide all cases of
like nature which may occur of inhabitants of
said places in Ylinois who, without violating
the constitution, may ask to continue subjects
of the Spanish Government within the limits
of that Province.38
Departures from St. Louis like those of La Lande and
Durocher did not cease; neither were they ignored by Spanish

37

Lansing B. Bloom, "The Death of Jacques D'Eglise,"
New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. II, No. 4 (October, 1927),
370. Harlow Lindley, "Western Travel, 1800-1820," The Mississippi Valley Historical,Review, Vol. VI, No. 2 (September,
1919), 187.
38

N. Salcedo to Alencaster, Chihuahua, September 9,
1805, State of New Mexico Records Center, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
The Spanish Archives of New Mexico, 1621-1821. Microfilm
Roll 16.
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officials remaining in that city until the final transfer
negotiations had been completed.
rumors abound.

In a situation such as this

Enough was true, however, to cause the

Spanish justifiable concern.

Pedro Vial had proven a "road"

to Santa Fe was practicable.

From trading in furs and other

merchandise might not the adventurers seek more alluring
traffic, silver and gold?

There were, in fact, other traders,

merchants and adventurers striking out from St. Louis for the
Southwest.

It should be noted again, however, that none of

these efforts were being carried out under the direction of
the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, or
any other official of the American Government.
To save France the expense of sending a special agent
to St. Louis for a mere formality, Captain Amos Stoddard received Upper Louisiana from Spain in the name of the French.
Subsequently, as the American Commissioner, he received the
territory from France.

Following this final phase of the

transfer, de Lassus noted:
It is clearly ~o be seen that the general
opinion of [the United States] is that its
limits will extend to Mexico itself, extending
their boundary lines to the Rio Bravo, penetrating into the said kingdom at different
points [following] other small rivers. So
general is this persuasion that I believe
that beforehand many are thinking of obtaining a great advantage from ~hose lands, and,

L
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as I see it, they are already calculating
the profit which they will obtain from the
mines • 39
De

Lassus further noted that American officials who "are

commanding here" were continually acquiring information about
the Indians and the "shortest routes to New Mexico or to Santa
Fe. 11

40

I believe one can go from here to Mexico in
less than two months. This can be done it is
true with hard work and is exposed to meeting
with various Indian Nations, • • • but by
.
t ak ing
arms an d some presents one can succeed. 41
Rumors were about to the effect that the real aim of
the Lewis and Clark expedition was to enter Mexico; the
announced plan to discover a route to the Pacific Ocean was
a mere pretext.

De Lassus doubted such rumors, but perhaps

Lewis, himself, helped give credence to an idea which would
be so readily accepted by minds already suspicious.

In

October, 1803, while preparations were being made to depart

39

De Lassus to Casa Calvo, St. Louis, August 10, 1804,
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 743.
40 rbid.
officials.
41
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De Lassus does not identify the American
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st.

Louis on the trek across the continent, Lewis sketched a

plan he had been considering to the President.

Noting that

he had been delayed somewhat in the preparations for his
major expedition, and not wanting to waste time, Lewis proposed a tour on horseback of some one hundred miles "through
the most interesting portion of the country adjoining my
winter establishment."

42

He indicated that his route would

be "toward Santa Fe," in any event on the south side of the
Missouri.

43

Perhaps too much has been made of this plan as

a desire to reach Santa Fe; nevertheless, Jefferson vetoed

the whole idea before it could ever get off the ground.

In

answer to Lewis' despatch the Chief Executive responded,
One thing • • • we are decided in. That you
must not undertake the winter excursion which
you propose in yours of October 3. Such an
excursion will be more dangerous than the main
expedition up the Missouri and would, by an
accident to you, hazard our main object which,
since the acquisition of Louisiana, interest
everybody in the highest degree.44

42

Richard Dillon, Meriwether Lewis, Manuel Lisa, and
the Tantalizing Santa Fe'Trail," Montana, The Magazine of
Western History, XVII, No. 2 (April, 1967), 48.
43
44

Ibid.

Jefferson to Lewis, Washington, November 16, 1803,
Jackson, Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition
., p.
136.
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No more was made over this affair by Meriwether
Lewis or the President.

Preparations for the expedition to

the Columbia continued and by May, 1804, the American party
left St. Louis on its way up the Missouri toward the Mandan
villages.

Meanwhile the Spanish officials in Mexico City,

Philadelphia, Chihuahua and Santa Fe, spurred on by Casa
Calvo in New Orleans, planned and plotted the disruption if
not the outright capture of the Lewis and Clark expedition.
The question of the western boundary of the Louisiana territory played an important role in regard to Spain's immediate
concern over this expedition; since it will become a major
issue in itself subsequent to the American expedition, the
whole subject of boundaries will receive separate treatment
in the next chapter.

Meanwhile Spanish officials concen-

trated on the activities of that small band of men crossing
the continent towards the Pacific.
The principal Spanish official who aroused his
countrymen to the dangers posed by the Lewis and Clark
expedition was the Marques de Casa Calvo, newly appointed
boundary cotnmissioner in' New Orleans. 45

45

Fearing that any

Loomis, Pedro Vial • • • , pp. 105-106, 181.
Sebastian Calvo de la Pue rta y O'Farrill, Marques de Casa
Calvo, was acting military governor of Louisiana from Gayoso's
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expedition to the headwaters of the Missouri would bring the
participants into the immediate neighborhood of the New
Mexico settlements, Casa Calvo began a letter campaign which
eventually brought him the odium of fellow government officials in the New World.

It seems that his desire was to bring

fame to himself by impressing his superiors with his diligence.
AS early as January, 1804, Casa Calvo informed the Spanish
Foreigh Minister, Pedro Cevalos, that Meriwether Lewis had
presented himself in St. Louis armed with a French passport
to ascend the Missouri River.

The immediate action on the

part of the commander in that city was to detain Lewis, but
within a month de Lassus was told to put no obstacle in the
way of the American expedition as the purchase of Louisiana
.
d States was a rea l"ity. 46
b y t h e Unite

Even Casa Calvo, while

hoping that the Americans could be stopped, knew they could
not be, and remarked,

death in 1799 to Manuel Salcedo's arrival in 1801. He was
appointed to the u. s.-spanish boundary commission after the
transfer of Louisiana, but was looked on by the Americans
as a spy, and finally was asked to leave New Orleans.

'
.
Governor of Louisiana to de Lassus, January 28, 1804,
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 725.
Casa Calvo to Cevallos, January 13, 1804, printed in Robertson,
Louisiana Under Spain, France, and the U.S., II, 162-65.
46
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we cannot now prevent their expeditions,
which it is beyond question they will
repeat, in order to make themselves
perfect masters of the river, and its
navigation and traffic, and of the
wealth of Sonora and Sinaloa, • • • 47
Casa Calvo solicited the support of Manuel Salcedo,
the Governor of Louisiana, and the two men dispatched a message
to Nemesio Salcedo in Chihuahua.

In their letter the two

Spanish officials tried to impress upon the commandante-general
the pressing danger to Spain's northern frontier.

Nemesio

Salcedo was told that it was necessary to "cut off the gigantic
steps of our neighbors if we wish • • • to preserve intact the
dominions of the King.

. . .,,4 8

It is believed that only very

decisive and determined action would prevent the encroachment
into New Spain by the Americans.

"The only means which pre-

sents itself is to arrest Captain Merry Weather [sic] and his
party, which cannot help but pass through the nations neighboring New Mexico, its presidios or rancherias." [Italics mineJ

47

Ibid.

48

49

'

Casa Calvo and Manuel Salcedo to N. Salcedo, March
5, 1804, printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II,

731.
49
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It was not until May, however, that Salcedo answered
the letter from Casa Calvo and initiated correspondence to
warn the appropriate officials on the frontier.

After in-

forming the Viceroy of the correspondence he had received
from New Orleans, the commandant-general addressed a dispatch
to the Governor of New Mexico at Santa Fe, who would have
immediate jurisdiction over the territory Lewis and Clark
.
so
were suppose dl y traversing.

The Governor was advised that

it might prove very prudent to impede the expedition, or at
least gain knowledge of its progress and state of being.
Nemesio Salcedo's major advice to the New Mexico official was
to use the Indians to do the Spaniard's work for them.

In

this manner two things of some importance could be achieved
simultaneously -- keep the Indians allied to Spain and stop
American intrusion.

The commandant-general put it so,

• • • it is important under the circumstances that the force of that
province [New Mexico] occupy itself
in continuing to punish the barbarous
Navajo nation; that Your Excellency,
making use of the friendship and

'
SON. Salcedo to the Governor of New Mexico, May 3,
1804, printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II,
734. N. Salcedo to Don Joseph de Yturrigaray, May 3, 1804,
ibid.
729. It is interesting to note that the Viceroy merely
-;--informed N. Salcedo that he had received his correspondence.
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difference towards us in which the other·
gentile nations find themselves, come to
an agreement with the chief of the Comanches or with the Chief of any other
[nation] • • • to send a party of individuals which you may collect to reconnoitre
the country which lies between those villages
as far as the right bank of the Missouri,
with instructions and necessary provisions
so that they examine if there are traces or
other vestiges of the expedition of Merry
and so that they acquaint themselves with
the direction that it has take~ and of
their operations upon the territory • • • 51
In addition to using the Indians, Salcedo suggested
that Pedro Vial, being the man most knowledgeable of the geography of the territories in question, would prove most helpful
in locating the Americans.

52

In what many would describe as

typical of Spanish bureaucratic administration, months of
indecision and "buck-passing" ensued; meanwhile, the Lewis
and Clark expedition continued on its way across the continent
to the Pacific.

Only in September, 1805, did the commandant-

general issue definite instructions to Governor Real Alencaster
in Santa Fe.

Again the Indians were to be drawn into close

alliance with the Spaniards, especially those tribes along
the Platte ·and Arkansas ' rivers.

51

Alencaster was ordered

N. Salcedo to the Governor of New Mexico, May 3,
1804, ibid.
52

Ibid.
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to instill in them an "extreme dislike for the English and
the Aroericans."

53

The natives were also to be persuaded to

openly refuse any communication to the Americans as these
"foreigners" were only making friendly advances for the
ultimate purpose of throwing the Indians off their land.
of specific importance for the Spanish Governor was a request for him to make it most plain to the Indian chiefs
that they were to intercept the Lewis and Clark expedition,
seize its individuals and "to do everything possible to take
away any boxes or papers that the same expedition carries." 54
such work would result in considerable advantages for Spain
without the necessity of supporting troops among the Indian
tribes.
Of particular interest is the section of this important letter of September 9, 1805, referring to the extent
of Alencaster's geographical jurisdiction.

A map "drawn up

to the minute" was included to
instruct your Excellency of the territory
that your province encompasses; of its distance to the rstablishments at Illinois and
to the English possessions on the course of
53

N. Salcedo to Alencaster, September 9, 1805,
printed in Loomis, Pedro Vial • • • , pp. 192-94.
54
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the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, those
that bear the name Colorado, Arkansas, or
Napestle, that enter the first, and those
known as Coas, or Cancer [Kansas], Chato,
Osages, and the others that enter the said
.
. • • • 55
Missouri
Nemesio Salcedo was certainly attributing to Alencaster a territory much larger than the Americans would
accede to, and definitely much larger than the frontier
governor could control given the small number of troops under
his authority.

There seems to be little doubt that Salcedo

was telling the New Mexico governor to approach Indian tribes
in a spirit of friendliness, especially those well within
United States jurisdiction.

Even if one accepts the paucity

of geographic information then available to the Spanish on
the frontier, Nemesio Salcedo could hardly have been so
completely ignorant of the retrocession and subsequent sale
of Louisiana by the fall of 1805.

The motivation behind the

actions of Spanish officials is not the subject of investigation here, and would certainly fill volumes in itself, but
some attention should be given to the status of geographic
knowledge

~urrent

at th! time, for it definitely had a

bearing on Spanish-American relations.

L
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It will be recalled that Casa Calvo, in his original
dispatch to the commandant-general in Chihuahua, noted that
the Lewis and Clark expedition could not but help pass near
New Mexico.

In reply, Salcedo noted that Casa Calvo's

noticias (maps and charts) did not jibe with the only maps
. 56
he had b e f ore h im.

. Spanish
In f act, one won d ers if

officials not only withheld their cartographic findings from
the non-Spanish world, but also from themselves; Casa Calvo,
the boundary commissioner in New Orleans, seemed to be much
more certain that the Americans were penetrating the neighborhood of Santa Fe than did the officials on the frontier.

In

yet another dispatch to the Spanish Foreign Minister in Madrid in September, 1804, Casa Calvo, after complaining about
the lack of interest evidenced by Salcedo, noted that he
could not ascertain news as to the course of the Lewis and
Clark expedition because he had no planes of the upper part
of the Missouri River.

He only calculated its proximity

to New Mexico from
what the Indians tell us, and from the landmarks and the'signs which are observed by the
Indians of the Upper Missouri, which manifest

56

N. Salcedo to Casa Calvo, May 3, 1804, printed in
Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 733.
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clearly their traffic with Spaniards • • •
the writers have decided that the origin
of that river is to the northwest. This
in the general plan of the maps should
bring it very near to the capital of the
aforementioned Kingdom of New Mexico.57
Later in the same month Casa Calvo noted that Lewis and Clark
were by that time probably some 300 leagues up the Missouri,
"quite advanced into the Provincias Internas."

58

Another

letter penned by the boundary commissioner noted that there
was "easy and continuous communication by water from Hudson
Bay to the Gulf of Mexico. 1159
Given the fact that Casa Calvo as Boundary Commissioner for Spain relative to the Louisiana territory and
his American counterpart were located in New Orleans, one
might conjecture that the same published maps of the day
were available to both.

If that were the case it is little

wonder that Casa Calvo was as confused as the Americans
concerning the true nature of the Southwest.

57

The famous

Casa Calvo to Cevallos, September 15, 1804, ibid.,

II, 750.
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Casa Calvo to N. Salcedo, September 20, 1804, ibid.,

II, 753.
59 Casa Calvo to The Prince of Peace, September 30,

1804, ibid., II, 754.
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Arrowsmith map of North America published in 1802 was still
iargely unmarked in the areas of the Rocky Mountain region,
Great Basin and the southern tributaries of the Missouri.

60

In the very year that Upper Louisiana was being formally
turned over to the Americans, Aaron Arrowsmith and Samuel
Lewis' New and Elegant General Atlas for 1804 was published
in Philadelphia.

About this set of maps Carl Wheat notes

that "they dramatize both the paucity of reliable geographic
information available at the time, and the many erroneous
.
.
assumptions
concerning
t h e Wes t ern country • . • • ,.61

There

seems to be some question as to why Arrowsmith and Lewis
included in this Atlas a map of the Louisiana territory which
was actually a version of the Soulard map of 1795 (which itself was a French version of a map ordered made by Baron de
Carondelet, the Governor of Louisiana under the Spanish).
On this map, which had great influence on current cartographic
thought until the publication of Lewis and Clark's own map
in 1814, there is no hint of the Colorado (of the West), and
streams which Soulard had originally shown as branches of
the Arkansas· are now unlabeled
'
and shown flowing south into
60
61
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the Colorado of Texas instead of the Mississippi.

The en-

f

tire region of the Platte and Upper Missouri river basins is

'

.
62
stretch e d wes t war d ou t o f propor t ion.
On another map in the Atlas entitled "Spanish
Dominions in North America," the Arkansas River is drawn
heading just east of Santa Fe; the Red River appears almost
correctly, but there is no Canadian.

The cartographer Carl

Wheat has drawn a most interesting conclusion about these
Arrowsmith maps,
If [these maps do] in fact represent enlightened geographic thought in England
and the United States as of the nineteenth century, one must admire the
success of Spanish efforts to withhold
knowledge of her colonies from the rest
of the world.
(Baron von Humboldt's
great map of New Spain, though already
drawn, was not yet publicly availabe) ,63
It was precisely because the available geographic
information about the Louisiana Territory was so lacking that
President Jefferson began immediately upon the Purchase to

'
.
Wheat, The Spanish Entrada • . • , I, 156-59; From
Lewis and Clark . . • , II, 6-8. Copy of map included.
62

63

L

Wheat, From Lewis and Clark

. . .,

II, 10.

87

IV.

SECTION OF LEWIS MAP OF 1804

(

/

Source: Paullin, Charles o., and Wright, John K. Atlas of
_!he Historical Geoqraphy of th~ United States. Washington:
Carnegie Institutions and American Geographical Society of New
York, 1932, Plate 28.
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rectify the situation.

If he was to bargain intelligently

with the Spanish about boundaries, rights to navigable streams,
control over Indian tribes and numerous other points, he had
to have facts, not myths, to back up America's claims.

Further-

more, if he were actually interested in the approaches to Santa
Fe would not considerably more knowledge of that region be
required?

The Lewis and Clark expedition was, of course, a

part of the effort to extend knowledge of the western reaches
of the American continent.

As far as the Southwestern portions

of Louisiana are concerned, however, other efforts at exploration became more important.

It was in July, 1803, that

Jefferson sent a list of seventeen questions pertaining to geography, population, laws, and the extent of the newly acquired
land to important governmental and scientific figures.

Thus

began an intensive effort by the American Government to secure
the Southwestern reaches of her recently acquired territory,
whatever they might be.

United States-Spanish relations were

deeply affected.

'

CHAPTER III
THE SOUTHWEST LIMITS OF LOUISIANA:
HOW NEAR TO SANTA FE?
Settlement of the eastern boundary of the Louisiana
Purchase, although tedious, time-consuming and involved with
political and diplomatic complexities, was relatively easy to
determine with geographic accuracy.

The question of western

boundaries, on the other hand, was complicated by a morass of
cartographic legend, myth and fanciful geography.

The lands

along the Mississippi River and Gulf Coast had been accurately
charted by eighteenth and nineteenth century map makers.

The

Mississippi River had been generally recognized as a major
boundary line by all parties concerned with the Louisiana
territory during the past two centuries.

1

1

West of that major

A full treatment of the East and West Florida controversy can be found in Iisac Joslin Cox, The West Florida
Controversy, 1798-1813 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967),
in addition to numerous other articles by the same author.
One may also refer to the works of Arthur P. Whitaker
previously cited as well as Philip Coolidge Brooks, Diplomacy
89

L

90

river, however, the story was quite different.

Thomas

Jefferson was surely not guilty of understatement when he
told Congress shortly following the Purchase that "the precise
boundaries of Louisiana, westward of the Mississippi, though
very extensive, are at present involved in some obscurity." 2
When questioned about the vagueness of the western
limits of Louisiana Napoleon supposedly answered, "If an obscurity did not already exist, it would perhaps be good policy
to put one there."

3

Doubtless the failure to indicate exact

and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1939).
2

U. s., Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the
Congress of the United States, with an Appendix, containing
Important State Papers and Public Documents, and all the Laws
of a Public Nature (42 vols.; Washington: Gales and Seaton,
1852), 8th Cong., 2d Sess., 1803, p. 1498. Future references
will be cited as Annals of Congress.
3
Thomas M. Marshall, A History of the Western Boundary
of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841 (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1914), p. 8. Such a statement shows
that Napoleon could play the role of a fox as well as that of
a lion. The French, for reasons of their own, would not pin
themselves down on agreeing to any specific boundaries. When
asked for clarification of boundaries by Livingston, Talleyrand
retorted, "you have madJ a noble bargain for yourselves, and
I suppose you will make the most of it." See Dumas Malone,
Jefferson the President, First Term, 1801-1805, Vol. IV of
Jefferson and His Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1970), pp. 302-10 for a good summary of the diplomatic
negotiations relative to indecisive boundaries.
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,,

boundaries could prove advantageous for either Spain or
runerica.

Valuable time would be gained whereby more exact

information could be gathered and evaluated, not to mention
the possibility of enlarging a claim by occupation.

Neverthe-

less, as far as Jefferson was concerned the days of guesswork
and conjecture had to be brought to a close.

The United States

should know the extent of what it had purchased; relations
with Spain relative to this matter had to be determined.

For

such reasons, as well as the necessity of providing Congress
with an accurate account of what America had acquired,
Jefferson queried a number of men who were to take up positions
of responsibility in New Orleans.

He also summoned the Congress

to a special session for October, 1803.

Included among the

persons from whom he was seeking information was Ephraim Kirby,
the American Boundary Commissioner, Daniel Clark, the United
States Consul at New Orleans, William Dunbar, scientist, and
William C.

c.

Claiborne, the Acting Governor of the Louisiana

Territory.
To each of these men the President sent a list of some
seventeen questions.

A ' few examples would serve well to

illustrate what Jefferson was attempting to ascertain.

Among

other things he asked,
1. What are the boundaries of Louisiana, and
on what authority does each portion of them rest?

L
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2. What is the distance from New Orleans to the
nearest point of the western boundary?
3.

Into what divisions is the province laid off?

4. What are the best maps, general of particular, of the whole or parts of the province: Copies
of them if to be had in print.4
It was not until the latter part of August and into
September that Jefferson began receiving some answers to his
pointed inquires.

Due to statements made by Thomas Jefferson

during these months of investigation, and later, relative to
the western reaches of Louisiana, some historians have coneluded that our first "geopolitician" desired to expand deep
into Spanish-held territory.

A good case for the American

Government's interest in continental expansion at this early
date can be and has been made using ideas expressed at this
time.

Perhaps a closer examination of Jefferson's statements

and actions during the years of his presidency would reveal
a Chief Executive who was more a clever diplomat playing at
brinkmanship rather than an active expansionist.

Jefferson

the man was also a person with the curious mind of a

'
scientist, ·a characteristic
which would certainly come to
4
Jefferson Papers, MSS, Missouri Historical Society,
St. Louis, Mo. Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
VIII, 253-54.
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the fore now that a vast new land awaited examination.

That

he necessarily desired or expected to acquire territory
reaching to the gates of Santa Fe within the span of his
political career does not appear to be so evident.
Early in August, 1803, while waiting for replies from
New Orleans, Jefferson penned a letter to his friend John
Dickinson concerning the subject of western boundaries.

In

this letter the President spoke of the "unquestioned" eastern
boundaries of Louisiana, but in reference to the western
limits he noted, "we have some pretensions to extend the
western territory • • • to the Rio Norte, or Bravo, • • • 115
In yet another letter, this one to John

c.

Breckenridge,

Jefferson stated, "we have some claims to extend on the sea
coast Westwardly to the Rio Norte or Bravo,
~·

. . ."6

To William

Dunbar, the man who was later to attempt an expedition up the

~

Red River, Jefferson insisted that "however we may compromise
on our Western limits, we never shall on the Eastern."

7

What

5Jefferson to Dickinson, August 9, 1803, ibid., 261.
6

.
'
Je·fferson to Breckenridge, August 12, 1803, ibid.,

242.
7

H. A. Washington (ed.), The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (Washington: Taylor and Maury, 1854), IV, 540.
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claims the Chief Executive did make regarding the western
limits of Louisiana seem to have been based almost exclusively on French sources.

Such a basis would naturally accord

to the 'united States an area much more extensive than Spain
would be willing to accept.

Ever since the days of La Salle's

ill-fated landing on the coast of Texas, the French had considered their claims to extend inward from the Gulf Coast to
the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo, Rio del Norte).

Spain had never

accepted this theory and was not about to now.

Jefferson was

well aware of the century-long controversy between Madrid and
Paris and intended to use it to his advantage.
custom~

This was his

he would use Spain's distress to work to America's

advantage.

8

Meanwhile the answers to his inquires began to arrive.
On August 24, 1803, Jefferson received a communication from
Governor Claiborne answering many of the questions earlier
posed by the President.

As to maps and boundaries, however,

the Governor was of little help.

He did promise to forward

8 Jefferson, both
' as Secretary of State an d as Presi.

dent, operated on the premise that we could eventually achieve
what we wanted from Spain if we just waited long enough and
took advantage of Spain's precarious European situations.
He was also prone to stress the concept of "natural rights"
in reference to rivers, their navigation and sovereignty of
the land through which they flow.
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at a future time some maps he had heard about, but at the
moment "none extant can be depended upon."

9

On the subject

of boundaries Claiborne could again offer only the vaguest
of information.

One interesting and, as it turned out,

prophetic point (a point neglected by the American statesmen
for some time) was Claiborne's remark,
It is related to me, on the authority of
the oldest Settlers in this Territory,
that some time previous to [the Treaty
of 1763) a design was formed of running
a Boundary Line, on the West of Louisiana,
between the French possessions and those
of Spain; and that the Mouth of the Sabine
River • • • was fixed upon, as the point
from which the Line should set out.10
Although no evidence of a formal boundary survey can be found,
the Sabine River, as a boundary between French and Spanish
territory, seems to have been an accepted, though unofficial,
line by the colonial settlers based upon the extent of actual
9

claiborne to Jefferson, August 24, 1803, Clarence
Edwin Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United
States (25 vols.; Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1934-1960), IX, 16.

lOib~d.

'

There is evidence of a map by Don Juan de
Langara published in 1799, which gives the Sabine as the
boundary between Spanish and French settlements. The map
seems to have been purely a maritime effort and executed
at a time when limits were of no interest. See Issac J.
Cox, The Early Exploration of Louisiana (Cincinnati:
University of Cincinnati Press, 1905), p. 37.
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settlement by each nation during the preceding century.

The

most eastern settlement made by the Spanish during the entire
colonial period was among the Adaes Indians at a point some
fifteen miles west of Natchitoches.
Daniel Clark, the American Consul still residing in
New Orleans until the formal transfer took place, informed
Secretary of State James Madison, "I know of no good maps
in print of the Western part of the province,

. . ... 11

William Dunbar's reply added little knowledge to the situation
except to verify the fact that the Spanish considered the
Sabine to be the more accurate boundary to separate their
territories from those of the United States than any river
farther to the west. 12 ·
Only John Sibley, the controversial Indian agent at
Natchitoches, gave encouragement that the true western border
of Louisiana reached to the environs of Santa Fe.

His infer-

mation, as the President was to learn, was not based on
personal exploration or concrete knowledge, but on hearsay

11

~aniel

'

Clark to James Madison, September 8, 1803,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 29.
12

william Dunbar to Jefferson, September 30, 1803,
ibid.' 67-68.
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of elderly, long-time residents of the Natchitoches and
surrounding area.

Sibley, when queried by Governor

Claiborne, regretted that he could not supply a map but none
were available to him.

He had often seen good charts of the

Gulf coast, but none of the interior.

The Indian agent had

gathered some information about the rivers west of the Mississippi and took the liberty of sketching a map, admittedly inaccurate, for the enlightenment of the Governor and ultimately
for President Jefferson.

A portion of this information would

prove quite interesting when compared to an accurate modern
map.

Sibley's geographical sketch read in part as follows,
the first River West of Red River is the
Quel queshoe • • • • The Next in Order is
the Sabine, • • • The Next River is the
Angalena or Snow River • • • The Next is
Trinity River, the next the Braces [Brazos},
then the Colorado or Red River, then the
little River St. Antoine [San Antonio} on
which the Town or Station of St. Antoine
is Situated, then a little River called
Guadelope [Guadalupe}, then the Nuces
[Nueces} or Walnut River which is a
Brance of the River Grand [Rio Grande},
it is a fine Country all the Way from
Natchitoches to St. Antoine, the distance
is about four,hundred Miles, • • • 13

13

John Sibley to Claiborne, October 10, 1803, ibid.,
72-74. Dr. John Sibley who had left the East because
marital difficulties was very effective at publicizing
himself. He was appointed surgeon for the army post at

or--
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It was largely from the above replies that Jefferson
formulated his report to Congress in November, 1803.

f

From

a geographical standpoint the information furnished by the

~

gentlemen he had contacted was meager; it certainly was not
enough data to support a claim to the western reaches of
the Rio Grande.

As Jefferson told Congress in November, 1803,

Of the province of Louisiana no general
map, sufficiently correct to be depended
upon, has been published, nor has any been
yet procured from a private source. It
is, indeed, probable that surveys have
never been made upon so extensive a
scale • • .14
Under the circumstance Jefferson decided to somewhat
avoid the question of limits for the time being.

He knew well

that of more immediate concern was the need to win Congressional approval of his purchase, and to secure American occupation
of the Louisiana Territory from a rather perplexed and unhappy
Spain.

Therefore, his statement about the boundaries being

Natchitoches and was acting Indian agent. He served in these
capacities for a number of years, and he gained the reputation,
among the Spaniards, of ' being a revolutionary. His reports
were important because they stirred Jefferson to go ahead
with plans for exploration.
14
1498.

Annals of Congress, 8th Cong., 2d Sess., 1803,
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involved in "some obscurity" was deemed sufficient. on the
subject for the moment.

He did not intend to have the situation

remain thus for long.
Similar to the events surrounding the Lewis and Clark
expedition, the problem of boundaries became intricately bound
to the whole problem of Spanish reaction to the Purchase; more
accurately, it was the reluctance of Spain to accept a fait
accompli.

The Spanish argument that France did not have the

right to sell Louisiana to any other nation has been previously
discussed.

Concurrent with this argument was Spanish in-

sistence that "if" America did truly occupy Louisiana the
western boundary was to be nowhere near the Rio Grande.
Recognition of such a boundary would, of course, mean giving
up Texas.

On this point Spain held firm.

The negotiations relative to the matter of boundaries
(a discussion which continued until 1819) point up several
interesting features.

First, there was the lack of accurate

knowledge on the part of all parties concerned as to what
Louisiana included; second, there existed the lack of a real
determinati~n

' of the United States to include the
on the part

approaches to Santa Fe as a sine qua non in its dealings with
Madrid.

It is believed that the latter point can be adequately

Substantiated, even though the diplomatic moves and public
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statements during the years of negotiation might appear to
indicate otherwise.
The prime basis for all the obscurity about boundaries can be traced to earlier treaties between France and
spain, particularly those of 1763 and 1800.

For example,

Article III of the Treaty of San Ildefonso expressly stated,
His Catholic Majesty promises and
pledges himself on his part to
retrocede to the French Republic • •
• the colony or the Province of
Louisiana with the same extension
that it now has in the possession
of Spain, and that it had when
France owned it • • .15
This same vague statement was again used when America purchased Louisiana from France in 1803.

Now the need for being

more explicit could no longer be avoided, and the American
Government naturally turned to French sources for clarification.

To the extent that France wanted to keep both the

United States and Spain happy she resorted to the old game
of diplomatic double-talk •
. There was no doubt that the French claimed as far

'

to the west' as their traders and explorers had penetrated.
French cartographers were prone to extend the western limits

15

L

See Chapter II, footnote 1.
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of Louisiana to the Rio Grande.

The important map found in

the equally important work Histoire de La Louisiane by Le
page du Pratz gave the French this western limit.

16

The Le

Page du Pratz volumes were available and known to American
officials as well as the statesmen of Europe. 17
As early as October, 1802, Talleyrand, that most
shrewd and clever of statesmen, noted that the boundaries
of New Mexico and Louisiana had been determined at least up
to the thirtieth degree of latitude on the Rio Bravo, which
is somewhat above the Big Bend of Texas but well below El
Paso.

From that point, however, the line was less exact.

The

Frenchman further noted, "it does not appear that any convention of boundaries was ever held for that part of the
frontier.

The farther north one goes, the more vague is the

Th e
importance of this work has been discussed in Chapter I.
Also see Marshall, A History of the Western Boundary • • • ,
chapters I and II.
lG Le Page d u Pratz, Histoire
'
'
d e 1 a Lou1s1ane.
' .

17

c1ark to Madison, September 8, 1803, Carter,
Territorial-Papers, IX, 29. In his Essay "The Limits and
Bounds of Louisiana," printed in Documents Relating to the
Purchase and Exploration of Louisiana (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin & Company, 1904), Jefferson based his discussion
of limits almost entirely on Le Page du Pratz.
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.
.,18
demarcation.

I n some secret instructions to the Cap t ain.

c;eneral of Louisiana, dated November 26, 1802, and approved
by Napoleon, mention was made that Louisiana must now be
"restored with the same extent that it had when France owned
it,

. . ..,19

According to the directive such limits included

the "Rio Bravo, from its mouth to the thirtieth degree, its
line of demarcation has not been traced beyond • • • and it
appears no convention has ever been held concerning this
.
.
.,20
point
o f t h e frontier.

As might be expected, the French

Commissioner in New Orleans followed this line of reasoning
when queried by both American and Spanish officials. 21
It is quite obvious from the documentation that the
French believed the United States favored the view of the
Rio Bravo constituting the western boundary of Louisiana,
and they were of no mind to cast any doubt on the matter.
18

Talleyrand to Decres, October 2, 1802, Robertson,
Louisiana Under Spain, France and the u.s., II, 141.
19
Louisiana.

secret Instruction for the Captain-General of
Approved by the First Consul, November 26, 1802,

~·I .I, 361-62.

'
21

Laussat to Salcedo and Casa Calvo, January 18, 1804,
ibid., II, 171. Madison to Robert R. Livingston, January 31,
18ci"i, American State Papers: Foreign Relations, II, 574.
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consequently, the American statesmen diligently pressed their
claims with the Spanish for the next several years.

Secretary

of state James Madison kept Robert Livingston in Paris abreast
of our moves and instructed Charles Pinckney and James Monroe
in Madrid to press the Spanish government for a settlement
according to theories we felt had French backing. 22
To rely on French support proved to be a mistake, for
Talleyrand also wished to appease Spain at this crucial time.
While assuring the United States that Louisiana was indeed
quite vast he was concurrently informing Senor Gavina, the
Spanish Ambassador at Paris, that the intention of the French
King was "to assure by all friendly means the good relations
of two powers which have so much interest in remaining united,
Accordingly, the Spanish Ambassador was informed

• • •

that
since the western boundary of
Louisiana was not fixed in so precise
a manner by the treaties preceding that
of [San Ildefonso] • • • the uncertainty

22

Ibid.
ibid., 575:--

-

Madison' to Livingston, March 31, 1804,

23Talleyrand to Senor
Gavina, August 30, 1804,

Robertson, Louisiana Under Spain, France and the U.S.,
II, 195-96.
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that could exist on the direction
of its frontiers must have still
remained since the cession of the
United States. France even could
not take it upon itself to indicate to the United States what
that precise boundary must be,
• • • 24 [Italics mine]
To the French Minister in the United States Talleyrand
wrote,
If the Mississippi and Iberville
Rivers mark precisely the eastern
limits of that colony, toward the
west its boundaries are less precise.
• • • There are often such wide
expanses, that it may be difficult 25
to agree on a line of demarcation.
The minister was further urged to dissuade the United States
from attempting to extend its boundaries westward in such a
way to "cause annoyance to the court of Madrid. 1126

Talleyrand

continued,

24

Ibid.

25

a,

'

Talleyrand to General Louis Marie Turreau, August
1804, ibid., 193-95.
26

Ibid.
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Whatever exaggeration there be in the
anxiety of the court of Madrid, it was
my duty General, to inform you of it,
so that you may judge by the mutual
inclinations of the two governments
how necessary it is for you to employall your care, • • • for the maintenance
of a system of reliable information • • • 27
Spanish protestations to both the United States and
France over the basic purchase itself are well known, and
Spain finally, though reluctantly, accepted the fait accompli.
The boundary question, once the transfer of territory had
been accepted, continued for years to be a point of bitter
argument.

Perhaps the Spanish view of American claims to

the Rio Grande was best expressed by Casa Calvo when he
referred to the matter as a "classic absurbity. 1128

Spain

may have had to give-in on the Purchase but she was determined not to lose Texas and New Mexico, or have her northern
frontier fall into the hands of the greedy Americans.
Spanish determination in this matter can be readily seen
by the fact that the dispute remained unsettled until the
year 1819.

When the Transcontinental Treaty was signed

'
27
28

163.

l

Ibid.
Casa Calvo to Cevallos, January 13, 1804, ibid.,
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in that year, Texas and the remainder of the Southwest continued under the flag of Spain, albeit not for long.
As indicated earlier, from the time of the earliest
discussions between the American and Spanish officials the
latter insisted upon the Sabine River (the present-day
boundary between Texas and Louisiana) as the line of demarcation between Louisiana and the Province of Texas. 29

Every

lengthy argument on the part of Monroe and Pinckney to push
the American claims was met with equal verbosity on the partof the Spanish ministers who felt the utmost need to "combat
the sophistries of the Arnericans."

3

°

From New Spain warnings

and pleas were reaching Madrid stressing how imperative it
was to keep the ambitious Americans as far as possible from
the Provincias Internas, especially from luring the Indian
tribes away from Bourbon influence.

31

29

Casa Calvo to Laussat, March 31, 1804, ibid., 184.
Salcedo to Cevallos, August 20, 1804, Nasatir, Befere Lewis
and Clark • • • , II, 745-50.
30

Cevallos to Casa Calvo, April 2, 1804, Robertson,
Louisiana Under Spain, France and the U.S • • • • , II, 177.
31

Salcedo to Cevallos, August 20, 1804, Nasatir,
Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 745-50.
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Through 1804 and into 1805 the argument continued;
correspondence mounted and the Spanish remained determined.
several interesting developments occurred over the question
of boundaries in early 1805.

Acting upon the directives of

the Secretary of State, Pinckney and Monroe began taking a
firmer stand with the Spanish government.

In a dispatch

dated March 30, 1805, the American Ministers indicated to
Cevallos that his continual delays could only lead the
former to "suspect that his silence is intended as an
intimation of his desire that negotiation should cease. 1132
The message continued,
But, if it is still his Excellency's
desire to continue the negotiation,
they have to request that he will be
so obliging as to give them the
sentiments of His Majesty's Government respecting the western limits of
. .
Louisiana
• • •3 3
Cevallos, of course, evidenced shock at this line of
approach.

It was not until Mid-April, however, that any

32 .

'

Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, March 30, 1805,
American State Papers: Foreign Relations, II, 657.
33

L

Ibid.
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answer worthy of the label was forthcoming from the Royal
court.

On April 13, 1805, Cevallos submitted to the American

envoys a most lengthy discourse on the necessity of gathering
material from many sources not readily available.

The Spanish

Foreign Minister began his argument with the often cited
phrase, "the western limits of Louisiana never having been
fixed in [an] exact manner,

. . ."34

Basing his case on the

facts of discovery, exploration and colonization Cevallos
attempted to illustrate that the French could never, under
any pretext, have considered Texas or any land west of that
Province to have been theirs.

He continued,

that claim must be extremely illusory
and unfounded which shall attempt to
carry the western limits of Louisiana
to the Rio Bravo, including therein a
great part of the interior provinces
of New Spain, acquired and established
at the cost of the treasures -0f Spai~
5
and the blood of her subjects, • • •
Lengthy and detailed as it was, this explanation was
apparently not accepted by the American envoys.

The United

States was continuing to base its claims on French sources.

'
34

Cevallos to Pinckney and Monroe, April 13, 1805,
ibid., 660-62.
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Basic to this stand was the idea that when a nation takes
possession of any seacoast, it is understood that this possession extends into the interior country, to the sources of
rivers emptying within that coast, "to all their branches and
the country t h ey cover, • • • "36

This was an argument

Jefferson had also previously used in justifying America's
claim to the Rio Grande.

And so the argument continued.

on the surface it appeared that the American Government was
determined to have Santa Fe.
Concurrent with these developments, however, was the
evolvement of another approach towards some kind of solution.
As early as 1804, Madison stated that he might suggest a line

not far west of the Mississippi River be drawn leaving a wide
unoccupied tract of land between the possessions of Spain
and American settlements.
of buffer zone.

He was actually suggesting a type

In early 1805 when, as indicated above,

negotiations were heavy, Madison again suggested the

36 Pinckney and Mpnroe to Cevallos, April 20, 1805,
~., 664.· Jefferson, still basing his claims on French
sources, argued that because of the explorations and settlements made by La Salle and Iberville, France had actual
possession of the coast from st. Bernard Bay {Matagorda
Bay) to Mobile.
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establishment of a neutral ground for twenty years.

37

secretary of State Madison was closely following President
Jefferson's thinking on the subject.

Although Jefferson

would hold to the concept of our "right" to the country from
the Rio Bravo east, as early as July, 1804, he was considering
the idea of a tract of land to be laid off in which no further
settlement was to be made by either country for "say thirty
'

years."

38

The tract of land as envisioned by Jefferson and

Madison would have lain between the Rio Grande and the Rio
Colorado of Texas, an area some 250 miles in breadth.

39

Although criticized by his contemporaries Jefferson defended
the move to relinquish land to the westward in proportion to
what could be obtained east of the Mississippi.

He further

believed "successive sacrifices were marked out, of which

37

Monroe and Pinckney to Cevallos, January 28, 1805,
637. Marshall, A History of the Western Boundary ••
• , pp. 32-33. This work, although emphasizing the Treaty of
1819 and subsequent events, has an excellent summary of the
issues and negotiations prior to the actual treaty. There
are also a number of maps illustrating the various "neutral
ground" propositions.
~.,

38

.

'

Jefferson to Madison, July 5, 1804, Ford, The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 309-10.
39

L
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even the Colorado was not the last."

40

It is important to remember that in all the negotiations surrounding the boundary question the matter of
western and Eastern Florida was of prime concern.

Madison

held the Floridas to be of much greater importance than the
western Boundary issue.

He considered West Florida "essential"

and East Florida "important" and, as time proved, he was
willing to yield if necessary on western claims to obtain the
Floridas.

When James Monroe and Charles Pinckney left Spain

in the Summer of 1805, the new American diplomat to Madrid,
James Bowdoin, was instructed to continue pressing his
country's cause along the same line.

Political as well as

diplomatic considerations are at the bottom of America's views
concerning the Floridas.

The basic question can again be

found in geographic obscurities.

Whether or not the Floridas,

or as least West Florida, was originally a part of the
Louisiana Territory was not clear to either the French or the
Spanish, and was not specified in either the cession of 1762
or the retrocession of 1800.

It should also be borne in mind

' the part of Jefferson to acquire
that the original move on
40

469.

L

Jefferson tow. A. Burwell, September 17, 1806, ibid.,
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New Orleans included the idea of purchasing West Florida.
It was felt the area was needed to assure the security of
Americans' use of the Mississippi River.

The fact that

America's population was rapidly expanding in the old Southwest towards the Floridas must also be considered. 41
Meanwhile, the increasingly close relationship
between France and Spain, in addition to a growing Spanish
reluctance to retire beyond the Sabine, caused Jefferson and
Madison to walk cautiously regarding a boundary settlement.
France had made it clear she would support her neighbor south
of the Pyrennees in any conflict which may be forthcoming.
French interest in the well-being of the Spanish Bourbons
did not stem from altruistic motives.
Napoleon Bonaparte's grand design.
was the easily duped Charles IV.
41

It was all part of

On the throne of Spain
The heir to the throne

For a full discussion of the relationship between
the Floridas and the Louisiana Purchase see, Cox, The West
Florida Controversy • • • , pp. 64-101. Jefferson's concern
over the right of Americans to use the Mississippi can be
traced back to the treaties of 1763 and 1783. Under the
earlier treaty British colonists had the right to navigate
that river, and when they became American citizens they
did not lose this right~ Jefferson also asserted that
inhabitants on the upper course of a river had the right
to pass in and out of its mouth. He cited a case in
International Law (Antwerp on the Scheldt) to substantiate
his case, see, Cox, The West Florida Controversy • • • ,
pp. 27-28. The importance of the Floridas will again
receive attention in Chapter v.
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was Prince Ferdinand who was in his early twenties; the actual
ruler of the country, however, was the ambitious Manuel de
Godoy, the Prince of Peace.

He is viewed by most historians

as being a vain and grasping adventurer who understood little
of the New World situation.
The situation in Spain enabled the clever Napoleon
gradually to reduce that state to a position of vassalage.

42

Meanwhile Jefferson, as was his custom, preferred "time to
await and avail ourselves of events. 1143
over Spanish affairs by

~apoleon

The increasing control

led Jefferson to inform

Madison,
Yet these acts shew a purpose both in
Spain & France against which we ought
to provide before the conclusion of a
peace. I think therefore we should
take into consideration whether we

42

The Napoleonic involvement in Spain has been the
subject of numerous works including biographies, monographs
and national histories. Two reliable works in which one may
conveniently find brief but excellent accounts are: Charles
E. Chapman, A History of Spain, Founded on the Historia de
Espaffa y de la Civilizac\on Espaii'.ola of Rafael Altamira (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1918), and Jean Descola, A History
of Spain (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).
·
43

Jefferson to Gallatin, April 3, 1805, Ford, The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 350.
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ought not immediately to propose
to England an eventual treaty of
alliance, • • • 44
In addition to the tense European situation the President
was also keeping abreast of Spanish activity in Texas relative
to their blocking any American advance in that direction.

Jef-

ferson did not intend to be caught unprepared in an emergency.
Jefferson's patience with Spain must have worn thin
during the years of his second administration.

In November,

1805, he presented the whole picture to his Cabinet.

The

decision of his official family was, in part,

44
45

Jefferson to Madison, August 4, 1805, ibid., 374.

Jefferson to Madison, September 16, 1805, ibid.,
379. In this dispatch to the Secretary of State Jefferson
put forth the suggestion that should Spain continue to block
America's move west the Congress should authorize the
Executive to suspend intercourse with Spain at discretion
and to dislodge the new Spanish establishments between the
Mississippi and the Rio Grande. He concluded, however, that
"these ideas [are] merely for consideration." Governor
Claiborne was also alert to the need for military preparedness
in case a move against the Spanish was necessary. See the
correspondence between tlaiborne and The Secretary of War,
The Secretary of State and General James Wilkinson in Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of w. c. C. Claiborne,
1801-1816 (6 vols.; Jackson: State Department of Archives
and History, 1917).
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1. Spain shall cede & confirm to the us.
East & West Florida with the islands &
waters thereon depending & shall deliver
possn. immedly.

......................
4. The boundary between the territories
of Orleans & Louisiana on the one side
& the damns. [sic] of Spain on the other
shall be the river Colorado from its
mouth to it's [sic] source then due N.
to the highlands inclosing the waters
which run directly or indirectly into
the Missouri or Misipi [sic] rivers,
& along those highlands as far as they
border on the Span. damns.
5. The country between the Western
boundary of the territories of Orleans
on the one side - & Louis~ on the other
(the Rio Bravo & Eastern or Salt river
branch thereof Rio Colorado) from its
main source & by the shortest coast to
the highlands before ment~ as the sd.
Western bound¥ shall remain unsettled
for 30 years from the date of this
treaty.

. . . . .. . . . .. .... . ... . . .
t

7 • • • • the us. shall permit no settlem •.
within the sd. country for the term of 30.
years before mentioned.46

'
46 Cab.inet Decision
. .
.
Nove mb er 14, 1805,
on S pain,
Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 383-84.
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An interesting note relative to point number 5 above is that
the manuscript for this document indicates that Jefferson
originally intended the statement to read "Guadaloupe, if
to be cbtd, Colorado if not."

47

Why he struck the line is

not readily discernible.
Thus the negotiations over the western limits continued
for many years.

Jefferson continued to assert America's

"right" to the Rio Grande, but, if actions speak louder than
words, he was more realistic and concentrated on exploring the
Sabine and Red River areas.

The Red

P~ver

seemed to have been

gradually accepted by both Spain and the United States as their
common boundary, although neither nation would openly admit
as much for a nu.'l\ber of years.

Meanwhile Thomas Jefferson, the

perennial student of scientific advancement, as well as the
dedicated statesman, set about to organize more expeditions
for the purpose of exploring the Louisiana Territory.
Lewis and Clark were tracking the upper reaches of
the Missouri and to the Pacific Coast.
venture up the Red and Arkansas rivers.

Someone was needed to
As early as March,

' contacted William Dunbar in New
1804, President Jefferson
Orleans.

This scientist was asked to lead an expedition

47

L

Ibid.
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to the headwaters of the aforementioned rivers.

Dunbar was

told that Congress would probably authorize an exploration
of "the greater waters on the western side of the Mississippi
and Missouri to their sources."

48

"In this case," the

President continued,
I should propose to send one party up the
Panis river to its source, thence along
the highlands to the source of the
Radoncas river and down it to its mouth,
• • • These several surveys will enable
us to prepare a map of Louisiana, • • •
and will give us a skeleton to be filled
up with details hereafter.~9
A chemist from Philadelphia, Dr. George Hunter, was
also assigned to the expedition.
in arriving at New Orleans.

The doctor was quite delayed

Because of his delay and other

problems of supply and manpower, by the time the expedition
was ready to get under way circumstances caused a major change
in plans.

The Osage Indians had taken to the warpath, and,

as a reaction to the Lewis and Clark expedition, the Spanish
evidenced a great reluctance to permit any American on any

'
48

Jefferson to Dunbar, March 13, 1804, Washington,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IV, 540-41.
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pretext to approach the Texas frontier.

Dunbar and Hunter

did conduct an expedition of some four months, but the direction was changed to the Washita River and Ozark Plateau,
an area less in controversy at the moment.

Though of more

limited value Jefferson accepted the change in plans as some
compensation for the postponement of his more extensive
plans.

50
During the winter of 1804, Jefferson received infer-

mation about the Red River region from Dr. John Sibley who
soon would be appointed Surgeon and Indian Agent at the
Natchitoches Post.

As indicated earlier Sibley's information

was based more on hearsay than fact.

Regardless, this man's

correspondence spurred Jefferson on to order another
expedition up the Red River in May, 1805.

Congress appro-

priated additional money, and William Dunbar received his
orders.

Because of the Osage danger and possible difficulty

in transferring baggage from the headwaters of the Red to
the Arkansas River, it was decided to ascend the Red River
to its source and descend the same stream.

Jefferson deemed

'
50

Dunbar's Journal is printed in Documents Relating
to the Purchase and Exploration of Louisiana. A summary of
the same journal appears in Annals of Congress, 9th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1106-1146.

L

119

this a better opportunity to ascertain "that which, in truth,
next to the Missouri, is the most interesting water of the
.

~

.

. .,51

b

.

Mississippi.

Dun ar was instructed to await orders from

the Secretary of

War~

meanwhile, a Spanish passport was to

be obtained from Casa Calvo.

In concluding his letter

Jefferson advised the leader of the expedition that,
In the present state of things between
Spain and us, we should spare nothing
to secure the friendship of the
Indians within reach of her.52
In his letter to Governor Claiborne concerning
acquisition of a passport for the Dunbar party, Jefferson
stressed the fact (a fact subsequently stressed to the Spanish)
that the object of the mission was to ascertain the geography
of the country -- a purely scientific expedition.

The members

were expressly forbidden to venture beyond the headwaters of
the Red River, but as they might come upon some Spanish
subjects along the way a passport was deemed advisable.

In

order to ease the suspicions or fears of the Spanish Jefferson
suggested to Claiborne

51

~at

he encourage Casa Calvo to send

Jefferson to Dunbar, May 25, 1805, Washington, The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IV, 577.
52

Ihid.
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V.

-----

THE EXPLORER'S ROAD TO SANTA FE

---- ---,
I

'

-

- - lewis and Clork

••••••••• Dunbar-Hunter

•••••••• freeman
""n>:u. ., Pike, 180.S
· - · - Pike, 18Q6..1807
- . . - Loni:.. 1820

Westward
Source: Billington, Ray Allen.
Expansion: A History of the American Frontier.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963, p. 447.
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"one or two persons of his own choice as witnesses of our
proceedings , •

. ..,53

The President further confided to

the Governor,
as we have to settle a boundary with
Spain to the Westward they cannot
expect that we will go blindfold
into the business. Both parties
ought to be free to make surveys
of experiment preparatory to
settlement, and each having a
certain claim to the country
must have equal right to procure
the information necessar~ for
elucidating their right. 4
When Claiborne approached Casa Calvo on these matters,
the latter was more than a little embarrassed to know what
to do.

Earlier, when the first Dunbar expedition was pre-

paring to advance up the Red River, Casa Calvo had advised
the Governor of Texas to take measures to either impede or
. .
55
d es t roy t h e expe d ition.

Now in his perplexity the Marques

53

Jefferson to Claiborne, May 26, 1805, Carter,
Territorial Papers, IX, 451.
54

Ibid.

'

55 Issac J. Cox, "The Exploration
.
. .
o f t h e Louisiana

Frontier, 1803-1806," Annual Report of the American Historical
Association For the Year 1904 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1905), pp. 162-63.
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decided to grant the passport and appoint someone to repre-

t

r

L

sent Spain.

At the same time, Casa Calvo concluded that

since the upper part of the Red River "runs into the Province
of Texas and perhaps into another Province more remote, it
seems to me prudent to communicate intelligence [of the
expedition] to the Commandant-General in Chihuahua. 1156

The

Spanish Boundary Commissioner was trying to avoid offense
to the American authorities who were already suspicious of
him.

At the same time he was striving to remain in good

standing with his superiors in Madrid, and throw the
responsibility for a final decision about the expedition on
Nemesio Salcedo.

In other words the Spanish officials were

reacting to the proposed Dunbar venture in a manner quite
reminiscent of their reaction to Lewis and Clark.
The Commandant-General was not reluctant to take a
firm stand against the Dunbar party just as he had previously done relative to the Lewis and Clark expedition.
He saw the present effort to explore the Red River as simply
an attempt to gain military knowledge of the country or to

' of the Indians.
tamper with the allegiance
56

Salcedo saw no

Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 5, 1805, Rowland,
Claiborne Letter Books, III, 129.
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need in further geographical exploration, especially by
Americans.

If the United States wanted geographical information,

he surmised, all they had to do was apply through proper
channels.

S7

Meanwhile preparations continued.

Records indicate

that William Dunbar was having a difficult time finding
58
.
cap abl e men o f sui't a bl e c h arac t er f or t a k'ing o b servations.
Finally a Lieutenant Thomas Freeman was selected to head the
expedition under the general supervision of William Dunbar. 59
Following more delays, however, it was not until April 19,
1806, that the expedition set out for Natchitoches on the Red
River.

This was actually a most inauspicious moment for the

party of thirty-seven to set-out from Fort Adams on the
Mississippi just above the mouth of the Red River.

60

It was

57

salcedo to Casa Calvo, October 8, 180S, cited in
Cox, "Exploration of the Louisiana Frontier . • • ," p. 163.
S8Dunbar to Henry Dearborn, June 8, 1805, National
Archives, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War,
Record Group 107, Letters Received by the Secretary of War,
Main Series, 1801-1870 (Microcopy No. 221). Future references will be cited as WD. Lette:.:s Received. Dunbar to
Henry Dearborn, October,8, 1805, ibid.
59

Cox, "Exploration of the Louisiana Frontier • • • ,"

p. 160.
6

°Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The
United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (London: The
Macmillan Company, 1969), p. SS. Fort Adams was established
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during the early part of 1806 that General James Wilkinson
was so actively engaged in meeting Spanish reluctance to
fl;'

t

move back to the west side of the Sabine.

The crisis was

r,~

finally settled by Wilkinson and the Spanish commander, Simon
de Herrera, in the field by November, but the whole atmosphere
at the time was definitely not conducive to an attitude of
.
friend 1 iness
on th e part o f

s pain.
. 61

Nevertheless Freeman led his group up to Natchitoches
where Sibley gave warning that Spanish soldiers might intercept them should they continue up that river.

The warning was

prophetic, for some 200 miles above Natchitoches a Spanish
garrison under the command of Don Francisco Viana met the
Americans and insisted they burn back.

Following the Presi-

dent's instructions and realizing the superior force of the
Spanish, Freeman acceded to the demand.

62

by General James Wilkinson on Loftus Heights about six miles
above the Spanish border as defined by Pinckney's Treaty
along the Mississippi River. Prucha described this post as
a watchtower to keep an eye on the Spanish in West Florida
and in Louisiana, and it could stop any large-scale movement up or down the Mississippi.
61

A·discussion of the Neutral Ground Agreement may be
found in various works on Texas History. One excellent account
may be found in Odie B. Faulk, A Successful Failure (Austin:
Steck-Vaughn Company, 1965), pp. 189-96.
62
p. 173.
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Thus by the end of 1806, Jefferson's plans for
exploring the Southwestern reaches of Louisiana had apparently
failed.

The immediate results of several years of planning

and expense were rather meager on the surface.

Freeman had

penetrated the Red River some 635 miles above its mouth, but
this was no further than French and Spanish traders and
explorers had ventured years earlier.

Furthermore, knowl-

edge of the head waters of the Red River and the Arkansas
River continued to remain in the area of fanciful geography.
The long-range results, however, were to be more fruitful.
Not unmindful of the need to obtain the good will of
the Indians, Jefferson gathered to his library the reports
of Dr. John Sibley.

The President used these reports, in

addition to the more official accounts corning in from Dunbar,
Lewis and Clark, to impress upon Congress the need to continued exploration of Louisiana.

Given the paucity of

accurate geographical knowledge of the Southwest, Sibley's
inaccurate and exaggerated reports of the road to Santa Fe
only further confused the picture.

For example, Sibley,

'

using information supplied to him by a man himself relying
on forty years of memory, put the Panis towns (in presentday Nebraska) some 300 miles from Santa Fe. 63
63

L
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Cartographic efforts during 1805, although benefiting
from the reports sent back by Lewis and Clark, remained little
improved where the Southwest was concerned.

Jefferson's

friend Nicholas King prepared several maps in 1805 based on
information furnished by the above duo, but the maps were
still quite vague when depicting the Rocky Mountain region;
the Rio Grande was confused with the Green River extending
north meeting the headwaters of the Snake.

The geography

in these maps is quite reminiscent of Arrowsmith's 1802
efforts.

64
In connection with the events thus far discussed

there remains a need to elaborate somewhat on the idea that
President Jefferson and the United States Government were
not particularly determined to push to the gates of Santa
Fe.

The willingness of the President and his Secretary of

State to bargin with the Spanish over various river boundaries
Communicating Discoveries Made in Exploring the Missouri, Red
River and Washita, By Captains Lewis and Clark, Doctor Sibley
and Mr. Dunbar: With a Statistical Account of the Countries
Adjacent, February 19, 1806 (Washington, 1806), pp. 110-11.
Considering that ZebulOll Pike encountered the Pawnees at the
Republican.Fork of the Kansas River (in eastern Nebraksa) that
same year, Sibley's information seems a bit inaccurate.
64

Wheat, From Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 43-44.
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from the Rio Bravo eastward to the Sabine has been pointed
out.

Likewise, the idea of creating a "buffer-zone" has

been discussed.

These approaches certainly indicate no

intense drive to "take-over" key Spanish posts in the Southwest.

Perhaps much of the "wait-and-see" policy of Jefferson

stemmed from his concept of what Louisiana was in a physical
sense and how it could best serve the needs and security of
the nation.

As early as July, 1803, Jefferson stated,

I presume the island of N. Orleans
and the settled country on the
opposite bank will be ann~xed to
the Mississippi Territory • • •
The rest of the territory will
probably be locked up from
American settlement, and under
the self-government of the native
occupants.65
The matter of what to do about the populace already
living in Louisiana, and regulations concerning future
American settlement had come up during the debate over
ratification of the Purchase Treaty.

The Federalists voiced

opposition to the Purchase on many points, but were
particularly accusatory On Constitutional items as they knew

65

Jefferson to Horatio Gates, July 11, 1803, Ford,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 250.
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bow scrupulous Jefferson was on such issues.

They also knew

he had some qualms about the constitutionality of the basic
treaty itself.

Citizenship by incorporation was, or could

be, a complex constitutional problem in relation to the acquisition of Louisiana, and the opposing Federalists well knew
it.

Such a method of naturalization had never been used

before and would certainly take a broad interpretation of the
constitution to carry out.

Jefferson used the doctrine of

implied powers, and all the Federalist bombardment about the
"great waste, a wilderness unpeopled with any beings except
wolves and wandering Indians," did little to dim the success
of the Republican President.

66

The problem of what to do with the territory acquired
remained.

As indicated earlier the President had his own

ideas, but he also sought advice, and the advice was forthcoming.

Thomas Mann Randolph, a Senate friend of the Chief

Executive, informed Jefferson that the Senate would no doubt
ratify the treaty, but he stressed it would be absolutely

•
66 .
Jerry w. Knudson, "Newspaper Reaction to the
Louisiana Purchase," MHR, LXIII (January, 1969), 198.
Marshall Smelser, Thel5'emocratic Republic, 1801-1815 (New
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), p. 98. Federalist
opposition to the Purchase is well discussed in Merrill D.
Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 767-72.
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necessary to prevent Americans from settling on the west bank
of the Mississippi, by force if persuasion was not sufficient.
He further observed,
we cannot in any other way quiet Spain;
she is jealous of her Mexican subjects
and so fearful lest our people should
hold intercourse with them, • • •
our peace would be in danger unless we
can satisfy her by obliging ourselves
to let all the country over the river
remain.in the ha~ds ~?the Indians for
a considerable time.
·
Randolph, like the President, knew that numbers of
people would be anxious to get into Louisiana, but as there
were "so many great reasons for shut ting up the country, "
68
h e wou ld support t h e Presi·dent a 1 ong t h ese l"ines.

Accordingly, no land office had been opened in Upper Louisiana,
and no one was permitted to settle on the public lands there.
The military was to insure compliance.

69

Jefferson saw to

it that knowledge of his sentiments reached the eyes and ears

67

Thomas M. Randolph to Jefferson, October 29, 1803,
Jefferson Papers MSS, M~ssouri Historical Society, St. Louis,
Mo.
68

rbid.

69 Jefferson to Lewis Waugh, January 6, 1805, ibid.
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of the Spanish.

Some of the Spanish officials, however, had

also seen the acquisition of Louisiana as a possible force
to contain the American population rather than provide an
area of immediate settlement.

Shortly after the Purchase had

been concluded Casa Yrujo, the Spanish Minister in Washington,
o.c., brought to the attention of his country that the United
States Government was well aware of "the evils that will
. .
L . .
follow • • • f rom co 1 on1z1ng
ou1s1ana. 11 70

Continuing, he

noted,
All their efforts will be directed
on the contrary to concentrate
their population in the lands
that they actually occupy, regarding as necessary the acquisition
of Louisiana only in so far as it
excludes the French whom they feared
. hb ors • • • • 71
as neig
A few months later Yrujo again wrote to his superior
in Madrid that American ownership of Louisiana would provide
Spain with

l

t

tf
f

t

k
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casa Yrujo to'Cevallos, November 5, 1803, Robertson,
Louisiana u·nder Spain, France and the u. s. , II, 118-20.
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a natural and powerful barrier between
the population of the American citizens
and our possessions of New Mexico, • • •
in addition to the settlements of the
Indians, an immense desert which will
serve us equally for protection.72
Many factors -- administrative, military, diplomatic -led Jefferson to follow a particular course.

The vastness of

the territory alone was enough to make any responsible official proceed with caution.

Historians continually credit

the "Great American Desert" myth to explorers such as Zebulon
N. Pike and Stephen H. Long, but one wonders if this concept
formalized at a later date by these men was not actually given
birth by the earlier explorers.

The concept definitely

colored the thinking of Jefferson and his official family.
From Sibley, Freeman and Dunbar the President, when comparing
their accounts with the French and Spanish sources, could have
easily drawn a picture of a vast inhospitable land: land fit
for little more than to house the roaming tribes of Indians.
The "Great Prairie" was seen by many travelers· as a dry,
broken and hilly region where scarcity of water could easily
force one back.

72

The country
extending between the Panis
'

casa Yrujo to Cevallos, January 17, 1804, Nasatir,
Before Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 723.
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towns and Santa Fe was described as all "country, prairie,
a few scattering cedar knobs excepted."

73

As late as June, 1807, Jefferson talking about the
expeditions of the past few years concluded,
For the day must be very distant when
it will be either the interest or the
wish of the United States to extend
settlements into the interior of that
country.74
The more immediate issue confronting the President was
military in nature.

It was necessary that the United States

make some display of authority over the new land and its
inhabitants.

Frontier defense, of course, necessitated some

type of Indian policy.

The frontier disturbances in the

Northwest Territory and south of the Ohio during the 1790's
indicated that as the white man advanced westward the confrontations with the Indians would only increase unless some
better policy could be advanced.

The Indian was not accepting

the white man's civilization as readily as many wished or
73

Message From the President • • • , February, 1806,

p. 111.
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Terry L. Alford, "The West as a Desert In American
Thought Prior to Day's 1819-1820 Expedition," Journal of The
West, VIV (October, 1969); Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, June
22, 1807, Andrew A. Lipscomb (ed.), The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (19 vols.; Washington: The Thomas Jefferson
Memorial Association, 1903-1904), p. 102.
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expected.

Therefore, some men were suggesting that the two

races be kept apart until some kind of adjustment program
could be formulated.

When the Louisiana Purchase was con-

eluded many thought the answer had arrived.

All the lands

east of the Mississippi could be reserved for white settlement, and the Indians could be relocated in the vast territory west of the river.
born.

The process of "removal" was thus

Francis Prucha, in his recent work, The Sword of the

Republic, gives Thomas Jefferson credit for originating
"this noble dream of moving the Indians to a permanent reser.
. . . . • • • " 75
vation
west o f th e Miss1ss1pp1

Throughout his adult life Jefferson had always been
prone to extol the virtues of the Indian.

Thomas Jefferson,

the rationalistic product of the Englightenment, let sentimentalism blur his scientific vision when his thoughts turned
to the "noble savage."

Taking into account the differences

in environment between the Indian and the white man, and
recognizing that the former were still barbarians, Jefferson
defended them against charges of "deficiency in sexual ardor

'
and lack of· domestic affection,"
and praised them "for
75

Prucha, Sword of the Republic, p. 74.
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courage an d f orti.• tude. ' 76
I

Now as President of the United States he had the
obligation to defend his nation's borders.

He was forced to

divest himself of tne sentimentality he had previously mani-

I

fested toward the Indian and remove him from the east bank

11

of the Mississippi.

Typical of his character, Jefferson

felt a need to rationalize his deeds; therefore, one can see
a stress on the humanistic factor of seeking to lead the
Indian into "the paths of peace and blessings of agricultural
society.

1177

The fraternal addresses to the Indians came

forth from the White House as never before.
Previous to informing Congress of his plans for the
Indians, Jefferson outlined his ideas to Secretary of War
Dearborn.

Hoping to establish a strong line of American

settlements along the Mississippi Jefferson suggested that,
Our proceedings with the Indians should
tend systematically to that object [procuring Indian lands] leaving the extinguishment of title in the interior
country to fall in as occasion may arise.
76

.

'

Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, Vol.
II of Jefferson and His Time (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1951), p. 102.
77
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The Indians being once closed in
between strong settled countries
on the Mississippi & Atlantic, will,
for want of game, be forced to agriculture, will find that small portions
of land well improved, will be worth
more to them than extensive forests
unemployed, and will be continually
parting with portions of them, for
money to buy stock, utensils &
necessities for their farms & families. 78
Despite all that he had said in the past about the
aborigines, he now felt a paternalistic authority must be
imposed upon them for their own good.

To William Henry

Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory he wrote:
In this way our settlements will
gradually circumscribe & approach
the Indians, & they will in time
either incorporate with us as
citizens of the U.S. or remove
beyond the Mississippi • . • • As
to their fear, we presume that our
strength & their weakness is now so
visible that they must see we have
only to shut our hand to crush them,
& that all our liberalities to them
proceed from motives of pure humanity
only.79

'

78Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, December 29, 1802,
cited in ibid., p. 274.
79

Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, February 27,
1803, ibid., p. 275.
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As noted above the military situation necessitated
some display of authority.
of opinion loomed forth.

It was here that differences
By the end of 1804, a survey of

the troop distribution in the Mississippi Valley showed the
following:
Fort Massac 61, Kaskaskia 80, St.
Louis 57, New Madrid 16, Arkansas
Post 16, Ouachita 19, Attakapas
14, Opelousas 47, Natchitoches 75,
New Orleans 375, Fort st. Philip
67, Fort Adams 4, Fort Pickering
16.80
Wilkinson was calling for more posts especially on the upper
Mississippi and Missouri rivers, but the War Department felt
the establishment of trading posts with garrison support was
sufficient for the moment.
frontier adequate or not?

Were military preparations on the
The answer depends upon one's

analysis of the whole Indian problem facing the Jefferson
Administration, as well as the potentially explosive diplomatic situation.

In 1805, however, General James Wilkinson

felt a need to expand military posts.

He had been appointed

Governor of. the Territofy of Louisiana (Upper Louisiana) in
March, 1805, and was charged to "conciliate the friendship &

80

Prucha, Sword of the Republic, p. 73.
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esteem of the Indians generally of that extensive country, &
to produce pease & harmony • • • between them & the white
.
"81
inhabitants.

.
Af ter surveying
the situation Wilkinson

observed to the Secretary of War,
When I estimate the number and force
of the Indian nations, who inhabit
the Country watered by the Missouri
and the Mississippi, and who if not
made our friends will become our
enemies -- when I survey the
Jealousies and the rivalry which
exist on the side of Canada, -When I anticipate the fears,
alarms and counteractions, which
must necessarily be exertsd on the
side of New Mexico, -- When I cast
my eyes over the expanse of Territory to be occupied or controuled, and
glance at futurity, I hope you will
pardon me Sir for observing, with all
due deference and respect to my
superiors, that we are not in sufficient strength, of men or means,
to meet the occasion and profit by
the favourable circumstances of the
moment __ 82

The Secretary of War did not share Wilkinson's concern for immediate precautions.

James Wilkinson had a very

81·Secretary of War
' to Wilkinson, April 19, 1805,
Carter, Territorial Papers, XII, 116-17.
82

wilkinson to Secretary of War, September 22,
1805, ibid., XIII, 230.
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personal interest in the Southwest; doubtless this interest
colored his professional attitude.

His role in affecting

Governmental policy will be discussed in the following
chapter.

For the moment, however, it seems to be well

established that as Jefferson ended one term and advanced
deep into his second administration, the Federal Government
was not anxiously pressing at the doors of the rich (?)
mines of Northern Mexico.

'

l

CHAPTER IV

THE AMERICAi"lS REACH SA."lTA FE

It is impossible to discuss any phase of Southwestern history for the early nineteenth century without
mentioning the name of James Wilkinson.

Few Americans in

an official capacity were more directly tied to the destinies
of United States-Spanish relations than this controversial
figure.

Due to his military and civilian administrative

positions, which he held concurrently for a period of time,
Wilkinson was able in a large way to direct American involvement in the trans-Mississippi West.

The fact that this

"backstairs Brigadier" was also on the Spanish pension rolls
as Agent Number 13, only complicates any evaluation of the
man and his activities.

His nefarious activities as a spy

and double agent, as well as his attachment to the unsavory
machinations of Aaron Burr, are only too well known.

The

'
man that John Randolph described
as "from the bark to the
very core a villian," has been the subject of numerous
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biograp h ies,
monograp h s an d other stud'ies. l

When all is·

said and done, however, one still finds it most difficult
to label Wilkinson with the onerous title of "traitor."
True, he did sell information to the Spanish, true, he did
cavort with Aaron Burr in some type of intrigue which probably called for the invasion of Mexico, or the separation
of the Ohio Valley region from the United States, or both.
The exact nature of the intrigue has never come to light.
Yet it is difficult to deny that as an American military
officer he served his country well on more than one occasion.
Perhaps Marshall Smelser expresses.this man's career well
when he states, "Wilkinson panned the dregs of international
intrigue for easy money, which he used for inconspicuous
consumption.

Quite inadvertently, his humbug and avarice

may have saved his country."

1

2

Thomas P. Abernethy, The South In the New Nation,

1789-1819 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1961), p. 294. Among the biographies of James Wilkinson

the one most recommended is James Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished
Warrior: !1ajor-General James Wilkinson (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1938). As Wilkinson was so intimately
tied to the Burr Conspiracy, one should not fail to note
Thomas P. Abernethy, The Burr Conspiracy (New York: Oxford
Press, 1954) •
2

Smelser, The Democratic Republic • • • , p. 112.
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No attempt will be made here to convict Wilkinson
of malfeasance in office or acquit him of all charges.

His

biographers have been trying to do both for many years, albeit
inconclusively.

He will be evaluated in light of his positions

as General of the United States Army and Governor of the Territory of Louisiana, two positions from which he actively contributed to America's official stand relative to the Spanish
Southwest, and, in a very special way, affected United States Spanish diplomacy.
James Wilkinson was trusted by several Presidents and
numerous other officials including his immediate superior,
Secretary of War Henry Dearborn.

3

While Dearborn and Jeffer-

son may have disagreed with the strategy of General Wilkinson,
they felt his judgement to be in the best interest of the
nation.

It is only years after the events described here that

the questionable aspects of Wilkinson's life became a topic

3

General Dearborn cast his fortunes with the party of
Jefferson, and was regarded as a leading representative of
the Republicans in New England for many years. On the accession of Thomas Jeffersoh to the Presidency in March, 1801,
Dearborn was appointed Secretary of War, a position which he
occupied for the following eight years. There seems to be
no reason to question his honesty or ability, but he was
definitely susceptible to Wilkinson's slyness. Interesting
comments on his penchant for details may be found in Prucha,
The Sword of the Republic, pp. 172-74.
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of official investigation and public scandal.

4

The Federal

Government accepted Wilkinson's plans and moves at face
value, and any analysis of his role vis-a-vis this nation's
official position must take such a fact into consideration.
Therefore, while taking note of questionable motives where
pertinent, Wilkinson's official acts will be discussed primarily on the basis of his official correspondence and public
records.
James Wilkinson, of course, had been personally
interested in the Spanish Southwest for many years.

His

journey down the Mississippi in the late eighteenth century
to confer with high ranking Spanish officials was the
beginning; his tenuous partnership with Aaron Burr, in what
is now known as the "Burr Conspiracy," furthered his
4
The trial of Aaron Burr brought to light many of
General Wilkinson's machinations and certainly placed a cloud
over his name, but he was able to explain away most of what
he had done. He did not satisfy all present, however, and
in December, 1807, John Randolph asked for an investigation
of the rumors that Wilkinson had received money from the
Spanish while an officer of the United States Army. Wilkinson, in turn, asked the President for a court of inquiry.
In July, 1808, the cour~ made its findings public. It declared that no evidence had been discovered of corruption
and Wilkinson had behaved "with honour to himself and fidelity
to his country." Several more investigations and a second
court martial faced the General before the end of his career,
but no convictions were obtained. Details of the various
investigations may be found in Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior.
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involvement, and Zebulon Pike became his instrument to penetrate the Spanish bastion of Santa Fe.

When appointed

Governor of the Louisiana Territory in the Spring of 1805,
Wilkinson had the perfect opportunity to further any design
he may have had relative to the penetration of Northern New
Spain, be it military or commercial penetration.

Neverthe-

less, he also had a difficult legitimate task to master.
As noted in the previous chapter he was charged with
the pacification of the Indians and responsibility for

Ii

carrying out the Indian policy of the Jefferson administration.
It has already been noted that the General did not see eye to
eye on military strategy with the Executive Department, parI

ticularly Secretary of War

~earborn.

But a point well worth

emphasizing is that General Wilkinson had been on the
Louisiana frontier from the time of the Purchase and even
before.

He had first-hand knowledge of the politics, military

defense, social matters and diplomatic activities, knowledge
he put to good use.
Shortly following the formal transfer of Upper

' pressuring the War Department for
Louisiana, Wilkinson began
more troops and more posts.

The Jefferson administration, on

the other hand, was pledged to a regular military force of

I

:
'
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the bare minimum necessary to police the frontier.

5

Given

the precarious situation between the United States and Spain
at the moment, and possibly for reasons of self interest,
Wilkinson worked diligently to impress upon Dearborn the need
for extended military posts.

Citing the views of another

military officer, Major James Bruff, who had previously served
as commander of Upper Louisiana, the General noted that the
militia was poorly armed and organized, "nor even rolls of
companies taken or the number ascertained. •

.. 6

The General

further stated,
Suffer me now to suggest, that if a
Military Post was established on the
Missouri at the mouth of the river
Platt [sic] between whose waters
and those of the del nord [Rio
Grande] there is but a short carrying
place; where Traders from Santa Fe
meet ours -- as is absolutely the
case at this moment. • • • They

5

Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians, A Study in
Administrative History, 1801-1829 (New York: The Free Press,
1951), pp. 211-12. L. D. Ingersoll, A History of the War
Department of the United States, with Biographical Sketches
of the Secretaries (Wash'ington: 1879), pp. 100-01. One
could also refer to Prucha, Sword of the Republic.
6

wilkinson to Dearborn, November 2, 1804, Carter,
Territorial Papers, XIII, 59.
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might check; if not prevent; 1711e
depredations of Indians • • •
Relations with Spain during the months subsequent
to the Louisiana Purchase were most precarious; the national
government was quite aware of the situation.

In early Feb-

ruary, 1805, Wilkinson received an interesting missive from
the Secretary of War.

Given the General's personal interest

in the Southwest and the tone of later directives from the War
Department, this letter takes on added importance.

Drawing

attention to Spanish military activities in the TexasLouisiana region Dearborn instructed Wilkinson to alert his
officers,
as will result in satisfactory
intelligence as to what movements are in operation, or have
been effected, within the boundaries
of Louisiana, between the Rio Bravo
and our advanced posts to the Westward of the Mississippi; from the
Red River to the borders of the Bay
of Mexico. • • • It will be particularly desirable to know what is
doing at St. Antonio • • • •
Individuals in the character
of hunters or traders may probably

7 Ibid.

This information is actually taken from the
enclosure-Wilkinson included in his letter to Dearborn: Bruff
~to Wilkinson, September 29, 1804.

i
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be emplo~ed with secrecy and
success.
Was this directive not encouraging to a man who was
already busily engaged in "sounding out" the situation on the
frontiers of New Spain?

For some sixteen years Wilkinson had

studied the strategic value of Santa Fe and New Orleans as
approaches to Mexico.

The adventurer and trader Philip Nolan

served as a source of information for many years but his
untimely death in 1801 deprived the General of a valuable
agent.

9

A few years later Wilkinson's interest again became

active when he received an invitation from Jefferson to come
to Washington and meet Baron Alexander von Humboldt.

This

eminent scientist had concluded his now famous expedition
throughout much of Spain's New World empire, and was visiting

8

oearborn to Wilkinson, February 26, 1805, WD. Letters
Sent-Military Affairs, Roll. 2.

,j
I

9

Loomis, Pedro Vial • . • , pp. 206-25. Issac J. Cox,
"Opening the Santa Fe Trail," Missouri Historical Review, XXV
(1931), 36. Philip Nolan was an associate of Wilkinson, on
good terms with Miro and Carondelet, and an adviser at one
time to Thomas Jefferson: He was a prodigious adventurer,
daring and ambitious, but apparently without deep loyalty
to anybody but himself. Like his associate Wilkinson this
mustanger was able to work both sides of the road at once,
although he proved to be less clever than the American
General.
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Washington, D. c., on his way back to Europe.

The Baron gave

Jefferson a nineteen-page "tableau statistique," reporting
population and other data on Mexico.

The information was

submitted by von Humboldt upon request of the American President who was obviously interested in all data relative to the
lO
.
t e d wes t ern b oun d ary o f Louisiana.
' ·
area o f th e d ispu
Wilkinson was unable to accept the President's invitation at
the moment and lamented the fact that the Baron would have to
depart the United States before a meeting could be arranged.
Wilkinson related to the President, "I feel a strong Interest
in haveing [sic] his answers to the queries which I take the
liberty to inclose you, because by such answers [I] shall be
able to determine the accuracy of his information. 1111
10

The

Donald Jackson (ed.), The Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike With Letters and Related Documents ( 2 vols.:
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), II, 370. Humboldt visited Washington in June, 1804. He loaned Albert
Gallatin a copy of his map (yet to be published) , and submitted the "tableau statistique" to Jefferson in response to
a request made on June 9, 1804. Contrary to what others
have said about Humboldt presenting a copy of his map to the
President, Donald Jackson cites evidence to support his claim
that a copy was merely loaned for a brief period of time to
the Secretary of the TreJsury: a copy which Humboldt received
back on June 27, 1804. During the time the map was in
Washington, however, Aaron Burr secured it for a brief time
and had it copied. This map, or portion thereof, found its
way to Wilkinson and subsequently to Pike.
11

L

Ibid.
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"queries" in Wilkinson's letter, however, suggest that he was
asking for information he already possessed, such as the
population of the province of Nueva Leon. 12
Meanwhile, following his appointment as Governor of
the Louisiana Territory and initiating his plans with Aaron
Burr, Wilkinson headed for St. Louis to take up his new
administrative duties.

Upon reaching the city General Wilkin-

son first met and dined with Auguste Chouteau, instead of
Major Bruff, the more logical person to contact according to
military protocol.

Chouteau was a leading civil figure in

the city, being a magistrate.

The Chouteau family had been

leading and influential traders out of St. Louis for several
generations.

13

Wilkinson was not unaware of Chouteau's position

in the community and knew the latter had received trading
rights from the Spanish government before Upper Louisiana
12

Ibid. The above incident is also described in Issac
J. Cox, The-Ea°rly Exploration of Louisiana (Cincinnati:
University of Cincinnati Press, 1905), p. 91, but the author
gives no explanation or analysis concerning the queries of
Wilkinson.
13

Loornis, Pedro'Vial • . • , p. 62. At the age of
fourteen Chouteau had been sent by Laclede (his stepfather)
to help in the building of St. Louis. He early gained
experience in dealing with the Indians, and had a monopoly
on Osage trade from 1794 to 1802. He was one of the first
three judges of Louisiana under the United States, and in
1808 was made colonel of the St. Louis militia.
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became American territory.

Chouteau was also one of the

chief promoters of the local fur trade in which Governor
Wilkinson would demonstrate more than a passing interest.
By the end of July, 1805, the clever Wilkinson had
already made use of his successful overtures to Chouteau
and had arranged for a Lieutenant George Peter with a military
escort to accompany Chouteau to the Osage country.

The de-

clared purpose of the expedition was to invite some of the
Indians to visit the nation's capital and meet their new

r

"Chief," but the trader was also to direct his attention to
gathering geographical information, particularly about the
distances to Santa Fe.

14

Wilkinson could thus carry out the

wishes of the President and at the same time serve his own
. h t b e. 15
en ds, wh atever th ey mig

Perhaps it was Auguste

Chouteau who convinced Wilkinson, however unwittingly, that
a road to Santa Fe was actually in the making.
Not satisfied with this sole effort, Wilkinson, around
the same time, dispatched Lieutenant Zebulon Montgomery Pike
to the source waters of the Mississippi.

This was the first

'
14

wilkinson to Chouteau, July 30, 1805, Carter,
Territorial Papers, XIII, 183.
15

L

cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail," p. 41.
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"errand" the young army officer was to perform for his commander.

Pike was to note geographical and scientific infer-

mation, and ascertain key locations for military posts between St. Louis and Prairie du Chien.

He was likewise to

arrange settlements of land acquisition from the Indians for
.
t a 11 a t.ions. 16
the propose d mi. l'itary ins

Pike left St, Louis

in July, 1805, and was back by the end of October.

The de-

tails of his Mississippi adventure are not of immediate concern here.

Whether the expedition was successful or not re-

mains a debatable question, but it did serve to give the young
lieutenant some experience before his major trek west.

As

General Wilkinson later phrased it, "they [the expeditions
of George Peter and Zebulon Pike] serve to instruct our young
officers and also our soldiery, on subjects which may hereafter
become interesting to the United States. 1117
Meanwhile Wilkinson continued his efforts to convince
a frugal administration to expand its military budget.

The

16

. f descrip
. t 'ion of the Mississippi expedition
A b rie
can be found in Prucha, 'sword of the Republic, pp. 88-91.
The full Journals and related documents can be located in
Jackson, Journals of Pike, I.

17wilkinson to Dearborn, August 25, 1805, Jackson,
Journals of Pike, I, 232.
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secretary of War had left no room for doubt as to projected
military spending when he informed the frontier commander
in early 1805 that "as no permanent Military Posts, can,
with propriety, be immediately established, it will be improper to incur any considerable expense, for works or
buildings at present."

18

Leonard White in his work, the

Jeffersonians, aptly describes the situation when he states,
"the election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800 and the appointment
of Albert Gallatin as Secretary of the Treasury • • • fore.
1 so ld"ier • • • • 1119
to ld l i"ttl e g 1 ory f or th e pro f essiona
Undaunted, Wilkinson wrote Dearborn shortly after taking
over his new position,

On the Subject of Indian affairs in
this New World, it must occur, that
to extend the name and influence of
the United States to the remote
Nations, will require considerable
disbursements: our relations to
Spain & Britain on our Southern,
Western and Northern unexplored
frontiers Suggest the expediency
of attaching to us, all the Nations
who drink of the waters which fall

18

'

Dear b orn to Wi"lk.inson, April 19, 1805, Carter,
Territorial Papers, XIII, 116.
19

white, The Jeffersonians, • • • , p. 211.
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into the Gulph of Mexico; • • •
The Comrnanches, who resort the
tract of Country between the
Osages and S~ Afee [sic], during
the temperature Seasons, merit
particular attention, because they
• • • have it in their power to
facilitate or impede our march to
New Mexico, should such a move20
ment ever become necessary • • •
Wilkinson further informed the Secretary that he intended to
hold a conference with both the Osages and Comanches, who
were usually warring factions, by the following Spring.

21

The phrase, "our march to Santa Fe," in the above
letter has been cited often to emphasize the personal ambitions of Wilkinson.

Could the remark not be in line with

military preparedness for a potentially explosive border war?
Even Dearborn, whose parsimony has already been noted, saw
the strategic value of a "Santa Fe highway" stretching forth
from St. Louis.

22

In fact, according to the official

20

wilkinson to Dearborn, July 27, 1805, Carter,
Territorial Papers, XIII, 169.
21
22

il.··......

Ibid.

'

wilkinson to Dearborn, September 8, 1805, Jackson,
Journals of Pike, II, 100. This letter clearly indicates that
Wilkinson and Dearborn had discussed the military value of
a road to New Mexico. In a letter to General Wilkinson dated
October 16, 1805, Dearborn states "I am more fully convinced,
by your communication, of the practicability, if necessary,
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correspondence, it was not until late 1805 that Wilkinson,
himself, considered any land expedition from St. Louis to
Santa Fe practical.

In a letter to the Secretary of War

in September Wilkinson stated,
I recollect having once disagreed
with you as to the Practicability
of carrying an expedition from this
point into New Mexico, and my objections were founded on the length
of the March, and the difficulty of
Subsisting the Troops -- but these
Obstacles have vanished, before
the information I have obtained
since my arrival here; for I find
we may derive abundant supplies
of meat from the fields and Forests
• • • and that the practicable
distance does not exceed 900 miles,
over a surface in general Smooth
23

...

Meanwhile Wilkinson had informed the Government about
the expeditions up the Mississippi and to the Osages, flattering himself that the results would "justify the toil and

of a military movement, either by the Platt, the Osage or
the Arkansas, to the Eastern part of Mexico; -- and I am
not sure that a project .pf that kind may not become necessary." See· Carter, Territorial Papers, XIII, 240.
23 'lk'
W1 ins on to Dear b orn, s ep t e rnb er 8 , 1805 , J ac k son,
Journals of Pike, II, 100-01.
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expense.

1124

He then proceeded to draw up a detailed project

for military deployment throughout the territory:

Taking it for granted, that we shall
not be able to controul the Indians,
before we get possession of the interior of their Country, I beg leave
to submit to your consideration, the
expediency of making enquiry, for the
most critical points of occupancy, on
both Rivers. . . • I would recommend
a Position on the River plate [Platte]
• • • at the Panis Towns on the right
bank of the said River, fifty leagues
(french computation) from its confluence with the Missouri, and Thirteen Days moderate walk, from the
Settlements of New Mexico -- 25

Later the same month Wilkinson again brought the
Secretary of War's attention to the strategic importance of
Santa Fe.

Obviously quoting from various bits of information

brought to St. Louis by traders and trappers, Wilkinson informed Dearborn that he had discovered a "most direct route
to St. Afee [sic] ."

26

Perhaps the most interesting and curious

24

wilkinson to Dearborn, August 10, 1805, Carter,
Territorial Papers, XIII, 183.
25

'

rbid. The actual distances involved to New Mexico
obviously remain vague in the mind of Wilkinson.
26

wilkinson to Dearborn, August 25, 1805, Jackson,
Journals of Pike, I, 232-33.
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item in this letter of August 25, 1805, was the General's
statement concerning geography.

Referring to the famous

map of Baron von Humboldt, Wilkinson noted that the river
"of which the mouth is said to be unknown, is the Arkansaw
[sic] which gives also the small branch marked R. Rouge near
to St. Afee.

,.2 7

Wilkinson is saying here that the river

rising in the vicinity of Santa Fe, believed to be the Red
by von Humboldt, was actually a branch of the Arkansas.
The German scientist had relied extensively on the earlier
maps of Mier y Pacheco for his delineation of Northern New
Spain, which meant that all of the cartographic errors of
the eighteenth century were perpetuated by the influential
Humboldt map.

The Baron showed the Red River rising in the

mountains east of Taos, a mark which he borrowed from Mier
y Pacheco, and merged it with the Pecos calling the result
"The Rio Rojo de Natchitoches ou Rio de Pecos."

28

As Donald

Jackson so cogently points out, Wilkinson's statement to

28

'

Ibid., 455. Although not published until 1812, the
map was actually drawn in 1803, and von Humboldt had it with
him when he visited President Jefferson in 1804. The facts
are not clear, but somehow the information on the. Humboldt
map found its way to General Wilkinson and was transmitted
to the charts carried by Pike. See footnote tlO.

l
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oearborn mentioned above was a correction on the Humboldt
map.

If the General truly knew what he had corrected from

Humboldt's map and passed this information on to Pike, the
whole motive factor of the Pike "mistake" would have to be
taken in a different light.

29

To rely upon Donald Jackson

once more, he believes that the confused wanderings of
Pike "are ample proof he accepted Humboldt." 30
Throughout the months of August and September
Governor Wilkinson continued to dwell upon the same ideas
of needed posts on the frontier and an increased Indian pacification program.

He felt the two points were inseparable.

Until peace could be restored between the Osage and the
Comanches, and an understanding reached with the Pawnees,
no allegiance could be counted upon.
ness would also be jeopardized.

Our military prepared-

The single best summary of

Wilkinson's defense plans can be found in his letter of
September 8, 1805, to Secretary of War Dearborn.

Due to the

subsequent actions of Wilkinson this letter becomes quite
important and should be quoted at some length.

'
29

Ibid., I, 456-57. Donald Jackson does not believe
Pike knew of or accepted Wilkinson's "corrections," but
accepted Humboldt's notations.
)Oibid.
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The nearest water approach from the
Missouri to St. Afee, will be found by
the superior right branch of the Osage
River, which is navigable in general
from the 1st March to the 10th of June,
to a village of traders & hunters,
standing about fifteen leagues above the
fork, called Choeatou [Chouteau] -- from
this place to the crossing of the Arkans aw river in the route, is five days easy
march. I have not been able to ascertain
the distance from this [place] to the
Mountains but the Mountain is refuted
[sic] to be, about 100 miles [from] St.
Afee where you cross it, the country
campaign &c. abounding with sheep,
cattle, and horses . • . •
It appears from my information, that the
Arkansaw river is navigable, far above the
crossing to light Batteaux, and of course
should there be no obstructions below,
that river will furnish us the nearest
water approach to New Mexico. It therefore becomes extremely desireable it
should be reconnoitred, and this cannot
be done, with any prospect of safety, or
Success, before we have brought the
numerous Erratic nation of Y,a, tans,
or Commanchees to a conference, because they reign the uncontrouled Masters
of that Country • • • •
Should We be involved in a War, (which
Heaven Avert) and it should be judged
expedient to take possession of New
Mexico, magazines of flour, ammunition
and arms, par~icularly Cavalry equipment with ten field Pieces, should be
dispatched up the Arkansaw or Osage
River about the 1st of March, and a
Corps of 100 Artillerists, 400 Cavalry,
400 Riflemen and 1100 Musquetry, should
move from this place about the 20th of
April • • • • These dispositions with
judicious and rapid movements, • • •

L
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and we should take possession of
the Northern Province without
opposition • • • • The uncertainty
of human life and the instability
of political affairs, induce me to
lodge this information with you in
its present crude State, • • • 31
Wilkinson felt that Spain, especially in a hostile
situation could employ the Indians "to obstruct our enterprizes and to harass our frontiers.

1132

He knew the Spaniards

were just as well aware of their potential advantage and he
wanted to forestall any headway they might be making. 33

It

was in this same letter that the Secretary of War was given
notice of Wilkinson's plans to send out an expedition to the
River Platte in the fall to construct a military post.
The result of these plans was an expedition headed
by the General's own son, Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, up
the Missouri to the mouth of the Platte in October, 1805.

31

wilkinson to Dearborn, September 8, 1805, ibid.,
II, 100-102.
32wilkinson to Uearborn, September 22, 1805, Carter,
Territorial· Papers, XIII, 229.
33 Ibid.
ibid., 235.

--------

L

Wilkinson to Dearborn, October 8, 1805,
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The expedition failed to reach its destination.

About 300

miles up the Missouri a clash occurred with Indians, and the
encounter was sufficient to check the enterprise.
was bacl( in St. Louis by December.

The group

34

The United States Government was not particularly
happy with what James Wilkinson was doing, and by October,
1805, the General knew it.

Even before Lt. Wilkinson had

started to ascend the Missouri, the Secretary of War had
penned a directive (which did not reach St. Louis before the
expedition h_ad set out) again emphasizing the government's
policy of consolidation rather than dispersa1.

35

The di-

rective was followed a few weeks later by another "reminder"
of the current sentiment of the administration.

There was

no excuse for any misunderstanding on Wilkinson's part when
he read the following:
no detachment should be made, to any
distant new post, at present. And, as
the establishment of new & distant posts
will, at all times, be a proper subject
for Executive discretion, the approbation of the President of the United
States, should,be considered necessary
34
35

Cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail," 43-44.

oearborn to Wilkinson, October 10, 1805, Carter,
Territorial Papers, XIII, 239.

L
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previous to any actual arrangements for such objects.
I hope you have not made any
detachments or taken steps,
which may not accord with the
foregoing observations. 36
Interestingly enough, in light of the above, the
'

secretary also informed Wilkinson that relations with Spain
were very cloudy and he was becoming more convinced that in
the event of a rupture a military movement by the Platte or
Arkansas rivers to New Mexico would be advisable.

37

Never-

theless the operations by the Genernl out of St. Louis were
being officially frowned .upon.

A rather stinging reprimand

was forthcoming in the latter part of November.

Secretary

Dearborn wrote General Wilkinson,
Sir, Your ordering a detachment to
the River Plat [sic] especially with
a view of establishing a Military Post
at a distance from 600 to 800 miles
from St. Louis, is very much to be
regretted. Indeed, it was not believed
you would undertake the execution of

36 oe·arborn to Wilkinson,
'
November 2, 180 5, ibid. ,
251-52.
37 nearborn to Wilkinson, October 16, 1805, ibid.,
239.
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such distant projects without the
express approbation of the President of the u.s . . . . 38
Wilkinson was further instructed to recall his
expedition and take no such further moves unless directed
by the Presi.dent. 39

As already mentioned, other factors had

caused the return of the General's son and his men.

Wilkin-

son did not let the reaction of the War Department hinder his
future plans concerning investigation of the West.

In fact,

he penned a lengthy defense of his actions to the Secretary
of War strongly emphasizing the necessity of making American
strength visible to the Indians between the Missouri and the
Spanish settlements in New Mexico.

He saw a definite need to

draw the natives away from Spanish influence; to Wilkinson
.
.
40
th e nee d was imperative.

Official Washington apparently

was not impressed, and with trouble increasing on the TexasLouisiana frontier troops were being concentrated in that area.
By May of the following year Wilkinson himself was in command

38 oearborn to Wilkinson, November 21, 1805, ibid.,
290.
39

l

Ibid.

40 wilkinson to Dearborn, December 30, 1805, ibid.,
355-56.
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along the Sabine.

The military emergency, however, did not

deter this army commander from setting afoot one of the most
famous and controversial of all western expeditions.
Zebulon Pike had barely returned from the upper reaches
of the Mississippi when Wilkinson dispatched him to the Southwest.

Exactly what part the Pike expedition played regarding

the General's personal ambitions is not readily discernable.
The Burr Conspiracy was well underway at this time, and
Wilkinson was a major figure in it.

Any information he could

obtain about Spanish strength in the Santa Fe region could
only prove advantageous.

From a military point of view, how-

ever, the Pike expedition could not be considered out of line
with military preparedness.

The Indian problem did not need

attention, and the explosive military situation was real.
In light of the above the question arises, did the
General purposely set the stage?
easily found.

Again, the answer is not

What role did Zebulon Pike play in the drama?

To his dying day Pike would contend that his expedition to
the west had no connection with the Burr Conspiracy.

If the

explorer's words may be 'accepted at face value, one can refer
to his Account published in 1810, where he states,

l

The great objects in view by this
expedition (as I conceived) in
addition to my instructions, were
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to attach the Indians to our
government, and to acquire such
geographical knowledge of the
south-western boundary of
Louisiana as to enable government to enter into a definitive
arrangement for a line of demarkation [sic] between that
territory and North Mexico.41
The official correspondence of the Pike expedition
tends to support this statement completely, but many historians have a strong suspicion that the Lieutenant received
additional secret instructions of a less savory nature.

What

about the personal character of Zebulon Montgomery Pike?
Here again there is little agreement among historians.

One

respected author describes Pike as an "ambitious young of.
. ' s commission.
.
.
.. 4 2
wh o was 1 oo k.ing f orward to a captain
f icer,

Another writer states that Pike's actions were "prompted by
selfishness and vanity and carried out in stupidity -- on
which last count, certainly it would not be hard to sustain
a conviction. 1143

One can read elsewhere that he was an

41 Pike's Preface. Jackson, Journals of Pike, I, xxiv.
42 Cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail," 47.
43

Loomis, Pedro Vial • • • , p. 235.
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"innocent pawn."

44

Donald Jackson, the foremost present-day

scholar on the Pike expeditions, believes the young junior
officer to have been basically honest and loyal, a "rather
simple soldier.

1145

Jackson concludes that Pike was guilty of

nothing more than attempting to explore the West and spy for
his country.

He was a spy and proud to be one. 46

The fact

does remain, however, that General Wilkinson ordered the Pike
expedition on his own authority without seeking prior authority
from Washington, D.C. -- a point on which he had been carefully briefed.
Pike received his orders in June, 1806.

By this date

Lewis and Clark were back on the upper reaches of the Missouri
on their return trek and the Freeman expedition up the Red
River had been turned back by the Spanish.

At the moment

there were legitimate reasons existing for sending Pike west.

44

Smelser, The Democratic Republic, p. 131.

45 Donald Jackson, "The American Entrada: A Spanish
Point of View," printed in John Francis McDermott (ed.),
The Frontier Reexamined' (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1967), p. 20.
46 Donald Jackson, "How Lost was Zebulon Pike?"
American Heritage (February, 1965), 75-80.
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some Osage Indians needed to be escorted back to their
villages; the Kansas had sought American aid in making peace
with the Osages, and, as no successful contact had been made
with the Comanche tribes, the General felt the time was
appropriate.

To these duties Wilkinson added instructions

for Pike to explore the headwaters of the Arkansas River.
Upon the completion of this reconnaissance he was to proceed
to the Red River and descend that river to the United States
post at Natchitoches.

This part of the expedition could

easily have been scientific and military purposes to benefit
the nation, Wilkinson's personal ambitions notwithstanding.
The instructions to Pike read in part,

l

As your Interview with the
Cammanchees [sic] will probably
lead you to the Head Branches of
the Arkansaw [sic] , and Red Rivers
you may find yourself approximate
to the settlements of New Mexico,
and therefore it will be necessary
you should move with great circumspection, to keep clear of any Hunting or reconnoitring parties from
that province, & to prevent alarm or
offense because the affairs of Spain,
& the United States appear to be on
the point of amicable adjustment,
and more over it is the desire of
the President, to cultivate the
Friendship & Harmonious Intercourse
of all the Nations of the Earth, &
particularly our near neighbors the
Spaniards • • • •
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It is an object of much Interest with
the Executive, to ascertain the
Direction, extent, & navigation of
the Arkansaw, & Red Rivers; as far
therefore as may be compatible with
these Instructions and practicable
to the means you may Command, I wish
you to carry your views to those
. t s, • • • 47
s ub Jee
Additional instructions were issued to Pike on July
12, 1806, informing him that a Dr. John Hamilton Robinson
. .
was to JOl.n
t h e party as a vo 1 unteer surgeon. 48

It is this

move that greatly increases the factors of intrigue and
espionage surrounding the motivation of Wilkinson and the
whole Pike expedition.

In addition to his stated duties,

Robinson was entrusted with the ostensible mission of collecting the monetary claims that the St. Louis merchant
William Morrison had against the trader Baptiste La Lande,
who had departed for Santa Fe in 1804 and had never
returned.

49

Many works on the Pike expedition, including the

47 Wi.'lk.inson to Pike, June 24, 1806, Jackson, Journals
of Pike, I, 285-87.
48

'

w~lk'
i
inson to Pike, July 12, 1806, ibid.

I

288-89.
1.I

49

The Morrison-Lalande incident was developed in
Chapter II, above.

L
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dated but respected edition of Pike's Journals by Elliot
coues, see the addition of Robinson to the expedition as
proof that Santa Fe and not the Red River was the primary
objective of the venture.

50

Wilkinson's motives remain a

question mark.
Zebulon Montgomery Pike with his detachment of one
lieutenant (James B. Wilkinson, the General's son), nineteen
men, an interpreter and a volunteer surgeon, set out on July
15, 1806.

They headed up the Missouri to the Osage River,

following that river to its source and continuing to the
Kansas, on whose Republican Fork they held council with the
Pawnees.

They then turned southwest, crossing the branches

of the Kansas River including Smokeyhill Forks, to the ·
Arkansas.

50

It was here that Lt. Wilkinson was sent down

Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire • . • , p. 47.
Professor Goetzrnann relies on Coues for most of his conclusions about the Pike expedition. Issac J. Cox believes
Robinson's real purpose for being a member of the expedition
was to carry out Wilkinson's object of exploring a trail
directly to Santa Fe. See Cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail,"
48. In his two volume work on the fur trade Chittenden notes
that "every_ circumstanc~ of the expedition indicates that it
Was all a scheme to get into Santa Fe • • • ,"The American
Fur Trade • . • , II, 493. Donald Jackson disagrees completely. He notes that Robinson brought no private communications from Wilkinson to Salcedo, and that the former
Was not a party to "the General's shadowy intrigues with
Spain." See Jackson, Journals of Pike, II, 206. /
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river with despatches and a map of the region thus far
traversed.

51

The remaining group, alarmed somewhat by

evidence that a large Spanish party had recently visited
the .area (a point discussed below), turned west rather than
continuing in a southerly direction.

The Rockies were first

sighted in mid-November which Pike described as
a spur of the grand western chain
oflilOUntains which divide the waters
of the Pacific from those of the
Atlantic oceans, • • • they appear
to present a natural boundary
between the province of Louisiana
and New Mexico and would 0e a defined and natural boundary. 52
This statement by Pike seems to be further evidence
that he was relying on the Humboldt map.
,,

It has been indi-

cated above that Baron von Humboldt relied heavily upon
Mier y Pacheco's map of the famous Escalante expedition for
his "Map of the Kingdom of New Spain."

By his own admission

the German scientist noted that most of the western part of
North America was "still but very imperfectly known,"
51 .

53

and,

'

Jackson, Journals of Pike, II, 17-18.

52Journal Entry for November 15, 1806, ibid., I, 345.
53

l

Wheat, The Spanish Entrada • • • , I, 132-33.
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although he was reluctant to "draw from suspicious sources,"

54

he incorporated the cargographic efforts of the Spanish for
the entire northwestern third of his famous map published in
1811.

Since Mier y Pacheco (and Humboldt) had pictured the

Rocky Mountains as the spine or backbone of North America in
which all the major rivers of the continent had their source,
it is little wonder that Pike came to his geographical con.
55
clusions.
To continue with the expedition, the remainder of
November .and December were spent exploring the Rockies north
to the sources of the South Platte and as far south as the
Sangre de Cristos Mountains of southern Colorado and New
Mexico.

It was during these weeks that Pike came to the

conclusion that the sources of the Platte and Arkansas came
from "that grand reservoir of snows and fountains, 1156 a

54

Ibid., 134. Humboldt's "Map of the Kingdom of New
Spain," was published in two large sheets and extends from
Natchitoches on the east to the head of the Gulf of California on the west, and from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec
on the south, to the "Lac de Timpanogos" on the north.
55 .
'
Alter, "Father Escalante' s Map," p. 67.
56 Pike's Dissertation on Louisiana, Jackson, Journals
Of Pike, II, 26.
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reservoir which also fed the other major rivers flowing forth
from the Rocky Mountain chain, including the Red River.

Carl

Wheat calls this idea the most forceful expression to date
of the long-held hypothesis of a common continental river
source.

57

William Clark swallowed this notion lock, stock,

and barrel, and added the information later to his famous
manuscript map of the Western country.
the perpetuation of mythical geography.

Yet another step in
58

In mid-January, after leaving some of his men in a
.

small fort on the Fountain river, a tributary of the upper
Arkansas, Pike set out with Dr. Robinson and twelve men toward the south.

Two weeks later the party reached the Rio

Grande which Pike believed (?) to be the Red River.

On the

Rio Consejos, a small branch of the Rio Grande, the

57

Wheat, From Lewis and Clark . • • , II, 18.

58

Ibid. Some inferences about Western geography
indicate that Pike may have seen a copy of William Clark's
map of 1805. This map was drawn while Lewis and Clark were
wintering with the Mandans in 1804-05 and was sent down the
Missouri in the spring. for the country west of the Mandan
Villages, Clark relied wholly upon second-hand knowledge and
legend. On this map the headwaters of the Yellowstone and
the South Platte intertwine, and the sources of the Arkansas,
Rio Grande and the Colorado are close by. Donald Jackson
notes that Pike himself "could hardly have drawn a better
representation of his reservoir of snows and fountains."
Jackson, Journals of Pike, I, 461.
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half-frozen party constructed a rude stockade.

It was here

on February 26, 1807, that a detachment of Spanish soldiers
arrived to "escort" Pike and his men to Santa Fe.

When told

he was on the Rio Grande, Pike's retort was simply "is not
this the Red River.

1159

Whether he was truly lost or not has remained a controversial point among historians.

Given the state of

geographic knowledge and cartographic accuracy at the time,
one could easily agree with Carl Wheat's evaluation of Pike's
geographic conclusions.

He contends that Pike, using the

maps available to him, should hardly be condemned for not
recognizing the distinction between the various rivers, none
of which he had seen.

Pike's confusion regarding the rivers

of the West and his "reservoir of snows" idea were both "part
and parcel of the ideas of the age."

60

Accident or no, Pike and his men were on Spanish soil
and were escorted to the New Mexican Capital as closely
guarded "guests" of the Spanish government.

If he were a

spy he surely had an opportunity seldom afforded men in that

'
59

Journal Entry for February 26, 1806, ibid., 384.

60 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 26-27.
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profession.

Before his sojourn was complete he had ample

time to observe everything about New Mexico, and, as it
turned out, much of Northern New Spain.

By the second of

March the American party was in Santa Fe.

From there Pike

and his group were escorted to Chihuahua where the CommandantGeneral could make a final decision on the future of the expedition.

Although his notes and papers were confiscated,

Pike was treated in a manner befitting his rank and position.

f~"
i,~
r

~

After several weeks at the Provincial headquarters of Nemesio
Salcedo, the Americans were escorted across Texas to Natchitoches, reaching that post on July 1, 1807.

61

Back on

American soil Zebulon Pike had completed what one writer
describes as the most successful espionage operation ever
.
h.
conducted in recorded American
istory. 62

61 For an interesting description of Santa Fe see
Pike's Journal Entry for March 2, 1806, Jackson, Journals
of Pike, I, 391-92. Among his other impressions of the town
he noted, "Its appearance from a distance, struck my mind
with the same effect as a fleet of the flat bottomed boats,
which are seen in the spring and fall seasons, descending
the Ohio River. There are two churches, the magnificence
of whose steeples form a striking contrast to the miserable
appearance of the houses'." For information regarding the
trip to Chihuahua and reception in that city see Alencaster's
Memorandum, April 10, 1807, and Pike to Nemesio Salcedo,
April 14, 1807, ibid., II, 193-97.
62

Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire • • • , p. 50.
Professor Goetzmann no doubt bases his remark on the fact
that Pike returned to the United States able to give

l

:,
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Another aspect of the Pike expedition which only
further confuses the issue was the fact that General Wilkinson, knowing the mistrust and fear of the Spaniards to American encroachment, seems to have warned them that Pike was
coming.

Historians generally accept that Wilkinson had now

decided to abandon Aaron Burr and used Pike and his men as
hostages to assure the Spanish of his good faith, and, at
the same time, Pike could act as a spy for the General's own
personal gains.

It was thus .to prevent a border clash that

Wilkinson probably leaked the secret of Pike's mission, even
before the young officer departed St. Louis.

63

Regardless of how the Spanish were alerted they acted;
almost simultaneously with the departure of Pike, the greatest
expedition the Spanish had ever sent out from New Mexico left

American officials much information about the Spanish in the
Southwest.
63

writing after his return to the United States,
but included as a footnote to the journal entry for September
25, 1805, in the 1810 edition of his Journals, Pike states
that the news of his ex9edition was furnished Salcedo
through Cap·tain Stephen Minor of Natchez. Minor was the
last Spanish commandant at Natchez and was an associate of
Wilkinson. In fact, when the General was ordered from St.
Louis to the border at Natchitoches in 1806, Mrs. Wilkinson
lodged with the Minor family. See Jackson, Journals of Pike,
I, 323.
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Santa Fe to detain this latest American effort to reach the
Rockies.

The expedition that the Spaniards dispatched con-

sisted of regular troops from Nueva Vizcaya to which were
added 400 militia and 100 Indians at Santa Fe.

The com-

mander, Lieutenant Facundo Melgares, led this number, plus
2000 horses and mules and supplies for six months, down the
Red River for several hundred leagues.

They then turned to

the Republican River and the Pawnee country of Kansas.
Melgares had a multiple mission to accomplish:

t

explore the

territory between New Mexico and the Missouri, intercept the
American party coming up the Red River (Freeman expedition) ,
and intercept the Pike expedition.

In retrospect the Spanish

endeavor did not accomplish too much.

Another Spanish force

had already met and turned back Freeman, and Melgares preceded the Pike group to the Pawnees by about a month.

He

did make a show of strength to the Indians, but the effort did
not prove long lasting.

Taking into custody a few traders he

found along his route, Melgares returned to Santa Fe.

His

were the Spanish troops reported by Pike in September, 1806.

'
64

Ibid., 323-25. Clark to Dearborn, May 18, 1807,
William Clark Collection, MSS, Missouri Historical Society,
St. Louis, Mo.

l
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To say that the Spanish were disturbed by the Pike
mission would greatly understate the case.

Beginning in

April, 1807, the correspondence between the various Spanish
frontier officials, and between Salcedo and Wilkinson mounted.
Early in April the Commandant-General vigorously protested
to Wilkinson about American projects into territory "unquestionably belonging to his majesty. 1165

Salcedo informed the

American commander that Pike's papers would be retained, and
further stressed that
the documents contain evident, unequivocal proofs, that an offense
of magnitude has been committed
against his majesty, and that every
individual of this party ought to
have been considered as prisoners
on the very spot, notwithstanding such
substantial and well grounded motives
66
that would have warranted such a measure.
Before two more months had passed every Spanish
frontier official, the Viceroy in Mexico City and the Spanish
Minister in Washington had been well apprised of the Pike

'
65 .
Salcedo to Wilkinson, April 8, 1807, Jackson, Journals
Of Pike, II, 185.
66

l

~., 185-86.
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67
expe d ition.

Real Alencaster, the Governor in Santa Fe, was

naturally the most concerned should Pike's venture be followed
by other Americans.

In fact a rumor had been "planted" by

men in the Pike group that several thousand troops would soon
be on their way to rescue the Americans.

Accordingly, in the

months following the presence of the Pike party in Santa Fe,
Governor Alencaster sent out several parties to reconnoiter
the areas of possible American approach. 68
James Wilkinson actually "directed" the Pike expedition
from his headquarters in New Orleans and on the Sabine.

It

will be recalled that the Summer of 1806 was a most trying
period along the Texas-Louisiana border.

The Spanish were

determined to establish a garrison on the east side of the
Sabine, and America would not allow such a move.
of war was great.

The danger

Governor Claiborne of the Orleans Terri-

tory called for more troops as his military strength was weak.
Responding to the plea, Secretary of War Dearborn ordered

67

oonald Jackson prints a number of these letters
in his two volume editio'n of Pike's Journals.
68

Loomis, Pedro Vial . . • , pp. 241-42. Alencaster
must have had little knowledge of America's actual military
strength along the frontier.
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Wilkinson to proceed without delay to the troubled area.
"You will • • • take upon yourself the command of the Troops
in that quarter," the Secretary directed, "and you will, by
all the means in your power, repel any invasion of the
Territory of the United States, East of the River Sabine • •
,,69
The order was dated May 6, 1806, but Wilkinson did not
•
reach the trouble spot until September.

In typical Wilkinson

fashion his delay was explained away in official correspondence with the Secretary of War, but the Pike endeavor and
the Burr conspiracy probably figured large in his itinerary.
In all fairness to the General, however, it should be
mentioned that his wife was suffering a terminal illness in
St. Louis.

She did eventually accompany Wilkinson as far

as Natchez.

70

Actually Jefferson was thankful for an opportunity
to remove Wilkinson from the Governorship in St. Louis.

The

latter had alienated both the military and civilian factions
in the city because of his rather stringent regulations.

69

•

He

oearborn to Wilkinson, May 6, 1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, XIII, 505-07.
70

see footnote number 63.
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had become quite unpopular.

Jefferson could see no reason

to keep an unpopular governor in the Territory of Louisiana,
but he did need a competent general along the Sabine; hence
the order from Dearborn.

71

There is yet a major point about the whole Pike
enterprise which needs some examination.

Zebulon Pike was

ordered to the headwaters of the Arkansas by General Wilkinson, not by the War Department or by the President.

What

reaction did the officials in Washington have to this move
by their frontier general and governor, a type of activity
about which he had been so earnestly cautioned?
that the records provide little.

It is here

As the Pike expedition was

not a secret mission in the strictest sense, Secretary of War
Dearborn was obviously informed, but to what extent?

The

Register of Letters Received by the Secretary of War contains
an entry for a letter from Wilkinson dated June 28, 1806;
the notation reads:

"Mode proposed to send the Indians &c.

to their Villages," but the letter has not survived.

72

Later

'
71·
Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior • • • , pp. 225-29.
72

wilkinson to Dearborn, June 28, 1806, National
Archives, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War,
Record Group 107, Registers of Letters Received by the
Secretary of War, Main Series, 1800-70 (Microcopy 22), Roll
3. The Wilkinson Papers, MSS, Chicago Historical Society,
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statements, however, clearly indicate that the administration
gave its approval if not always officially so stated.
Jefferson, in his annual message to Congress in December, 1806,
had only praise for Pike's Mississippi exploration.
Very useful additions have also been
made to our knowledge of the Mississippi
by Lieutenant Pike who ascended to its
source, and whose journal and map, giving
the details of the journey, will shortly
be ready for communication to both houses
of Congress. Those of Messrs. Lewis and
Clarke, and Freeman, will require further
time to be digested and prepared. These
important surveys, in addition to those
before possessed, furnish materials for
commencing an accurate map of the Mississippi, and its western waters. Some
principal rivers, however, remain still
to be explored, • • • 73
In the Summer of 1807, when the correspondence between
the Spanish and Americans over the Pike expedition was rather

Chicago, Illinois, do not throw any light on this matter. In
fact, the Wilkinson Papers are very limited in their value
for this investigation; the greater part are written to
Wilkinson, but the letters from Pike are conspicuous by their
absence.
73

'

sixth Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1806,
Ford, The-writings of Jefferson, VIII, 315. A search of the
correspondence between the President and his Secretaries of
War and State reveal no comments on the Pike expedition prior
to the above.
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heavy, the President, in a communique to Dearborn,·suggested
some ideas that Wilkinson might use in answering CommandantGeneral Salcedo.

Re-stating this nation's argument that the

land to the Rio Grande was included in the Louisiana Purchase,
President Jefferson was quite emphatic that there could be no
question about the Red River of Texas.

Spain had never made

a settlement on that river, whereas the French had made several.
Jefferson also defended the scientific purpose of Pike's mission and seems to have been fully convinced that the American
explorer must have been lost when he "got on the waters of
the Rio Norte, instead of those of the Red River. 1174

That

Jefferson also saw the diplomatic advantage of such an argument may be prudently inferred.

Nevertheless he maintained

this stand throughout the years of Spanish protestations.

75

In 1808, when Pike's Journals were sent to the President by Dearborn, the latter suggested that it might be proper
to give Pike some "extra compensation, or other notice," for
74

Jefferson to Dearborn, June 22, 1807, Ford, Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 85-86.
75

'

Jefferson to Madison, August
Journals of Pike, II, 268. Madison to
1807, ibid., 269. Valentin de Foronda
charge<:i'affaires to the United States
1805 - September 26, 1809.

30, 1807, Jackson,
Fornoda, September 2,
was consul general and
from Spain, April 17,
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his efforts.

76

The following month Pike received

a

letter

from the Secretary of War which clearly stated the attitude
of the administration.

Henry Dearborn had the following to

say to the young explorer:
I • • • can with pleasure observe that
altho' the two exploring expeditions
you have performed were not previously
ordered by the President of the U.S.
there were frequent communications
on the subject of each, between Genl.
Wilkinson & this Department, of which
the President of the U.S. was acquainted
from time to time, and it will be no
more than what justice requires, to
say that your conduct in each of those
expeditions met the approbation of the
President and that the Information you
obtained and communicated to the
Executive in relation to the sources
of the Mississippi & the natives in
that quarter, and the country generally,as well on the upper Mississippi as that between the Arkansas, & the Missouri, and on the
borders of the latter extensive river
to its source and the adjacent country,
has been considered as highly interesting in a political, geographical,
& historical view. And you may rest
assured that your services are held
in high estimation by the President
of the U.S., and • • • I consider the
public much i~debted to you • • • 77
76 Dearborn to Jefferson, January 29, 1808, ibid., 289.
77 Dearborn to Pike, February 24, 1808, ibid., 300-01.
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The above letter made it quite obvious that, given
the boundary question, the Indian problems and the diplomatic
situation faced by his administration, Jefferson was fully
aware of the value of Pike's ventures, and was not going to
quibble over discrepancies in protocol no longer pertinent.
Before leaving the subject of the Pike expedition it
would be well to look briefly to some of the longer range
effects of this mission.

Pike's report, compiled largely

from memory, came out in 1810 (several years earlier than
the published Lewis and Clark journals), and was the most
significant work on the Southwest up to that date.

Several

things he had to say affected American attitudes towards
the Great Plains and the Spanish Southwest for many years.
In describing the "internal deserts" over which he had
traveled to Santa Fe, Pike noted,
These vast plains of the western
hemisphere may become in time
equally celebrated as the sandy
desarts [sic] of Africa; for I
saw in my route, in various places,
tracts of many leagues, where the
wind had thrown up the sand, in
all fanciful forms of the ocean's
rolling wave, and on which not a 78
speck of vegetable matter existed.

78 Pike's
·
·
'
. '
'b. d
27 •
Dissertation
on Louisiana,
~··

L
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Pike continued his description emphasizing an idea
that would have certainly appealed to President Jefferson.
But from these immense prairies may
arise one great advantage to the
United States, viz: The restriction
of our population to some certain
limits, and thereby a continuation
of the union. Our citizens being so
prone to rambling and extending themselves, on the frontiers, will,
through necessity, be constrained
to limit their extent on the west,
to the borders of the Missouri and
Mississippi, while they leave the
prairies incapable of cultivation
to the wandering and uncivilized
aborigines of the country. 79
It is largely because of the above statements that historians
see Pike as one of the early promoters of the Great American
Desert idea; an idea which was perpetuated for a number of
decades by other explorers and traders.

80

The maps published by Zebulon M. Pike were the first
maps of the Southwest to be derived from actual exploration

80 Terry L. A1 ford, "The West As A Desert I n American
.
Thought Prior to Long's 1819-1820 Expedition," Journal of The
West, VIII (October, 1969), 516-20. Alford notes that even
18th century accounts, namely The Journals of Trudeau, referred to the plains as great wastelands, sterile, with
little grass.
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by Americans, and in that sense are of great historic value.
Th~

Red and Canadian rivers were still confused, but the

lower Arkansas region was charted with much more accuracy
than on previous maps.

The Provincias Internas, however,

were still largely a plagiarism of the Alexander von Humboldt map of New Spain, which was likewise, as indicated
earlier, based on other cartographic efforts.

Despite the

errors and misconceptions prevalent at the time, Carl Wheat
sees the Pike maps as "milestones in the mapping of the
American West." 81
The return of Zebulon Pike in July, 1807, just as
the return of Lewis and Clark the previous September, opened
the flood gates to adventurous traders and trappers.

Trade

with the Indians up the Missouri and the western rivers was
nothing new, but the return of these two major expeditions
encouraged adventurers that the prospect for vast sources of
fur bearing animals and profitable markets were better than
they had ever hoped.

Trade was the chief occupation on the

frohtier; even General Wilkinson, while directing the Pike

'

mission, engaged in a trading venture.

It was not success-

ful, but the organization of trading companies in St. Louis
81

Wheat, From Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 20-25.
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was a favorite occupation, and Wilkinson, with an eye for
.
.
b y. 82
easy money, 1e t no opportunity
pass him

Except for the fact that the Federal Government had
set down specific rules and regulations concerning the
licensing of traders, and determined the areas of exclusive
trading rights, the many trading expeditions out of St. Louis
and other points were private in character -- a number being
clandestine ventures to evade government restrictions.

Many

of the traders directed their efforts to the upper Missouri
and into the area watered by the Yellowstone, Big Horn and
Snake rivers.

Their adventurers, while interesting and of

great importance to the history of the American West, are
not of immediate concern here.

The lure of Santa Fe also

attracted more than a few traders and trappers; the names of
Jacques Clamorgan (a name already noted in earlier trader
activity) and Manuel Lisa being only two of the better
82

Very soon after the departure of Zebulon Pike,
Wilkinson sent a John McClallen to the Platte with goods to
trade. Mcclallen was an army captain who had come west witi1
Wilkinson in 1805. He brought several thousands of dollars
worth of goods with him'to use in the Indian trade after
resigning his commission. This is the man wilkinson was
referring to in a letter to Secretary of War Dearborn when
he stated that he had "engaged a bold adventurer, who
served under me during the late Indian War • • • to look at
St. Afee in person pending the Winter • • • " Wilkinson to
Dearborn, September 8, 1805, Carter, Territorial Papers,
XIII, 199. Lewis-and Clark met Mcclallen on September 17,
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known.
a time.

In fact, these two figures were secret partners for
In the game of trading and trapping, partners today

could easily become competitors tomorrow.
In the very year of Pike's return Chamorgan, now well
advanced in age, with money and goods furnished by Lisa, made
a trip to Santa Fe, arriving in that city on December 12, 1807.
He had earlier received a license to trade with the Pawnee
Republic, and this served as a ruse for his larger schemes.
He reached Santa Fe, but did not find the warm welcome he
possibly expected and was quickly escorted to Chihuahua as
Pike had been.

In that city he sold his goods and returned

to St. Louis the following year.

Clamorgan has

t~e

dis-

tinction of being the first American to earn profits on a
trip to Santa Fe.

He did not repeat his venture, but the

information he offered to the public about trade possibilities
no doubt whetted the appetite of many.

83

1806, and he told them that he was on "reather"[sic]

a speculative expedition to the confines of New Spain with
the view to entroduce [sic] a trade with those people."
Journal Entry for Septel'hber 17, 1806, Bernard DeVoto (ed.),
The Journals of Lewis and Clark (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1953), p. 474. There is no evidence that Mcclallen
ever reached Santa Fe.

L

83Joseph J. Hill, "An Unknown Expedition to Santa Fe
in 180'/," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. VI,
No. 4 (March, 1920) 560-62. Nasatir, "Jacques Clamorgan • • • ,"
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The more important and controversial trader to appear
on the scene at this time was Manuel Lisa.

His activities

were many and varied, being the subject of several scholarly studies.

Hardly anyone engaging in merchandizing and

trade, i.ncluding Auguste Chouteau, had not worked in partnership with Lisa, only to find in him a bitter competitor a
short while later.

He was one of the most dynamic men in

the Missouri country, having been active in and around St.
Louis for years.

One historian describes him thusly:

"He

made the wild Missouri River his highway, and the savages
along its shores were his suppliers and his customers.
was a schemer and a driver ••

..

II

84

He

Chittenden, in his

famous work on the fur trade, remarks that in boldness of
enterprise and restless energy Lisa was "a fair representative
of the Spaniards of the days of Cortez. "

85

84

Loomis, Pedro Vial • • • , pp. 246-47. For an excellent detailed study of this controversial figure who seemed
to be always present and active when there was a profit to
be made, and far away when bills were to be collected, one
may refer to Walter B. Douglas, Manuel Lisa, Edited by A. P.
Nasatir (New York: Argo~ Antiquarian Ltd., 1964). Another
excellent study is Richard Edward Oglesby, Manuel Lisa and
Opening of the Missouri Fur Trade (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1963).
85

chittenden, The American Fur Trade • • • ,I, 114.
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Although Lisa's major activity was to the north of
the Santa Fe region, the possibility of lucrative connections
with that Spanish outpost was given more than a passing
thought.

The Pike expedition interested him very much.

In

August, 1806, while tracking the Great Plains, Pike received
a message from Wilkinson warning him that Manuel Lisa was
contemplating some type of commercial venture with the
Spanish in Santa Fe.

Wilkinson noted that such a contract

would be "injurious to the United States.

1186

The General

further commented,
I understand [the project] will be
attempted without the sanction of
Law, or the permission of the
executive, you must do what you
can consistantly to defeat the
Plan. No Good can be derived
to the United States from such a
project, because the prosecution
of it will depend entirely on the
Spaniards, & they will not permit
it unless to serve their politi87
cal as well as personal Interests.

'
86 wilkinson to Pike, August 6, 1806, Jackson,
Journals of Pike, II, 134.
87 Proclamation Against Burr's Plot, November 27, 1806,
Ford, The Writings of .Thomas Jefferson, X, 301-02.
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Lisa apparently dropped the plan at this time only to revive
it more forcefully in 1812.
The years following the Clamorgan and Lisa attempts
to interest the Spanish in American trade saw many more individual traders and trappers head for Santa Fe; the long list ineludes such names as Maria Raphael Henderson, Joseph McLanahan, Reuben Smith, James Patterson and Emanuel Blanco,
to name a few of the better known.

The exact number of

fearless men who tracked the vast American West can only be
speculated, for documentary evidence is slim.

Following the

Pike expedition and the trouble along the Sabine, most of these
men were not welcomed by the Spanish at Santa Fe, and only
served to further alarm His Majesty's frontier officers.

To

distinguish clandestine from legitimate enterprises became an
almost impossible task for the Spaniards.
Meanwhile other events began to occupy the minds and
efforts of American officials.
France were mounting.

The problems with England and

These two nations were once again at

war, and the United States as a neutral nation was finding it

' to maintain its neutrality.
more difficult each month

The

British Orders in Council and the Continental System laid
down by Napoleon made it quite unsafe for American ships to
ply the Atlantic Ocean.

Impressment of American seamen by
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the British was an especially thorny issue.
In an attempt to meet these problems Jefferson drew
up his famous Embargo which was implemented in 1807.

The

soundness of this boycott is still a subject of debate among
historians.

The immediate effects of the Embargo Act were

less than Jefferson had hoped for, as neither England nor
France substantially changed their tactics relative to American shipping and maritime rights.

Meanwhile a domestic

crisis developed because of the embargo, and Jefferson was
faced with a barrage of criticism.

The Federalists made

political capital out of the misfortunes consequent on the
embargo.

Much of their case was manufactured, for the embargo

did not cause all the harm they claimed, but actual damage was
sufficient to further their political hopes for a victory in
1808.
With the nations of Europe again forming alliances,
the opportunity for Jefferson to take advantage of Europe's
"distress," at least in regard to Spain, once more presented
itself.

The diplomatic problems between the United States

' 1806 and 1807, such as the Texasand Spain during the years
Louisiana border dispute and the Pike expedition, have
received mention.

It should be kept in mind that these were

also the years of the Burr Conspiracy, as well as the continued negotiations between America and Spain over the Floridas
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and the over-all western boundary settlement.

It is inte-

resting to observe how all these questions became intertwined, and how President Jefferson attempted to make the
most out of each situation to the advantage of his nation.
The Burr Conspiracy caused Jefferson many agonizing
months, and the great (one might even say exaggerated) desire
on the part of the President to see Burr convicted of treason
is well known.

It was on November 27, 1B06, that Jefferson

issued a proclamation prejudging Aaron Burr guilty of crime
and ordering his arrest.

In the proclamation the President

enjoined and warned
all faithful citizens who have been
led to participate in the sd [sic]
unlawful enterprises without due
knolege [sic] or consideration
to withdraw from sa~e without
delay • • • to cease all further
proceedings therein as they will
answer to the contrary at their
peril, and will incur prosecution
with all the rigors of the law.BB
In the above proclamation, as well as in subsequent
communiques, the Governcµ:s of Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio and

88 Proclamation Against Burr's Plot, November 27, 1806,
Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, X, 301-02.
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Mississippi, and General Wilkinson, were expressly enjoined
to search-out and bring to account anyone attempting to conduct or join any type of filibustering expedition into Spanish
territory.

At the same time Jefferson made it perfectly clear

that Spanish activity on the western side of the Mississippi
made it necessary for all governors of the aforementioned
states and territories to keep their respective militias in
readiness.

The men would not be called upon unless there was

some form of aggression, but when called "it will not be for
a 1 ounging,
·
b u t f or an ac t'ive, & perh aps d'is t an t , service.
·
••

89

Jefferson used the fact that he took such stern action
in the case of Aaron Burr as a lever to indicate to the
Spanish that he was sincere in wanting to arrive at an arnicable settlement with them.

At the same time, knowing the

predicament she was in vis-a-vis France, the President wanted
to impress upon Spain the power of America and what this nation
was capable of doing if it so desired.

It was now that Jeffer-

son followed a line of argument which lends credence to those
historian.s who like to see an expansionist-minded American
President.

' to the United States Minister in
In directives

89 circular Letter to the Governors of Kentucky,
Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi, March 21, 1807, ibid.,
IX, 34-35.
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Spain Jefferson does outline a rather bellicose approach
that our minister should follow in his discussion with the
Spanish.

After noting that the Spanish should realize our

good faith by the "vigor with which we have acted, & the
expense incurred in suppressing the enterprise meditated
lately by Burr against Mexico," he further implied that should
she so desire, the United States could "be in possession of
the city of Mexico" in but one month.

90

In another letter in August of the same year referring
to "western intrigues" by the Spanish, Jefferson noted,
Our southern defensive force can take
the Floridas, volunteers for a Mexican
army will flock to our standard, and
rich pabulum will be offered to our
privateers in the plunder of their
commerce & coasts. Probably Cuba
91
would add itself to our confederation.
The above remarks by President Thomas Jefferson do indeed
smack of the concepts of Manifest Destiny; yet when put in
their proper perspective they lose some of the character of

'

90 Jefferson to the
1807, ibid., 40-41.

u.s.

Minister to Spain, April 2,

91
. Jefferson to Madison, August 16, 1807, ibid., 12425.

l
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a consciously thought-out plan of action, and assume more the
flavor of diplomatic pressure.
Thus with the political and diplomatic situations
in such a precarious state during the last months of his
administration, Jefferson's attention was understandably
focused on matters of more immediate concern than exploring
a road to Santa Fe.

He did not ignore the western fringes

of Louisiana, nor did he forget about the Indian problems
facing the government.

In fact, the trouble between the

United States and England was directly related to our Indian
policy.

The British were still in Canada, and British traders

were quite active along the Upper Mississippi and !'1issouri rivers
as well as along the rivers of the Pacific Northwest.

The in-

fluence of British traders among the American Indians had given
United States officials concern for a number of years.
It is interesting to note that the bulk of correspondence between Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, who had been
appointed Governor and Indian Agent for the Territory of Louisiana respectively, was concerned with the danger of British
'
. .
92
traders among the Indian tribes of Upper Louisiana.

92

Meriwether Lewis became Governor of the Territory
in March, 1807; William Clark was appointed Indian Agent in
the same month. Carter, Territorial Papers, XIV, 107-09.
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Governor Lewis drew attention of the War Department to the
situation and informed Dearborn that he had dispatched spies
to learn the designs of the Indians;
The design of the indians are soon
changed by interest; the Spaniards
have no merchansize to attach them
firmly to them -- the british have,
[sic] and it is to them that I look
more particularly for all our pending
evils on the frontier, and I sincerely
hope that the general government in
their philanthropic feelings towards
the indians will not loose [sic] sight
of the safety of our defenceless [sic]
and extended frontiers.93
Again, Dearborn and the President were being reminded
that the defense of the frontier was inadequate.

An exami-

nation of the correspondence of both Lewis and Clark to the
Secretary of War reveal that they stressed the same points
urged so often by James Wilkinson.

In June, 1807, Clark

informed the Secretary of War that,
the Militia (when organized) are so
scattered that they will afford but
a feeble defence to extensive
frontiers of tpis Territory against
the Indians • • • • To prevent the

93

Lewis to Dearborn, July 1, 1808, Carter, Territorial Papers, XIV, 200.

l
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probebility [sic] of an Indian war
(which can only be effected by Spanish
or British influence and intreague [sic]
it will in my oppinion [sic] be necessary to have some establishments of
troops in the Indian Country; • • • 94

Men on the frontier were also in line with Jefferson's
idea of concentrating the white population east of the Mississippi River.

One official suggested to the President that,

transfer [of the) inhabitants of a
great portion of this upper Territory to some other part of the Union
or territory, say New Orleans or the
east side of the Mississippi, thereby making the settlements more compact,
facilitating the administration of
justice and making us more strong in
those parts where we are the most exposed and vulnerable from the attacks
of foreign enemies •
95
Meanwhile the Spanish were reverting to an "iron
curtain" frontier policy and continuing to protest the Pike

94

clark to Dearborn, June 1, 1807, ibid., 126-27.
Other than the two letters cited above, Lewis and Clark do
not seem to express concern for the Spanish in any of their
correspondence.
'
95 Edward F. Bond to Jefferson, October 17, 1806,
Jefferson Papers, MSS, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis,
Mo.
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expedition including the motives behind it.

The position

of the Spanish government relative to its New World colonies
was also quite unsettled at the moment: Napoleon's march into
Spain did little to better the situation.

When Napoleon's

brother Joseph was placed on the throne of Spain, the people
did not accept him and continued to resist the imperial army
until it was forced to return to France in 1813.

During the

period of French occupation the Spanish Cortez declared
for Ferdinand VII, and the governments throughout the Spanish
colonies largely followed suit.

The vacillating Ferdinand,

however, soon caused disillusionment among colonial leaders
and the groundwork for the independence movement was laid,
destined to break forth in 1810.

The movement would grow

during the next decade until the cry for independence spread
throughout Spain's entire colonial empire.
Amidst the precarious political and diplomatic
situations facing the United States, spoken of earlier, the
country was witness to another constitutional change of government.

In the election of 1808, Thomas Jefferson chose not to

run for office and the 'Republican mantle fell to James Madison.
Jefferson retired to Monticello and the problems of state were
then taken up by President Madison who defeated his Federalist
opponent in the election.

The approaching War of 1812

199

occupied the attention of Madison to a greater degree than
any other matter, but the frontier problems remained and the
interest of Americans in the Southwest continued to grow.

'

I
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CHAPTER V
THE WESTERN BOUNDARY IS SETTLED
When the Marques de Casa Yrujo left the United States
in 1807, effective representation of Spain in this country
came to an end for several years.

It is true that Valentin

de Foronda and Jose Ignacio Viar, were left behind as charges
d'affaires, or, more properly, encargodos de negocios, but
these two men seemed to have spent more time arguing among
themselves than representing their home government.

At this

same time the relations between the United States and England
were deteriorating and Spain was placed in a rather precarious
position should war break out between these two nations.
Accordingly the encargodos stopped bickering long enough to
pressure their government to appoint a minister of sufficient
rank and powers to adequately represent Spain in America.
The.result of their plea was the appointment of Don Luis de
Onis by the Junta CentrAl in 1809.

1

1 Foronda to Consul of Baltimore, September 18, 1809,
National Archives, Records of the Department of State, Record
200
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It was essential for Spain to have accurate infermation concerning the ambitions of American relative to
westward expansion.

Likewise, every effort had to be made

to influence the United States Government on all matters
touching Spain to the advantage and well-being of the latter.
The appointment of Onis did not immediately rectify the
situation, however, for the United States declined to acknowledge the monarchy of Joseph, Napoleon's brother, or the
Junta Central.

Therefore, Onis was not officially received

by President Madison.

George

w.

Erving, our representative

in Madrid, was officially in much the same position as on!s
was in this country; that is, he was little more than an
observer.

Erving finally gave up even that position and left

Spain in August, 1810.

2

Group 59, Notes From the Spanish Legation in the United States
(Microcopy 59), Roll 4. Future references will be designated
as SD, Notes From the Spanish Legation. Brooks, Diplomacy
and the Borderlands • • • , pp. 8-13. Luis de Onis had been
chosen as minister to the United States in 1792, but the fall
of the Floridablanca cabinet prevented his serving in this
capacity. He was active in the Peace of Amiens in 1802, and
went to Bayonne at the request of Cevallos from where he wrote
his opinion of Ferdinand's renunciation of the Spanish crown.
On1s felt the King neither could nor should make such a concession; this stand made it necessary for him to flee Spain
and he joined the Junta central. He arrived in the United
States on October 4, 1809.
2

l

rbid., p. 13.
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Meanwhile, Luis de On1s made friends, listened,
communicated and traveled.

He distrusted the Republican

Party, and seems never to have become friendly with either
President Madison or James Monroe, who took up the duties of
Secretary of State in 1811.

On1s made the most of his friend-

ships among the Federalists using them as sources of information as well as of influence.

3

Failing to receive official

recognition, the Spanish Minister retired to Philadelphia,
where he found more convenient channels of communication,
especially through his association with Alexander J. Dallas,
the United States district attorney for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.

4

The troubled Spanish Government faced another grave
crisis in the opening guns of violent revolutions in the
Western Hemisphere which were eventually to tear her colonial
empire to shreds.

It was September 16, 1810, in the village

of Dolores that Father Miguel Hidalgo sounded his Grito for
Mexican independence.

True, the Hidalgo uprising was soon

quelled, and the priest himself faced a firing squad the

•
3
4

rbid., p. 17.
rbid.
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following July.

The flames of revolution had been ignited,

however, and the independence movements throughout Mexico
and the rest of Spain's colonial empire did not come to a
rest until their goals had been reached.
Of especial interest to this study would be the course
of the Mexican revolutionary movement, particularly as it
affected those areas adjacent to United States territory.
Spanish subjects in Texas and New Mexico, attempting to free
themselves from the yoke of the mother country, could not but
give added encouragement to Americans already eyeing the vast
Northern Provinces of New Spain.

Possible wealth in the form

of silver, furs, or trade seemed ready at hand to adventurous
souls.

Again one can find a decided difference in the atti-

tudes of individual Americans and the United States Government.
Even among key governmental officials there were variant ideas
and plans relative to the Spanish Southwest.
These variant ideas and plans were not enhanced by
advances made in geographic knowledge of the approaches to
Santa Fe, the expedition of Zebulon Pike notwithstanding.

As

'
noted in the previous chapter,
Pike's Journals and maps were
published in 1810, but his cartographic efforts gave America's
officials little more accurate information of the Provincias
Internas than· they had up to that date.

l

True, his route up
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the Missouri and Osage rivers to the Pawnee villages on the
Republican are fairly accurate, but farther west he relied
on earlier maps from various sources.

Since all of Pike's

sketch maps from the Great Bend of the Arkansas westward were
taken from him by the Spaniards, it was obviously necessary
for him to rely on other than personal observations for
his published maps.

5

The year 1810 also saw another major cartographic
work published.

In that year Aaron Arrowsmith brought out

an imposing map entitled "A Map of Mexico and adjacent
provinces compiled from original documents."

This map was

actually a composite of the just-published Pike effort and
Baron von Humboldt's famous cartographic work, although
"her gent 1 eman ' s name appeare d on it.
.
neit

6

Thus the two im-

portant geographic publications of 1810 added little to
accurate scientific knowledge of the vast Spanish Southwest.
Returning to the Latin American revolutionary movements, when news of the Hidalgo uprising reached San Antonio,
the principal Spanish bastion in Texas, the local officials

'
5

Jackson, Journals of Pike, I, 457-64.

6

Wheat, From Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 27-28.

l'I
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declared their loyalty to Ferdinand VII.

By January, 1811,

however, a revolt against royal authority was led by one
Juan Bautista de Casas, who captured Governor Manuel Salcedo
and had himself elected to the position of governor ad interim.
The revolutionists enjoyed a short-lived power, for royal
authority was soon restored, only to be challenged once more
in 1812 by filibustering expeditions from the Louisiana-Texas
.
7
f rontier.

Thomas Jefferson, in retirement at Monticello,

viewed the happenings in Latin America and observed prophetically,
Another great field of political
experiment is opening in our
neighborhood, in Spanish America.
I fear the degrading ignorance
into which their priests and
kings have sunk them, has disqualified them from the maintenance
or even knowledge of their rights,
and that much blood be shed for
little improvement in their
7

An excellent account of the early revolutionary
activities in Texas may be found in Rupert N. Richardson, Texas
The Lone Star State (~ew York: Prentice-Hall, 1967). More
specialized studies include, Julia Kathryn Garrett, Green Flag
Over Texas (Dallas: Cordova Press, 1939). Mattie Austin
Hatcher, The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801-1821
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1927). Issac Joslin Cox,
"The Louisiana-Texas Frontier," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, X, No. l (July, 1906), and XVI, No. 4 (April, 1913),
and XVII, No. l (July, 1913), and XVII, No. 2 (October, 1913).
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condition. Should their new rulers
honestly lay their shoulders to
remove the great obstacles of
ignorance, and press the remedies
of education and information, they
will still be in jeopardy until
another generation comes into
place, and what may happen in the
interval cannot be predicted, nor
shall • • • I live to see it.8
In Santa Fe there was no open revolt against Spanish
authority as in San Antonio, but the people of that city
were definitely affected by the political crisis in Spain and
the New World.

The Junta Central in Spain issued its decree

on January 22, 1809, recognizing the Spanish dominions in
America as integral parts of the Spanish nation and declaring
their right to representation in the Cortes.

Representatives

to the Spanish congress were to be selected in each provincial
capital by the local ayuntamiento (municipal council) from a
list of names of the leading citizens.
representative in August, 1810.

Santa Fe elected its

Pedro Bautista Pino, the

man chosen, embarked for Spain in October, 1811.

9

Historians

8

Jefferson to Dupont de Nemours, April 15, 1811, Ford
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 322.
9

Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New Mexico
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 203.

11.:
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will be eternally grateful to Pino for the lengthy report or
Exposicion he prepared for the Cortes.

This document pro-

vides one of the best sources extant for New Mexican history
at the end of the Spanish period.

For example, one can learn

that New Mexico was still a rather "poor" province with no
physician, surgeon or pharmacist for its citizens; agriculture, furnishings and clothing were as yet in a primitive
state.

According to Pino the state of education was pitiful,

and he bemoaned the fact that "for a period of more than two
hundred years since the conquest, the province has made no
provision for [its citizens] in any of the literary careers. 1110
Loomis concludes that it was the lack of artisanship that
created the great demand for goods in Santa Fe and was the
real reason for the continual attempts at penetration by
. d s. 11
non- Spaniar

10 H. Bailey Carroll and M. Villasana Haggard (eds.
and trans.), Three New Mexico Chronicles (Albuquerque: The
Quivira Society, 1942), p. 94. It should be borne in mind
that Pino was attempting to make the government of Spain
pay more attention to his province; therefore, he did tend
to exaggerate to some ex~ent the poor conditions in New Mexico.
The poor state of education was also noted by various Spanish
officials in New Mexico. See Simmons, Spanish Government ••
:_1 PP • 172-74 •
11Loornis, Pedro Vial • • • , p. 7.
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In light of the continual Spanish fear of American
encroachment the observations of Pino in his Exposici6n
on the subject are of interest here.

Under the section

entitled "Legal and Judicial Affairs" he had the following
to say,
these official instructions will prove
to your majesty the imminent danger of
these provinces' falling prey to our
neighbors, thus leaving the other
provinces to tbe same fate, one
after another. I trust your majesty
may become aware of this fact, because the purchase of Louisiana by
the United States has opened the way
for the Americans to arm and incite
the wild Indians against us; al.'30
the way is open for tne Americans to
invade the province. Once the territory is lost, it will be impossible
to recover it. Since there is still
time to prevent this disaster, your
majesty should take advantage of this
warning, which incidentally has been
brought over by me, because a delay
in furnishing remedial relief may
permit the development of the evils
which are feared by the one who has
the honor of making them known to your
majesty.12
The warning by

f ino

was not news to the ears of

Spanish officials in Madrid; they had been aware of foreign

12
p. 59.

Carroll and Haggard, Three New Mexico Chronicles,

209
penetration of their northern frontier for many years.

The

unrest in Mexico at this time, however, caused renewed alarm,
especially since more than a few Americans were ready and
willing to aid the revolutionaries by joining filibustering
expeditions.

The interest of Anglo-Americans in Mexican

affairs only proved to Spanish authorities that their fear of
many years was justified.

The greedy American was only waiting

. opportun1. t y. 13
h is
Statements by United States officials such as Governor
William

c. c.

Claiborne of the Territory of Orleans could

easily convince the Spanish that "official" America was encouraging the activities of its adventurous citizens.

Governor

Claiborne was a known expansionist, and was not reluctant to
voice his ideas relative to United States occupation of
Spanish colonial territory.

In a letter to the Secretary of

the Navy in December, 1811, Claiborne pointed out that if the
"Friends of Independence" in Mexico needed money they should
turn to America for help.

14

Land as a compensation for aid

Fray Angelico ' Chavez, O.F.M. Archives of the
Archdiocese of Santa Fe, 1678-1900 (Washington: Academy of
American Francisacan History, 1957), p. 74.
13

14

c1aiborne to Hamilton, December 26, 1811, Rowland,
Claiborne Letter Books, VI, 21.
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would be our reward.

In another letter the following month

the energetic young governor said,
Mexico is again represented to be in
a State of Revolution, it would not
be difficult to give such direction
as might accord with the views &
Interests of the United States.
Five thousand Regular Troops marched
to St. Antoine & fifty thousand stand
of Muskets would give Independence
to Mexico, & banish forever European
Influence; --15
Yet another letter of the same tenor went to a
Congressman in January, 1812.

The gentleman was informed,

It is indeed time for the Nation
& Government to unite in avenging
our wrongs • • • • The Canada's surely
will present no serious obstacles
to our Northern Brethren -- and in
this quarter the Florida's will be
an easy acquisition. -- Cuba, Mexico,
and the Spanish American possessions
generally deserve our particular
attention. The occasion is favorable
to free them from all European Influence either Commerical or Political, & to effect whatever else, the
Interests of the United States may
suggest.16

'

15 c1aiborne to Hamilton, January 23, 1812, ibid., p. 38.
16
p. 40.

l

c1aiborne to Senator Varnum, January 26, 1812, ibid.,
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During the latter part of 1812, and into 1813, the
Gutierrez-Magee filibustering expedition was making headway
in Texas; Governor Claiborne wanted his government to take
advantage of the situation and not let a golden opportunity
slip through its fingers.

To the Secretary of State he wrote

on June 21, 1813,
the movements in the Neighbouring
Province of Texas, Deserve the
attention of Government. The
Revolutionists have got possession
of the Capitol of their Province,
St. Antonio and are likely for the
present to maintain their possession.
Their Chiefs manifest no disposition
to be Dependent upon the American
Government, or to grant any peculiar
privileges to the American people;
• • • They may become useful Neighbours, -- but as we have no certainty
of it, I wish sincerely, it comported
with the Policy of the American Government to take possession of the country
as far as the River Grande. -- Under
the Louisiana Convention, we claim
the tract extending from the Sabine
to the River Grande, or River Bravo,
as it is sometimes called.17
Thus as late as 1813 the long-held American claim to
the Rio Bravo as the western boundary of the Louisiana

17

claiborne to the Secretary of State, June 21, 1813,
ibid., pp. 227-29.

-
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Purchase was still being cited as justification to move west.
Such a boundary would, of course, bring Santa Fe within the
orbit of American control as the Rio Grande flows just west
of that Spanish village.

Zebulon Pike had brought this fact

home several years earlier.

So strong were Claiborne's

feelings on the subject that he penned a letter very similar
to the above to President Madison the following month. 18

The

response Governor Claiborne received from the President and
his Secretary of State were assuredly not to the Governor's
liking.
It has been indicated earlier (Chapter III) that James
Madison, when Secretary of State, held the Floridas to be of
more importance than the western boundary question.

His

attitude apparently did not alter when he became President.
Here again the records show that President Madison demonstrated grave concern over the East and West Florida questions,
while giving only scant attention to the expansionist potential west of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.

Further-

more, the Indians of the Plains gave Madison less concern than

'
they did Thomas Jefferson.

Obviously the deteriorating

relations with England and the forthcoming War of 1812 occupied

18

c1aiborne to Madison, July 9, 1813, ibid., IV, 236.
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the greater part of the Chief Executive's attention.

Given

his intense concern for the Floridas, their strategic location
relative to military and commercial interests of both England
and the United States, the President could keep his eye on
English maritime depredations while not losing sight of the
Floridas as land for possible American expansion.

The

Spanish to the west of the Mississippi did not seem to pose

! "

11

an immediate threat to the well-being of the United States.
A thorough search of the writings of President Madison
as collected and edited by Gaillard Hunt, and Richardson's
Messages of the Presidents reveal that Madison gave little if
any attention to the Spanish, the Indians, trade routes, or
military expeditions, between the American settlements along
the Mississippi and Missouri rivers and the Spanish outpost of
Santa Fe.

Likewise the records of the War Department reveal

that the Secretary of War, during the eight years of Madison's
administration, focused his attention relative to military
matters and Indian affairs to the geographical area east of
the Mississippi from the Great Lakes south to New Orleans.

19

'
19

Gaillard Hunt (ed.), The Writings of James Madison
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908). Richardson, Messages
of the Presidents. Eustis to Wilkinson, May 4, 1809, Wilkinson Papers, MSS, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois.
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Given the real and fancied influence which the British exercised among the Indian nations of that general region, such
an outlook is easily understood.
When Madison did speak of a southwest frontier problem, he thought more in terms of the Territories of Orleans
and Mississippi, as well as the Floridas.

The other frontier

region which concerned the President was the Old Northwest.
It was there that the white man continued to covet the tillable
soil and was continuing to press upon the lands of the Miami,
Shawnee, Winnebago, Pottawattamie and other tribes indigenous
to the land north of the Ohio River.

It seems that Madison

did not share Thomas Jefferson's desire to move the Indians
across the Mississippi into land largely uninhabited by the
white man.

The President was more concerned with the manner

of purchasing land from the Indians.

Madison was not to fare

well in his attempt to keep on amicable terms with the red
man.

As Irving Brant so cogently points out, "had he wished

to stop the purchases he could not have stood against the
.
.
,.20
torrential drive of the westward flowing masses.

'
20 rrving Brant, James Madison: The President,
1809-1812 (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956),
p. 190.
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Indian hostility on the frontier, heightened by the
actions of William Henry Harrison in such engagements as
the Battle of Tippicanoe, made the Indian problem an integral
part of the worsening relations between this country and England.

The war fever quickened.

Here again President Madi-

son's major biographer captures the predicament of the Chief
Executive:
He desired friendship and peace with
the Indians but continued a longestablished land policy which made
the first unattainable and the second
depend on the degeneration of the
dispossessed tribes and the weak21
ness of despair in those more distant.
Throughout most of the War of 1812, the administration's attitude toward the Indian as far as any over-all
policy went, may be seen in the statement by the President in
his Second Annual Message to Congress, December 5, 1810, a
sentiment which he echoed many times during the following years.
With the Indian tribes also the peace
and friendship of the United States are
found to be so,eligible that the general
disposition to preserve both continues
to gain strength.22
21

Ibid., p. 388.

22 Madison's Second Annual Message, December 5, 1810,
Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, VIII, 126. In Madison's
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of course, those Indian tribes aiding the British cause were
considered enemies of the United States and were approached
as any enemy would be.
As noted previously, the Jefferson administration
frowned upon any type of filibustering activity originating
within the United States for the purpose of harassing the
Spanish colonies.

Madison continued to support such a policy.

As Secretary of State under Jefferson he was largely respon-

sible for transferring the President's policy into action in
such matters, and

he came to the Presidency with much

experience along these lines.
The early Latin American revolutionary movements seem
to have received little attention from President Madison.

The

major edition of Madison's writings indicates that the President penned one letter to Joel Barlow, Minister to France, on
November 17, 1811, concerning the independence movement which
had broken out in the Spanish colonial empire.

In this letter

Madison refers to the movements in Venezuela and Mexico, noting
that the former country had asked for United States recognition.

As for Mexico, ' "according to our intelligence, which

is difficult & obscure, [she] is still in the struggle between

Third Annual Message there is no mention of the Indians, and
his Fourth Message echoes the one quoted above.

I
, I

ii
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the revolutionary & royal parties. 1123

Even here, however,

Madison's major concern seems to be how the Latin American
situation will aid or hinder the power of Great Britain,
given her commercial interests in that region of the world.

24

The fact that some of these early attempts at independence
were largely quelled by royal force as in Mexico, and that
others were not successful until Madison had left office,
can offer some explanation for his less than avid interest
in them.

It should be specifically noted, however, that

Madison's policy relative.to the areas immediately adjacent
to American territory, was the same as his predecessor.
The enthusiastic Governor Claiborne was not encouraged
in his dreams of American expansion at the expense of Spain.
In fact, he was expressly reminded that any activity on American soil for the purpose of invading Spanish-held land would
be considered as treasonous.

A case in point was that of

Dr. John Robinson, the controversial gentleman of the Pike
expedition.

Robinson had remained in Spanish territory

following the aforementioned expedition.

His motives are still

'
23 Madison to Joel Barlow, November 17, 1811, ibid.,
pp. 171-72.
24

Ibid.
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somewhat of a mystery.

Nevertheless he later became involved

in a crusade to liberate Mexico from Spanish rule.

Seeking

aid in the United States he evidently returned to Natchez.

25

Lacking everything except nerve Robinson contacted Secretary
of State James Monroe about his proposed plans to help liberate the people of Mexico from monarchial tyranny with the help
of willing Americans.

Monroe's reply could have left little

doubt in the mind of the ambitious doctor as to the official
attitude of the United States Government.

In his answer to

Robinson on February 14, 1814, Monroe stated,
The measures in which you are engaged
being contrary to law and wholly unauthorized, have excited no little
surprise, especially as you knew this
to be the case from your instructions
while acting under the authority of
the government on the recommendation
of the late general [sic] Pike. Your
conduct is the more reprehensible from
the circumstance that as you were employed some time past in making friendly
communication to the governor of the
internal provinces of Spain it may be
inferred that you are still in the
service of the government, and acting
in conformity to its views, and by
its authority~ [italics mine] • • •

25

Monroe to Dr. Robinson, February 14, 1814, National
Archives, General Records of the Department of State, Record
Group 59, Domestic Letters, Roll 14. Future references will
be cited as SD, Domestic Letters.
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I now write to inform you that
if you do not immediately desist
from your illegal measures and
pursuits, the most decisive
steps will be taken to give
effect to the legal restraint
applicable to them.26
On the very same day the Secretary of State wrote to
Governor Claiborne briefing him on the situation.

Again

emphasizing the fact that Robinson's activities could be
easily construed by the Spanish to represent the official
position of the United States due to his former connection
with the government, Monroe pointed out that Robinson's
activities were "repugnant to the views of the government,
an d con t rary t o 1 aw. .. 27

Furthermore, the Secretary impressed

upon Claiborne that,
While at peace with Spain, whatever
may be the injuries heretofore
received from her government, it is
highly improper for any of the
citizens of the U.S. to violate
that relation. The president
therefore expects that you will
take the necessary and proper
steps to prevent any measures of
the kind imput~d to Dr. Robinson
being carried into effect.28
26
27

28

Ibid.
Monroe to Governor Claiborne, February 14, 1814, ibid.
Ibid.

r
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'

Claiborne had actually written the Secretary of
State the previous November that he was concerned with some
filibustering plans which were rumored to be afoot in
Louisiana.

Monroe believed these preparations to be a part

of the Robinson endeavor and instructed the Governor to let
his [Monroe's] letter of February 14, 1814, apply to that
case as well.

29

The desire to help the people of Mexico

liberate themselves from the yoke of Spain continued, but
the Madison administration maintained its policy, at least
officially, of "hands-off."

The matter of Latin American

independence was a problem between the New World colonies and
the mother country.

That most Americans were sympathetic

to the cause of the colonials cannot be denied.
policy of the nation, however,

w~s

The official

one of non-interference.

It might be interesting to note here that during the period
1809-1815 there were no official attempts to explore or chart
the approaches to Santa Fe.

While that may have been the

story for the United States Government as such, the private
trader and adventurer had other ideas.

'
29

Monroe to Governor Claiborne, February 17, 1814, ibid.
In yet another letter the following August the Secretary of~~
State reiterated his concern that any and all attempts to invade Spanish territory by filibustering parties must be stopped.

r
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As mentioned earlier the Missouri Fur Company underwent reorganization in 1809.

The new company's roster in-

eluded the names of Manuel Lisa, as might be expected, and
William Clark, Auguste and Pierre Chouteau, Major Andrew
Henry and many other leading traders of St. Louis.

The

company's first expedition towards the Lower Rockies was in
the spring of 1809.

This particular expedition was rather

interesting in that it was, in part, tied-up with a government
contract.

When Lewis and Clark had returned to St. Louis

several years earlier they had brought with them a Mandan
Chief, Shehaka.

It was the responsibility of the Federal

Government to return this warrior to his people once the Chief
had completed his visit.

All previous attempts had failed due

to the warlike activity of the Arikaras, who were located
along the Missouri just south of the Mandan villages.

Now

the Secretary of War contracted with the Missouri Fur Company
to do the job for the United States Government.
Governor Meriwether Lewis of the Territory of
Louisiana was the official who carried out the actual contracting procedures.

Tha contract was made with M. Pierre

Chouteau, Indian trader and Agent, in the amount of seven
thousand dollars.

With this money Chouteau was to "raise,

organize, arm & equip at their own expense one hundred and

'-.I

I
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forty Volunteers and to furnish whatever might be deemed
necessary.

30

This all seemed innocent enough, but the per-

sonalities involved and the lure of profits resulted in a
rather different situation than officials in Washington envisioned.

By July, 1809, it can be seen that the War Depart-

ment had become quite disturbed over this enterprise, questioning the additional monies requested by Governor Lewis for
Chouteau.
suspicion.

The motives of the traders were definitely under
The letter from the Secretary of War clearly

illustrates that the Government's attitude toward expenditures on the frontier had not changed substantially since the
days of Jefferson.

31

After informing Governor Lewis that a draft for an
additional five hundred dollars to purchase "Tobacco, Powder,
&c. intended as Presents for the Indians, through which this
expedition is to pass," had not been honored, the Secretary
went on to say,
It has been usual to advise the
Government of the United States

'
30

Secretary of War to Governor Lewis, July 15, 1809,
Carter, Territorial Papers, XIV, 285.
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when expenditures to a considerable
amount are contemplated in the
Territorial Governments. In the
instance of accepting the volunteer
services of 140 men for a military
expedition to a point and purpose
not designated, which expedition
is stated to combine commercial as
well as military objects, and when
an Agent of the Government appointed
for other purposes is selected for
the command, it is thought the
Government might, without injury
to the public interests, have been
consulted. As the object & destination of this Force is unknown and
more especially as it combines
Commercial purposes, so it cannot
be considered as having the sanction
of the Government of the United States,
or that they are responsible for consequences. 32
The letter further stated that since Chouteau accepted the
command of the expedition his position as Indian Agent would
automatically become vacant, and Governor Lewis should recom33
. .
men d someone e 1 se f or t h e position.

Meriwether Lewis was quite upset at the above letter,
and on August 18, 1809, penned a most direct reply.

Lewis

went into some detail trying to explain that his motives had

'
32

rbid., p. 286.
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always been of the highest order, and flatly denied any
charges that his financial situation was not in good order.
Referring specifically to the Chouteau case Lewis stated
explicitely,
I do most solennly [sic] aver, that the
expedition sent up the Misoury [sic]
under the command of Mr Pierre Chouteau,
as a military Command, has no other
object than that of conveying the Mandane [sic] Chief and his Family to their
Village. -- and in a commercial point of
view, that they intend only, to hunt
and trade on the waters of the Misoury
[sic] and Columbia Rivers within the
Rockey-Mountains [sic] and the Planes
[sic] bordering those Mountains on the
east side -- and that they have no intention with ~hich I am acquainted,
to enter the Dominions, or do injury
to any foreign Power. 34
He then requested that Chouteau be able to retain his post as
Indian Agent, as the latter had now been ordered to return to
St. Louis as soon as the military part of the expedition was
over. 35

Lewis felt written explanations would not be suf-

ficient, however, and it was over this matter that he

•
34

Governor Lewis to Secretary of War, August 18, 1809,
ibid., p. 290.
35

L

rbid., p. 292.
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subsequently set out for Washington, a trip which he would
never complete due to his untimely death at a roadside inn.

36

Another member of the Missouri Fur Company, and a man
well known to students of western history, was Manuel Lisa.
When last mentioned, Manuel Lisa, the controversial and energetic trader, had apparently dropped active participation in
any kind of Santa Fe adventure.

He became no less active in

trading activity per se, however, turning his attention north
and west from St. Louis.

With great intensity he set out to

expand his control over the fur trade of the Upper Missouri
and into the Great Basin.

With the help of experienced men

such as John Colter and George Drouillard, both of the famous
Lewis and Clark expedition, he engaged in a series of expeditions which by the War of 1812 brought him much personal
prestige and influence.

Lisa was ultimately recognized by

the American Government in an official capacity in 1814, when
he was made Indian Agent for the tribes of the Upper Missouri.

36

rbid. Lewis u~doubtedly took the remarks of the
Secretary as personal affronts to his honesty. In this same
letter Lewis stated that the United States could never make
"A Burr" out of him.
37

Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire • • • , p. 29.
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Lisa's general plan was to set up a series of trading
posts which would serve as permanent bases of operation.

From

these posts traders could move out in every direction at all
times of the year, and would always be able to keep an eye
out for competitors.

Returning to an area a year or so later

only to find your caches destroyed or your influence superceded by another trader would be largely eliminated.

Operating

on this premise Lisa made his way far up the Missouri and down
the Yellowstone into virtually unknown territory as far as the
junction of the Big Horn River.

It was in this locale, in

present-day Montana, that Lisa had Manuel's Fort constructed.
Manuel's Fort became the focal point for many important
trading expeditions in the early and mid-nineteenth century.

38

It could be expected that a man of Lisa's enterprising
nature would attempt once more to contact the Spanish who, he
believed as did most other traders of the time, were located
only a short distance to the south of the Yellowstone region.
The Spanish themselves had been trading far to the north of
Santa Fe for several decades.
38

It is possible they were active

'

Llsa's activity can be traced in detail by referring
to one of several scholarly studies such as Walter B. Douglas,
Manuel Lisa, edited by Abraham P. Nasatir (New York: Argosy
Antiquarian Ltd., 1964), and Richard Edward Oglesby, Manuel
Lisa and the Opening of the Missouri Fur Trade (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963).

l
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along the Green and Snake rivers as well as reaching the
Yellowstone.

39

Lewis and Clark had reported in their journal

that the Shoshones had horses and mules obtained from the
Spaniards via the Yellowstone River.

In his journal entry for

August 20, 1805, Lewis noted,
They [the Shoshones] informed me that
they could pass to the Spaniards by the
way of the yellowstone [sic] river in
10 days. I can discover that these
people are by no means friendly to the
Spaniards. Their complaint is, that
the Spaniards will not let them have
fire arms and amunition, that they
put them off by telling them that if
they suffer them to have guns they
will kill each other, thus leaving
them defenceless and an easy prey to
their blood-thirsty neighbours to the
East of them, • • • 40

. 39 Joseph J. Hill, "Spanish and Mexican Exploration
and Trade Northwest from New Mexico Into the Great Basin,
1765-1853," Utah Historical Quarterly, III, No. 1 (January,
1930), 3-23. David J. Weber, "Spanish Fur Trade From New
Mexico, 1540-1821," The Americas, XXIV (1967), 130-32.
The Comanches provided a source of furs for the people of
New Mexico in the late 18th century which whetted the appetites of the Spaniards,for more trade in furs. Contact
was made with the Utes, and by the end of the century the
Spanish had ventured well into the Southern Rockies and
the Great Basin for the purpose of trade.
40

Devoto, Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 213.
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There seems to be some evidence that the f arnous John
Colter's treks out of Manuel's Fort were, at least in part,
for the purpose of opening trade with Spanish settlements. 41
In 1808, George Drouillard conducted two expeditions south of
Manuel's Fort.

Historians recognize that one of the most irn-

portant results of these explorations was the crude map that
Drouillard made, a map later used by William Clark in cornpiling his maps of the West.

An examination of the Drouillard

map reveals several interesting notations.

Primarily, the

Spanish settlements are mentioned as being accessible by way
of the Big Horn River, and the "number of days" distance as
figured by the Indians is also recorded.

One scholar notes

that the estimates of travel time quoted from the Indians are
hardly accurate, or at least confusing, for a day's travel
might be based upon the distance covered by an entire band
moving at a leisurely pace, or a forced march of a war party.

42

41

M. o. Skarsten, George Drouillard, Hunter and Interpreter for Lewis and Clark and Fur Trader, 1807-1810 (Glendale: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1964), p. 265.
42

Ibid. The aulhor draws a question as to whether
Drouillard actually ascended the Big Horn to anywhere near
these settlements. The marks on the map that appear to be a
continuation of his route, could simply have been placed there
to indicate that a trail was extant rather than to indicate
an actual itinerary of the trapper. See Also Burton Harris,
John Colter, His Years In the Rockies (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 97.
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This hardly seems a vital question at this point; the fact
remains that the proximity of Spaniards to the American
trading posts was believed to exist, and the idea that a
few day's ride from the Upper Missouri or Yellowstone would
put American traders in the heart of the Spanish Empire was
real.

It is interesting to note here that the geography

furnished by Drouillard was used in both the manuscript and
published maps of William Clark, and would thus perpetuate
the misconceptions about the geography of the West for years
to come.

43
With such attractive news even a man of lesser

imagination and energy than Manuel Lisa would have been
encouraged to attempt once more to open trade with the Spanish.
Trade with the Spanish had never been far from Lisa's thoughts,
and by 1810, he felt it was time to again seek rewards to the
south.

Sometime during the summer of that year the trapper

Jean Baptiste Champlain and a party of some twenty-three
hunters returned to Fort Mandan from an expedition to the
Arapaho nation on the headwaters of the Platte.

The

' Algonquin language group, were
Arapahos, Indians of the
43

Wheat, From Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 54.
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located generally between the hunting grounds of the
Northern and Southern Cheyennes, in the eastern part of
the present-day state of Colorado. 44
Champlain advised that the Spaniards made contact
with the Arapaho for trade at least once each year.

This was

exciting news to Lisa and he immediately determined to contact his former countrymen.

If a trading connection could be

made with Spanish subjects, thought Lisa, his trading company,
the Missouri Fur Company, would possibly be able to succeed.
He figured this would happen even if the shaky relations
between the United States and England led to a war.

Ac-

cordingly, Lisa outfitted Champlain and sent him back to the
Arapaho nation with instructions to open trade with the
Spanish if possible, and, at least according to what he later
told the Spaniards, if the trade would "not be to the prejudice of the government [of Spain] • 1145

44

oglesby, Manuel Lisa • • • , p. 115. Alvin M.
Josephy, Jr. The Indian Heritage of America (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1969), p. 117.

'

45 Manuel Lisa to the Spaniards of New Mexico, September
8, 1812, Manuel Lisa Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St.
Louis, Mo. Herbert E. Bolton, "New Light on Manuel Lisa and
the Spanish Fur Trade," Southwestern Historical Quarterly,
XVII, No. 1 (July, 1913), 63.
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By August, 1812, no word had been received from the
Champlain party.

No one knew if they had reached their

destination or had been killed.

The loss of Champlain would

certainly have been a personal blow to Lisa for the two men
were long-time associates.

More than that, however, with the

loss of Champlain went Lisa's immediate hopes of opening a
connection between the Upper Missouri country and the Spanish
to the south.

The Indians becoming more hostile at this time

further dampened any hopes of success.

Meanwhile the McKnight

expedition, which will be discussed below, had been outfitting
in St. Louis and was heading in the direction of Santa Fe.
These factors made it imperative for Lisa to act immediately
. 1 Santa Fe tra d e. 46
or face t h e loss o f any potentia

With this

situation in mind Lisa made what has been described as a lastditch attempt to secure ingress to Spain's northern bastion.
But first, another member of the Champlain party deserves
examination.
One of the men accompanying Champlain on his attempt
to open trade with the Spanish was Ezekiel Williams.

The

' and his activities are still
particulars ·about this man
somewhat clouded, but there is sufficient historical evidence

46

Oglesby, Manuel Lisa • • • , pp. 127-28.
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to fix him in time and place as a member of the party Manuel
Lisa sent out in 1810 to open trade negotiations with the
Spanish on the approaches to Santa Fe. 47

Apparently the

Champlain party broke up on the upper Platte River, Williams
and a small group continuing on to the Arkansas.

According

to what Williams later told the United States Indian Agent
at Fort Osage on the Missouri, he was robbed and kept
prisoner by a band of Kansas Indians who found him in June,
He was kept prisoner until mid-August and then re-

1813.

leased.

The weary traveler arrived at Boon's Lick trading

post on September 1, 1813.
rnann

~1e

48

According to Professor Goetz-

Williams incident furnished authorities with important

geographical information.

It established the existence of

the Central Rockies which form most of the state of Colorado.
Thus it clearly showed that "the Spanish settlements of New
Mexico and Manuel's Fort on the Yellowstone did not • • •

4711 Ezekiel Williams' Adventure in Colorado," Missouri
Historical Society Collections, IV, No. 2 (1913), 194-95.
There is another work extant concerning the trek of Williams.
It is David H. Coyner, 1he Lost Trappers: A Collection of
Interesting Scenes and Events in the Rocky Mountains (Cincinnati: J.A. & U.P. James, 1847). This account is considered to be a very exaggerated and inaccurate account.
4811 Ezekiel Williams' Adventure in Colorado," p. 195.
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lie on opposite sides of a single mountain ridge. 1149

Santa

Fe was obviously not a "few days ride" from the nearest
western outpost of the Americans.
Now back to Manuel Lisa and his last attempt to gain
inroads to Spanish trade.

Not having heard from the Champlain

party (including Williams) for many months Lisa dispatched
another trader, Charles Sanguinet, one of his most trusted
and able lieutenants, to the Spanish in the name of the
Missouri Fur Company.
resting letter.

Sanguinet was armed with a most inte-

The letter explained that Sanguinet's trip

was necessary as no word had been received from Champlain,
and it was clearly a proposal for trade.

50

In September, 1812, Charles Sanguinet with over
$1,000.00 in merchandise, set out for Santa Fe from Fort
Manuel.

The letter he carried was of immense importance be-

cause of what it tells concerning Lisa's ideas about trade,
as well as the activity in the fur trade by the Spaniards.
Thus it should be quoted at some length.

Lisa told the

Spaniards,

'
49 Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire • • • , p. 27.
SOManuel Lisa to the Spaniards of New Mexico,
September 8, 1812, Lisa Papers. Bolton, "New Light on Manuel
Lisa • • • ," pp. 63-64.
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Ever since my first journey among the
forks of the Missouri, nine hundred
leagues from my domicile, I have
desired to find an opportunity to
communicate with my [com]patriots,
the Spaniards. I have had hunters
to the number of twenty-three who
have gone to the Arapaho nation.
Last year they came to my Fort Mandanne
[sic] where I equipped them anew to
return to the place whence they had
come. They are the ones who informed
me that the Spaniards of Mexico were
coming every year to trade with the
Arapahoes. Therefore I gave to a
certain Juan Bautista Champlain, an
honorable young man, and Juan Bautista
Lafargue, some goods for the purpose
of trading with you, • . . since up
to the present I have not had any news
[of them] , I have decided to send one
of my trusted servants, Don Carlos
Sanguinet, with two engages to let
them know they should come out with
their peltry; ••
I have especially instructed Don Carlos
Sanguinet to arrange that this letter
of mine should fall into the hands
of some Spaniard who may be worthy to
communicate with me [sea digno de
communicar conmigo] on those honorable principles, and in no other
manner, my desire being to engage in
business and open up a new commerce
which might easily be done. With this
in view, and as directory of the
Missouri Fur ;ompany, I propose to you
gentlemen that if you wish to trade
and deal with me, for whatever quantity
of goods it may be, I will obligate myself to fill each year any bill of goods
which shall be given me, and all shall
be delivered [as stipulated] both as to
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quality and as to quantity, at the
place nearest and most convenient
for both parties, to your satisfaction, after we shall have agreed
on the chosen place.
In case any of you should wish to
come with Don Carlos Sanguinet to
this my establishment to communicate and trade with me, you
will be received and treated with
great pleasure and satisfaction,
and assured to a sufficient escort,
agreeable to you, up to the time of
your return to your country • • • • Sl
While Lisa waited for news from Sanguinet he directed
the completion of Fort Manuel.

The news that did finally

arrive in December was all bad.

Lisa was informed from the

land of the Arapaho that Champlain had been killed by the
Blackfeet, that Lafargue and five others had run off to the
Spaniards, and that eight more had run off to the Crows.

Never

having reached Santa Fe, Sanguinet, himself, was back at Fort
Mandan by January, 1813, with some thirty horses for which he
had bartered.

No trade agreement with the Spaniards had been

made, and Sanguinet had no Spanish official with him to discuss the matter with Li¥1.

52

This incident drew Lisa's

51

Manuel Lisa to the Spaniards of New Mexico,
September 8, 1812, Lisa Papers.
52

Richard Dillon, "Meriwether Lewis, Manuel Lisa, and
the Tantalizing Santa Fe Trade," Montana, the Magazine of
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efforts to contact Santa Fe to a close.

The War of 1812 now

interrupted the activities of the Missouri Fur Company and
it fell on hard times.
Another incident whereby individual Americans sought
their fortunes on the roads to Santa Fe, and involved the
United States Government, was the effort by Joseph McLanahan,
Reuben Smith, James Patterson and Emanuel Blanco.

These

traders left St. Genevieve in November, 1809, and reached
Santa Fe in the latter part of February the following year.
The Spanish Governor of New Mexico did not buy their story of
an intention to settle in that region, and had them imprisoned.

Colonel Jose Manrrique, the ad interim governor,

became quite alarmed at the ease with which Spain's possessions were being encroached upon by foreigners.

He

encouraged the New Mexicans to open trade arrangements with
the surrounding Indian tribes in order to secure the red
man's friendship and use them as sources of information
relative to the activity of intruders.

53

' 2 (April, 1967), 51-52.
Western History, XVII, No.
53

Loomis, Pedro Vial • • • , p. 249.
information on their route is scarce.
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The imprisonment of McLanahan, Smith and party caused
some consternation among citizens in the United States when
they became aware of the fate of their fellow Americans.
Once the American newspapers took up the story the issue
became one of Spanish oppression versus the "innocent" traders.
To capitalize on such an emotional issue was not difficult: an
excerpt from the Louisiana Gazette would point this out well:
Mark the pretended ignorance of
these bloodhounds, they knew these
gentlemen were from St. Genevieve
in the Territory of Louisiana, • • •
Vermin! what a prostitution of
language! Messrs. Smith M'Clanahan
and Patterson strangers to the
policy of Mexico and the monkish
barbarism of the natives, they conceived they would visit white men
clothed with the Christian name:
unhappy incredulity~ They would
have found more generosity in the
breast of an Arab, more hospitality
in the den of a Hiena. -- The
assassins of Mexico have ere-this
butchered three respectable inhabitants of Louisiana! . . • 54

Appeals were made to the State Department by some

•

leading Americans including General Andrew Jackson to
pressure the Spanish Government for the immediate release of

54 I b"d
l. •

L

'

pp. 249-50.
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these "three respectable inhabitants of Louisiana,"
stern action if the traders were no longer alive.

55

or take

In De-

cernber, 1810, Secretary of State Robert Smith did instruct
Governor Benjamin Howard of the Louisiana Territory to write
Nemesio Salcedo, the Commandant-General of the Provincias
Internas, in behalf of the prisoners attesting to their character and citizenship.
this issue mounted.

56

Official correspondence surrounding

Salcedo was informed that a number of

men in high places of government had "interested themselves
warmly in behalf of the sufferers. 1157
The McLanahan party was finally released after a
year in the Santa Fe prison and returned to Louisiana in June,
1812.

The three men, McLanahan, Smith and Patterson, cele-

brated their return from the "assassins of Mexico" by informing the Governor in St. Louis that they intended to join
a filibustering expedition into Texas to help liberate that

56

Robert Smith to Governor Benjamin Howard, December
11, 1810, Carter, Territorial Papers, XIV, 426-27. This
letter indicates that Governor Claiborne had also attempted
to intercede for the traders a few months earlier.
57

Ibid.
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land from the yoke of Spain.

The United States Government's

attitude toward such projects has already been discussed,
but it might be of merit here to include a portion of what
Secretary of State .Monroe wrote to Governor Howard upon
learning of the plans afoot.
If the projected visit contemplates
any measure of hostility to Spain
it is repugnant to the policy of the
United States. It is also positively
prohibited by law.SS
Yet another private trading venture forced the
American Government to become involved diplomatically with
Spain at a time when it would have much preferred that
relations with His Catholic Majesty remain tranquil.

Some-

time during 1811 and 1812, James Baird, a personal friend of
Zebulon M. Pike, joined with Robert McKnight and Samuel
Chambers in an effort to open trade relations with the Spanish
in New Mexico.

The feasibility of overland contact with

Santa Fe had been established by the journey of Pike as well
as others.

In fact, Pike's Journals were published by this

' the people of the United States
time and their impact upon
58

.

Monroe to Governor Howard, September 3, 1810, SD,
Domestic Letters.
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including trader, trapper and government official, cannot be
over emphasized (See Chapter IV) •

Baird and his party used

th e J ourna 1 s as a gui"d e b ook. 59
There can be little doubt that these men were aware
of the way Spanish officials frowned uoon foreign intrustion
as of late.

News of the Hidalgo uprising in Mexico and the

subsequent independence activity doubtless gave encouragement
to such traders.

It was hoped that the new revolutionary

governments would look with more favor upon trade with their
neighbors to the east.

Unknown to the Baird-McKnight-Chambers

party before they departed on their long journey, the Hidalgo
movement had been short-lived and the leader had been executed.
Given the suspicion on the part of the Spanish that Americans
aided in the recent uprisings and were constantly threatening
New Spain with filibustering activities, a favorable reception
in New Mexico could hardly be expected.

60

59

Frank B. Golley, "James Baird, Early Santa Fe
Trader," Missouri Historical Society Bulletin, XV, No. 3
(April, 1959), p. 179. Family tradition suggests that Baird
and the famous explorer,Zebulon Montgomery Pike, became
friends during their stay at Pittsburgh, and that it was
through Pike that Baird first became cognizant of the possibilities of the Mexican trade.
60 Chittenden, The American Fur Trade • • • , II, 495-96.
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Nevertheless mules, horses, provisions and trade
goods were gathered, and the expedition left St. Louis for
the northern frontier of New Spain sometime in April, 1812.

61

The complete cargo, consisting of such things as silk, muslin,
calico, cotton, gun powder, knives, jackets and purses, was
valued at approximately $10,000.00.

After several months of

exhausting travel they arrived at Taos, using the route recommended by Pike on his map -- up the Arkansas River to the
Purgatory River, then to the mountains and finally to Taos.
It was in Taos that the party learned of the failure of the
Hidalgo uprising.
corted to Santa Fe.

They were subsequantly arrested and esIn spite of sufficient documentation and

trade goods to verify their status as legitimate traders,
Governor Manrrique had the Americans placed in jail and their
goods were applied to the cost of maintaining the prisoners.
Just how long they remained in jail in Santa Fe is not known,
but from that town the Americans were taken to Chihuahua by
way of Albuquerque and El Paso.

While in Chihuahua the

prisoners were at liberty under bond and restricted to the

'
confines of the city limits.

Sometime in 1815 they were tried

for their part in a supposed conspiracy and confined in the

61

Golley, "James Baird • • • ," p. 174.
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Military Hospital.

62

News of the capture and imprisonment of the Baird
party reached St. Louis in early 1813, and it opened a storm
of protest from members of the traders' families, newspaper
editors and Congressmen.

It was demanded of the Spanish that

they release their prisoners immediately.

Due to the efforts

of Baird's wife and McKnight's brother, the case was laid
before the Department of State in 1813.

This move brought

little success until 1817; for until that time Luis de Onis,
the only Spanish official in the United States of sufficient
rank and power to do anything about the situation, was not
credited by the American Government.

63

In February, 1817, Secretary of State Monroe initiated
a series of letters to Minister Onis, who had finally been
recognized officially as the Spanish Minister to the United
States.

The correspondence relative to the imprisonment of

Baird, McKnight and Chambers continued for several years to
no avail.

62
63

In a bureaucratic and procrastinating fashion

'

rbid., pp. 179-81.

rbid., pp. 180-83. Baird apparently wrote his wife
during his stay in Chihuahua.
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reminiscent of earlier times, the Spanish colonial officials
wrote and forwarded letter after letter between each other
and the Crown relative to the imprisonment and release of
the Americans, all to no positive result. 64

In justice to the

Spanish it must be pointed out here that the period 1818-1820
was a most trying one for them.

Both at home and in the

colonies revolution was the byword; frantic efforts were
being made to hold on to their colonial empire.
VII was struggling to maintain his throne.

Ferdinand

In such a situation

the fate of several American trappers languishing in a
Chihuahuan jail would not hold a place of prime importance
for the troubled Spanish officials.

This would be all the

more true due to the continued reluctance of the United
States Government to involve itself diplomatically with
Spain over the activities of individual American citizens in
the territory of a foreign power.

64

Monroe to Onis, February 8, 1817, ibid., p. 183.
Onls to J.Q. Adams, February 13, 1817, ibid.:-P:- 184. John
Scott, Delegate to Congress from the ~1iSS'Ollri Territory to
J.Q. Adams, December 29: 1817, ibid., p. 185. J. Q. Adams
to Onis, January 7, 1818, ibid.;-p:- 185. Onis to J. Q. Adams,
January 12, 1818, ibid., p-:-186. Onis to Don Ruiz de Apodaca,
Viceroy of New Spain, January 12, 1818, ibid., p. 187. The
correspondence of the American officials--cin also be found
in Carter, Territorial Papers, XV.
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The prisoners were eventually set free in 1821 by
the revolutionary government of Augustin Iturbide.

In the

interim, however, the inability of the United States to secure
any redress from the Spanish provoked a storm of protest
from some American citizens, especially those living in the
more western states and territories.

The inability of the

American government to effect the release of the prisoners
was easily translated by the populace into the lack of desire
to do so, the press playing a large role in this aspect.
Records indicate that official channels were used albeit to
no ava1'l • 65
The latter days of Madison's administration witnessed
another attempt by several Americans to open a trade route
to Santa Fe, an attempt which was not well received by officials in that city.

Auguste Pierre Chouteau had continued

active trading out of St. Louis following the War of 1812.
In his position as Agent to the Osage Indians he likewise
continued to hold a place of influence in government circles.
Governor William Clark of the recently created Territory of

' complimentary of the Frenchman's
Missouri, was especially

65

Golley, "James Baird • • • , " p. 180.
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service to the American nation.

66

In the summer of 1815,

Chouteau formed a partnership with Jules de Mun of St. Louis
for the purpose of trading on the Upper Arkansas with the
Arapaho and other Indian tribes of that region.
These two men actually arrived at the idea for such
a trading enterprise when another trader, James Philibert,
returned to St. Louis in 1815 for more supplies in order to
rendezvous on the Upper Arkansas with members of a party he
had led there the previous year.

The new team received a

license to trade from Governor Clark and set out on September 10, 1815.

On the way across the Plains, De Mun and

Chouteau bought out Philibert, expecting to acquire the services of his men when they would rendezvous on Huerfano
Creek near Pueblo, Colorado.

Huerfano Creek was a fork of

the Arkansas called El Haerfano by the Spanish.

On arriving

at the appointed spot December 8, 1815, the men Philibert
had left behind were nowhere to be found.

Inquiry among

the Indians established that the men, thinking Philibert

66

'

Clark to William H. Crawford, December 11, 1815,
Clark Papers, MSS, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis,
Mo. Appointment of William Clark as Governor of the Missouri
Territory by President Madison, June 16, 1813, ibid.
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. d s at Taos. 67
1 os t or d ea d , h a d gone over to t h e Spaniar
It was decided that Chouteau would remain on the
Huerfano and De Mun would go into Taos to inquire about the
trappers.

He would also speak to the Spaniards about future

trapping in the region.

De Mun found the trappers in Taos

apparently well and happy.

Proceeding to Santa Pe De Mun also

found the Spanish Governor, Alberto Maynez, rather well disposed toward American traders.

De Mun gives the following

account:

Having seen on my way to Santa Fe
that the rivers abounded with beaver,
. I asked the Governor the permission of
coming, with a fixed number of hunters,
to catch beaver in the rivers which
empty themselves into Rio del Norte.
This he could not take upon himself
to grant, but had the goodness to write
on that subject to the commandant General.
As I could not wait for the answer, Don
Alberto told me to come back • • • to know
the General's answer.68
What De Mun had to say next is of interest in light
of the geographic concepts held at the time.

67

'

It should be

Thomas Marshall, "Journals of De Mun • • • , " pp.
172-73. De Mun's letter to Governor William Clark, November
25, 1817, is given in full.
68

Ibid., p. 173.
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kept in mind that the western boundary dispute between Spain
and the United States was as yet unsettled, although progress
was being made.

De Mun continued,

I must not omit to say that the
Governor did not seem a moment to
doubt that we had a right to frequent the east side of the mountains,
and there to trade or catch beaver
if we could; for he advised me not
to go to the south of Red River of
Natchitoches, but from that river
to the northward we might trade
and hunt as we pleased. 69
Here was one Spaniard whose concept of what the Americans had
purchased in 1803 came close to matching that of the Americans themselves.
De Mun subsequently returned to Taos, picked up his
trappers and returned to Chouteau on the Huerfano.

It was

then decided De Mun should return to St. Louis for additional
supplies; accordingly, he set out at the end of February, 1816,
and reached St. Louis some forty-six days later.

Being well

supplied De Mun once more turned west and made rendezvous
with Chouteau at the mquth of the Kansas River as previously
arranged.

The two men then started for the Rocky Mountains,

where De Mun once again left Chouteau at camp and sought out
69

rbid.
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the Spanish authorities to see if word had been received from
the Commandant-General in Chihuahua. 70
To De Mun's consternation there had been a change in
Governors at Santa Fe.

The new official, Pedro Maria de

Allande, was not well disposed towards Americans.

In fact,

the Governor would not even allow De Mun to enter the city,
and ordered him out of Spanish territory immediately. Accordingly, the De Mun-Chouteau trading party recrossed the
mountains and wintered on the east side of the Arkansas
.
71
River.
Not willing to give up so easily, De Mun decided to
make one more trip back to Taos and see if the climate had
improved to any degree.

Upon his arrival at this small village

he was told that there were "very unfavorable reports."

72

The Spanish authorities confronted him with the story that they
had news of an American fort with some 20,000 men being built
on the Arkansas at the Rio de las Animas (located in the

7 oibid., pp. 175-76.
71
72

'
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 177.
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southeastern corner of the present-day state of Colorado) •
De Mun offered himself as a hostage while the Spaniards
searched out the rumors.

Several days later there arrived

in Taos a force of Spanish militia under the command of
Lieutenant Don Francisco Salazar who proceeded to take De
Mun back to his companions, raised all their caches, and
escorted the whole party back to Santa Fe.

The provincial

Governor was most angry because the Americans had not taken
heed of his first orders and left Spanish territory.

Governor

Allande did not hold the same concept as to where American
territory extended and Spanish domain began expressed by his
predecessor.

He would not accept the traders' explanation

of their right to trap along the Arkansas and into the rnountains.

According to De Mun,
I replied • . • that we were taken on
.American territory, where our Governor
had given us a license to go. At this
he got into a violent rage, saying that
we should pay for our own and our
Governor's ignorance; using all the
time very abusive language; repeating
several times that he would have our
brains blown l.\P • • • 73

73

rbi"d., pp. 178 - 80 •
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The trappers were subsequently imprisoned for fortyeight days after which they received a court martial composed
of six members and a president -- Governor Allande.
again the question of boundaries came up.

Once

De Mun insisted

that he was not on Spanish soil while on the Arkansas, because
that river was within United States territory since the purchase of Louisiana.

In addition, Governor Clark had issued

.
. t h e area. 74
t h em 1 1censes
to trap in

It has been noted earlier that Governor Clark maintained a manuscript map on which he continually made changes
and notations as more knowledge became available.

This map

covers much more territory than the engraved map which came
out in 1814, and is of more value in determining what concepts
Clark held relative to the Southwest.

On the manuscript map

the Nebraska and Kansas country is carefully charted; Governor Clark definitely used Pike's map for the approaches to
Santa Fe.

Clark continually made revisions and notations.

For example, high along the third fork of the Arkansas
[Huerfano] he now added "Chouteau & Dumen [sic] taken by
Spaniards.
74

1175

To the south
and southwest of the Lower
'

Ibid.

75 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark • • • , II, 51.
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VII.

SECTION OF WILLIAM CLARK'S MANUSCRIPT
MAP

Source: Goetzmann, William H.
Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the
~t.UU_n__tlliL.!'.?.tnn_i_ng_Qf the American West.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966, p. 26.
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Rockies, however, he continued to rely upon inaccurate
Spanish maps which had in turn been relied upon by the famous
Baron von Humboldt.
to prevail.

Thus imaginary geography continued

Given the other information he had received

from "mountain men" such as Colter and Drouillard, it would
not be unusual to find Governor Clark issuing licenses to trap
.

along the Ark ansas River.

76

Governor Allande denied that the United States had
·the right to issue such licenses and permit trappers "to go
.
,,77
as f ar as the headwaters o f sai.d river.

Furthermore, the

Spaniard spoke much about a big river that was the boundary
between the t\·10 countries but did not know its name.

When

De Mun suggested it might be the Mississippi, Allan de "jumped
up saying, that that was the big river he meant; that Spain
had never ceded the west side of it. "7 8
The sentence of the court martial was that the
Americans leave the dominions of Spain which they did, returning to St. Louis in early September, 1817.
76
77

Ibid.

De Mun

•

Marshall, "Journals of De Mun • • • , " p. 180.
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figured the loss of the trapping venture to the·tune of over
$30,00o.oo.

There now remained the question of whether

the United States Government could or would demand satisfaction of the King of Spain "for outrages committed by his
•
.
• .
79
ignorant
Governor on Am erican
citizens."

The State Depart-

ment, now under the leadership of John Quincy Adams, did
initiate a claim against the government of Spain, and a settlement was finally reached years later.

80

Meanwhile, in November, 1816, the people of the United
States elected another Chief Executive.

Following the prece-

dent set down by the nation's first President, Madison decided
not to run for a third term and the Jeffersonian-Republican
mantle fell to another Virginian, James Monroe.

Monroe was

certainly no newcomer to the field of national politics or
international diplomacy, having held several ministerial posts
in Europe under both Jefferson and Madison, as well as Cabinet
positions under the latter statesman.

79

Ibid. Statement and Proof in Case of Chouteau and
De Mun, of Their Loss al'\d Treatment by the Spaniards, ASP,
Foreign Relations, IV, 209-10.
80 Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., lst Sess., II,
1953-66.
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Although the pending negotiations and problems with
Spain would not be settled until several years after Monroe
assumed the office of President, his election, in many ways,
marked the end of one period of United States-Spanish relations
and the opening of a new era.

The new period would see a

decided quickening of pace respective to concluding unsettled
issues with Spain, and a definite interest on the part of
government to sponsor expeditions to the Rocky Mountain region.
The scientific aspect of such expeditions was obvious, but
much of the new approach had to do with military reorganization
and defense.

Indian policy was also a major factor.

The man

largely responsible for this reorganization, and the administrative force behind a more vigorous approach to the west,
was Monroe's Secretary of War, John

c. Calhoun.

The War Department was responsible for the management
of army business and the conduct of Indian Affairs.

In both

areas there was a mixture of civilian and military influence
that proved difficult to reconcile at times.

Great distances

and poor roads did little to facilitate administration, and
the absence of a true q~artermaster corps during the time
of Jefferson and Madison added to faulty management.

As

Leonard White points out in his work on the Jeffersonians,
"Army organization before 1813 • • • was extremely simple.

r
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;

• • • The army consisted of small self-sufficing scattered
posts mostly on the frontier under the control of local
commanders."

81

The War of 1812 forced the Congress to act

and in 1813 some reorganization took place, and a General
Staff was created.

Once the war was over, however, there

was an immediate cry for reduction of the armed forces.

By

an act of congress within two months of the Battle of New
Orleans, Congress passed a bill which read in part,
That the military peace establishment
of the United States shall consist
of such proportions of artillery,
infantry, and riflemen, not exceeding in the whole ten thousand
men, as the President shall judge
proper, and that the corps of
engineers as at present established,
be retained.82
When James Monroe took the oath of office in March,
1817, the state of the military and its management were not
such that anyone would volunteer to have the chance to put
them in order.

81

Monroe had difficulty in persuading someone

'

white, The Jeffersonians • • • , p. 236.

82 L.

n. Ingersoll, A History of the War Department of

the United States, With Biographical Sketches of the Secretaries
(Washington, D.C.: Francis B. Mohun, 1880), pp. 74-75.

1817, the position was accepted by John

c.

Calhoun.

Although

without military experience he attacked his duties with a
determination and vision that made him "one of the remarkable
cabinet members of his age."

83

Part of his task was the formulation of a defense
policy for the western frontier, and here he differed extensively with many high ranking army officers who were
thinking more in terms of a limited advance on the frontiers.
The famous Yellowstone Expedition of 1818, and the first
expedition led by Stephen H. Long in 1819, were the earliest
efforts in what Francis Prucha describes as Calhoun's "dreams
of national grandeur."

84

Although not completely successful

due to a still cautious Congress, the aforementioned expeditions
signaled a new dawn in army exploration of the West and in
cartography of the Southwest.

The Indians were to find in

Calhoun a man who strongly believed that any type of independent status for Indians within state limits should be abolished:
furthermore, if the red man opposed the process of civilization

•

into the white man's world, removal to the West was the only
83

Prucha, Sword of the Republic • • • , p. 135.

84Ib' .

-~..~·I p. 140.
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answer. 85
Thus after 1818, the approaches to Santa Fe were becoming attractive to the United States Government as well as
to the individual trader or trapper.

In fact, the attempts

of individual Americans to seek fortunes in the West began to
rapidly increase, culminating in what has been described as
the most significant trip ever made in the West -- the opening
of the Santa Fe Trail by William Becknell in 1821. 86

By that

time, however, the independence movement in Mexico had sueceeded and Santa Fe was no longer under the control of His
Catholic Majesty.

The new :.1exican officials viewed trade

with the United States, at least in the beginning, in a different light than did the Spanish.

Within a few short years

visions of trade with New Mexico loomed forth in the minds
of men too numerous to count.
Meanwhile, the western boundary question was being
brought to a conclusion by the diligent efforts of John Quincy

85

rbid., p. 254. Ingersoll, A History of the War
, p. 461-

Department~.~
••

8 6 The full story of t h e Santa Fe trai· 1 may b e f oun d

in R. L. Duffus, The Santa Fe Trail (New York: Logmanns,
1930). See also William Becknell, "Journal of Two Expeditions from Boon's Lick to Santa Fe," Missouri Historical
Society Collections.
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Adams and Luis de Onis.

Once he had been officially

recognized by the United States Government in December, 1815,
Onis had considered the solution of territorial problems with
the United States vital to the larger scope of Spanish
colonial policy.

He hoped a well-defined border would aid

in defending the colonies and deter restless adventurers from
east of the Mississippi.

Furthermore, a settlement of the

boundary dispute would ease the diplomatic tension between
his country and the United States.

87

The final delineation of a common western boundary
between United States and Spanish territory was integrally
tied to settlement of the Florida question.

As noted several

times above the settlement of the Florida issue was foremost
in the minds of American statesmen; such was also the case
with Spanish diplomats.

Spain's inability to control Florida

in the waning years of her colonial empire is well known,
but she still valued the territory and
it.

~ished

to hold on to

The Americans had been pushing into West Florida for

some time, and the War of 1812 all but secured the entire area
for the United States.

'President

Madison evidenced full

support for the American urge to make West Florida a part of

87

Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands • • • , pp. 1-2.
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t h e Union.

88

East Florida also had its allure.

The strategic value of East Florida during the War of
1812 gave justification to American statesmen to consider

annexing the area.

Following the war the inability of

Spanish officials to restrain the Indians from raiding into
American territoriJ, and the inability, if not reluctance,
of these same officials to return the hundreds of runaway
slaves, kept the lure for possession of East Florida in
American sights.

Little more than verbosity occurred over the

Floridas between the end of the War and the year 1818 however,
until General Andrew Jackson made his famous move into the
area and stirred up a veritable "hornet's nest" of diplomatic
haranguing.
Another vital factor to the outcome of the Adams-Onis
negotiations was the explosive situation facing Spain in the
form of renewed independence movements spreading throughout
her New World possessions.

Actually this situation could be

considered the key issue which eventually forced Spain to give
in to the United States on the question of the Floridas, and

'
88

.Tunerican interest in and occupation of West Florida
is discussed fully in Issac J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Gloucester,
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967). See especially Chapters X-XVII.
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make concessions on the western boundary.

Spain feared United

States active support of the insurgent governments, and, as
it proved, was willing to go to great lengths to prevent such
aid.

The active sympathy of the American populace permitted

the outfitting of privateers in our ports under the flags of
the belligerent countries.

Too often these privateers were

manned by American crews in violation of neutrality laws.
Faced with the rising power of the insurgents and the swelling
tide of opinion in the United States, the Spanish Foreign
Minister, Jose Garcia de Leon y Pizarro, feared a recognition
by Washington of the independence of the rebel states.

He

thus grew increasingly alarmed at the precarious condition
of the indefensible borderlands.

89

Pizarro tried in vain to enlist the support of England
in his nation's negotiations with the United States.

He wished

England to assume responsibility for maintaining the integrity
of the Spanish Empire and to mediate directly in the affairs
of Spain with America.

89

This England would not do.

Between

'

arooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands • • • , p. 115.
Pizarro was appointed Foreign Minister by Ferdinand VII in
October, 1816. Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and ~~e
Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1965), p. 305.
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!

England and the United States at the moment there were too
many diplomatic bargainings in process which had grown out of
the Treaty of Ghent to allow for an added complication.
Besides mediation by the British was flatly refused by the
American Government.

Therefore, alone, and in serious trouble

with her colonial subjects, Spain had to tackle the Florida
and western boundary questions with one of the ablest statesmen America could put forth.

Many historians consider John

Quincy Adams to have been one of America's finest statesmen
. d'l.p 1 omacy. 90
J.n

John Quincy Adams's first major proposal to Onis
was made on January 16, 1818.

It called for a line north

from the source of the Colorado River of Texas to the northern
limits of Louisiana; the line would run across the prairies
just to the east of the Rocky Mountains.

This proposal was

actually the offer that Jame::> Monroe had made to the Spanish
in 1816, when he was Secretary of State.

Such a boundary

would save the Louisiana Purchase for the United States but
. would cut t h e nat1on
.
'
91
J.t
off from t h e Pac1' f 1c.

One can

'
90

91

Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands • • • , p. 115.
aemis, John Quincy Adams • • • , p. 309.

r
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only conclude that such an offer was made with full knowledge
that Santa Fe and all of New Mexico would be well outside
United States territory.

While the cartography of the South-

west was still primitive, that Santa Fe was some distance to
the west of the Colorado River of Texas was common knowledge
given the events of the previous decade.
•

Here was a golden

opportunity for Onis to take advantage of a rather carelessly
made offer and lock-up the Americans east of the Rockies.
Such an opportunity quickly calls to mind the time, not too
many years earlier, when Spain attempted to restrict the
United States to an area east of the Alleghenies.
apparently did not see his opportunity.

On!s

It would have done

him little good even if he had for his instruction of the
moment did not allow for him to agree to a boundary for the
United States even tnat far west:

In answer to Adams's

January proposal the Spanish minister offered the customary
boundary between Spanish Texas and French Louisiana; a point
half-way between the Mermentau and Calcasieu Rivers, two
small parallel streams flowing into the Gulf of Mexico entirely within the State ' of Louisiana.

92

~., p. 310.

92
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President Monroe would not accept any line that cut
the State of Louisiana.

He did offer, however, to bring

America's proposal eastward to the Trinity River.

Monroe

told Adams,
We may agree to fix the boundary by
the Trinity, from its mouth to its
source, then to the Arkansas at its
nearest point, and along the Arkansas to its source, thence due West
to the Pacific, or to leave the
limit in the latter instance to
be settled by commissioners. If
this is done, and Florida, west,
to the Perdido, is ceded, and
the Convention of 1802 ratified,
the u States will undertake to
pay, in satisfaction of claims,
on account of the French
spoliations, and condemnations
in Spanish ports, • • • 93
This is the first recorded suggestion of carrying the boundary
line through to the Pacific.

Whether it was Monroe's idea or

the suggestion of John Quincy Adams is not clear.

94

93

Memorandum, Monroe to J.Q. Adams, cited in ibid.
Bemis notes that this memorandum is found between two documents dated February 5 ~nd 23, 1818, in a volume of letters
from James Monroe to J.Q. Adams, 1798-1831, Adams MSS.
94

Philip c. Brooks feels that John Jacob Astor
prompted Adams to include Oregon in the treaty line, although
there is no certain record of Astor's intervention. John
Astor's interest in the Pacific Northwest needs no comment;
he did assemble a dinner party of a hundred persons to welcome
J. Q. Adams home from England in 1817, and perhaps he planted
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In February, 1818, the whole diplomatic situation
received a sudden jolt when Andrew Jackson, the Napoleon des
bois, marched into Florida to "punish" the renegade Indians,
Spanish and English.· Now, added to the problems of boundaries
a·nd spoliation claims was the hue and cry from the Spanish
that their sovereignty had been violated by this aggressive
act.

The invasion of Florida by General Jackson also percipi-

tated a serious debate within President Monroe's Cabinet.
Outside the official family, Henry Clay and his cohorts saw
a chance to use Jackson's actions to levy criticisms against
the Administration.

Monroe was worried about political

opposition, but he feared more the diplomatic effect if he
disavowed Jackson's moves.

Privately the President deemed

Jackson's actions in Florida to be well beyond what he was
authorized to do, and stated as much to the Genera1.

95

Publicly, however, Monroe, with the support of Adams, felt

the idea of obtaining Oregon in the mind of that statesman
at that time. See Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands •
• • , pp. 151-52. Adams will later claim the whole idea was
his own; see below.
'
95 Monroe to Jackson, July 19, 1818, Stanislaus Murray
Hamilton (ed.), The Writings of James Monroe (6 vols., New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 190'0), VI, 55. ~onroe to
Madison, July 20, 1818, ~., 61.
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he must take a different stand.

As he told Jefferson a few

months after the event, "his [Jackson's] trial, unless he
should ask it himself, would be the triumph of Spain, &
confirm her in the disposition not to cede Florida. 1196

Rather

than apologize Monroe desired to use the situation to press
Spain into a settlement of the outstanding issues without
driving her to the brink of war.
As expected Luf s de Onfs announced he could negotiate
no treaty until the United States restored Florida to Spanish
authority and paid suitable indemnity for the outrages committed against his country.

In Madrid, Pizarro ceased com-

munications with the American Minister, George Erving.

In

actuality, however, Adams and Onis continued to hold meetings
and pursue an amicable settlement of the boundary question.
It was during these meetings that the two diplomats agreed
to use John Melish's "Map of the United States with the
contiguous British and Spanish possessions. 1197

This map

96

Monroe to Jefferson, July 22, 1818, ibid., 63.
Jackson insisted until his death that he had orders to proceed
as he did in Florida; 11kewise President Monroe swore he never
so commissioned the General.
97

wheat, From Lewis and Clark . • . , II, 62. Melish
was praised by former President Jefferson for producing a
map which gave a "luminous view of the comparative possessions
of different powers in our America," ~·, p. 64. Wheat also
notes that the Melish map was used to settle boundary disputes with Mexico in 1828 and with the Republic of Texas in 1838.
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originally had been published in 1816, but the two statesmen
were making use of a later edition.

The map had been received

well and included the information furnished by the previously
published efforts of Pike, Lewis and Clark and von Humboldt.
It should be noted, however, that none of the above as yet
.
. h accuracy. 98
d epicted
t h e Sout h west wit

Although Onis com-

plained somewhat over the cartographic authority of the
Melish map he agreed to use the map for negotiations.

Try as

they may the two negotiators could arrive at no workable
solution.
The Foreign Minister in Madrid now faced with loss
of his British mediation scheme, and extremely fearful that
the United States would extend recognition to the revolutionary
movements in South America, began to alter his hard line.
On1s, in early April, was instructed to place the Spanish
.

of f er o f a western b oun d ary at t h e Sa b ine.

99

Later the same

month, Pizarro wrote that Onis could offer the cession of
the Floridas and cancellation of all claims, if the United
States was to promise no recognition or aid to the insurgents.

'

100

98~., p. 63.
99

Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands • • • , p. 141.

lOOibid., p. 134.
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It was during the crisis caused by the Jackson move
into Florida, a time when both America and Spain were not
officially negotiating, that the French Minister to the
United States, Hyde de Neuville, offered his services to
mediate the outstanding issues and prevent a break between
Spain and the United States.

His motives are not clear;

regardless, Monroe and Adams were happy to avail themselves
of the Frenchman's services.

From July, 1818, to the con-

clusion of the treaty, the negotiations between Spain and
the United States were channeled through this gentleman. 101
On July 16, 1818, Adams submitted another major
proposal to the Spanish which yielded more of Texas than the
original Colorado River offer, but included more of the
Oregon Territory.

The offer read in part,

lOlBemis, John Quincy Adams • • • , p. 320. Bemis has
the following to say about the motives of the French Minister:
"In his sketchy MAmoires, Hyde de Neuville reveals a deepseated fear of British intrusion in the Caribbean area. Undoubtedly he wanted to strengthen Spain's position there by
composing all her differences with the United States on the
Continent of North America. It is also quite possible that
he felt the establishmeat and enforcement of an agreed boundary between the two countries in North America would discourage the filibustering plots of the Napoleonic exiles.
Certain it is that the French Government feared the United
States might recognize the independence of the new states of
Latin America; perhaps here was a way of staving off such a
calamity."
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the Trinity, from its mouth to its
source, thence a line due north to
the Red River, following a course
of that to its source, then crossing
to the Rio del Norte, and following
the course of it, or the summit of
a chain of mountains northward and
parallel to it; there stop, or take
a line west to the Pacific. 102

On the Melish map the Rio Grande appears to rise in about
41° 30' N.L.

By October, 1818, Adams and On1s had agreed

to the Sabine River north to tl1e Red River, but from this
point north and west the two diplomats were far from agreement.
Again whether the idea to give up most of Texas was conceived
by Adams or Monroe may never be known.

Several years after

the treaty was concluded, John Quincy Adams declared that
he was the last man in the Administration to agree to the
Sabine for the western boundary.

103

To put it in his own

words, "I was the last who had consented to take the Sabine
for our western boundary."

104

Samuel Flagg Bemis feels that

102~·, p. 321.
103

niary Entry /,or April 13, 1820, Walter LaFeber
(ed.), John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire,
Letters, Papers and Speeci1es (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1965), p. 86.
l0 4 Ibid.
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ever since Monroe had anything to do with the Spanish negotiations he had been willing to give up Texas for the
Floridas: therefore, it was he that commanded the steps to
retreat eastward from the Colorado.
chief with no great if any protest,"

"Adams followed his
105

The "stair-step"

boundary line from the Texas-Louisiana border needed much more
refining.

It is of interest to note that none of the subse-

quent proposals made by either the United States Government
or the Spanish were of such design as to include Santa Fe or
any of New Mexico.
It was years after the conclusion of negotiations that
John Quincy Adams learned that by I~ovember, 1818, On!s had
received instructions from Pizarro to yield on a boundary
west of the Sabine if necessary to prevent a break, even as
far west as the Colorado.

Adams could have had Texas, or most

of it, but Onis kept these latest instructions to himself and
continued his hard bargaining for the Sabine.

106

It was

during the first two months of 1819 that the two diplomats
concluded their arduous task.

They had ceased to wrestle

'

7
"b ac k an d f or t•n across t h e Continent.
'
II 1°
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aemis, John Quincy Adams • • . , p. 321.
Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands • • • , p.146.

lO? Bemis,
·
J o l1n Quincy
'
Ad ams • • • , p. 329 •
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The final stages of the negotiations hinged around
the degree of north latitude on which the line to the Pacific
would be drawn.

Adams held out for 41° N.L., and Onis would

not come further south than 43° N.L.

In early February, 1819,

President Monroe was inclined to accept the Spaniards' latest
offer and settle the matter once and for all.

He indicated

some concern over political harassment from Clay because of
the relinquishment of Texas, but wanted the matter closed.
The President directed Adams to get General Jackson's opinion
on giving up Texas.

108

Accordingly, the Secretary of State

called upon General Jackson on February 2, 1819, and asked
his opinion of the negotiations with Spain thus far.

Adams

noted that Jackson felt the friends of the Administration
would be satisfied, but their adversaries would be severe
in their censure.

According to Adams the General said,

there were many individuals who would
take exception to our receding so far
from the boundary of the Rio del Norte,
which we claim, as the Sabine, and
the enemies of the Administration
would certainly make a handle of it
to assail them: but the possession
of the Floridas was of so great

108

oiary Entry for February 1, 1819, LaFeber, Adams's
Letters,Papers and Speeches, p. 80.
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importance to the southern frontier
of the United States, and so essential
even to their safety, that the vast
majority of the nation would be
satisfied with the western boundary
.
.
109
as we propose, i"f we o b tain
the Floridas.

President Monroe called a Cabinet Meeting to consider
On1s's latest offer and all except Adams felt agreement was
so near it would be senseless to jeopardize a treaty at this
time.

The Floridas had been secured; the Sabine would secure

Louisiana on the west.

Adams brought up to the President

that public opinion and political criticism would be bitter
over the loss of Texas, but Monroe assured the Secretary
that his political opponents would be troublesome whether
a treaty was signed or not, and the acquisition of Florida
and title to the Pacific would offset any popular opposition
to the loss of Texas.

110

On February 22, 1819, John Quincy

109

oiary Entry for February 2, 1819, ibid. Diary
Entry for February 3, 1819, Allan Nevins (ed.), The Diary
of> John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1951), p. 209. Andrew Jackson continually denied that
he agreed on the Sabine boundary or giving up Texas for
Florida. See Jackson tb Francis P. Blair, October 24, 1844,
John Spencer Bassett (ed.) , Correspondence of Andre\·/ Jackson
(7 vols., Washington: Carnegie Institution of Nashington,
1933), VI, 326. Jackson to Blair, January 21, 1845, ibid.,
367.
110

oiary Entry for February 2, 1819, LaFeber,
Adams's Letters, Papers and Speeches, p. 81. One must rely
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MAP OF THE 1819 BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT
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Adams and Luis de Onis affixed their signatures to a monumental document.

In his diary that evening Adams wrote,

The acquisition of the Floridas has
long been an object of earnest desire
to this country. The acknowledgement
of a definite line of boundary to the
South Sea forms a great epoch in our
history. The first proposal of it
in this negotiation was my own, and
I trust it is now secured beyond
the reach of revocation.111
Adams was convinced that the United States should
obtain more by adhering to our demands, but he seems to have
maintained that stand almost alone.

President James Monroe

was never disposed to endanger the United States by making
a determined effort to get Texas or draw a line westward to
the Pacific bringing Santa Fe within the American orbit.
wanted Florida, and he got it.

He

In later years Adams would

receive more than a little criticism for relinquishing Texas;
politics have a strange way over the memories of men.
Actually in 1819, Texas and New Mexico were theoretically

on the Diary of John Qulncy Adams for the details of this
important period of negotiations; neither the papers of
Adams or Monroe as edited by Ford and Hamilton throw any
light on the subject.
111 oiary Entry for February 22, 1819, Nevins, Diary
of John Quincy Adams, pp. 211-12.

274
available for American expansion, at least in a commercial
way; trade was the byword.

The flood of immigrants which

began after 1820 could not be foreseen, nor could the desire
for cheap land and agricultural pursuits be predicted.

The

Florida situation was much more immediate and in tune with
the expansionist ideas holding forth in Washington.

Thus

one period of United States-Spanish relations came to a
close, which in itself signaled the opening guns of a new
and more vigorously aggressive period to follow.

'

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that the preceding chapters have shed a
bit more light on the many faceted story of American interest
in the Spanish Southwest during

L~e

better part of the first

two decades of the nineteenth century.

It has been seen that

during the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison many American citizens demonstrated more than a little
concern for penetrating Spanish-held territory beyond the
Mississippi and

~issouri

rivers.

with the trader and the trapper.

Such was especially the case
Their concern represented,

for the most part, a desire to make quick and sizable fortunes;
some men, of course, were drawn to the Southwest by the lure
of simple adventure or power.

Were it up to these indi-

viduals, the United States flag would have been flying above
the government buildings in Texas, New Mexico and California
years before it actually did.

These people did, in fact,

represent an aggressive, expansionist-minded America to the
Spaniards.
275
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When one looks to the interests and attitudes of
the American Government during these same years, however,
it becomes quite obvious that the officials and statesmen
of this nation were more cautious than many an individual
citizen.

The diplomatic consequences of any move toward

land claimed by Spain could easily prove serious and were
weighed carefully.

In fact, the United States Government, at

times, discouraged and forbade its citizens to move toward
the Rocky Mountains.

Such a fact becomes all the more inte-

resting when one notes that Thomas Jefferson, President from
1801 to 1809, is considered this nation's first "expansionist"
President.
Using various statements made by Thomas Jefferson,
and considering the fact that he negotiated the Louisiana
Purchase, historians have continually played upon Jefferson's
idea to build an "Empire of Liberty."

There is little doubt

that Jefferson, statesman and man of science, cast eyes
towards the West.

Were his thoughts any part of a syste-

matic plan to bring what was then Spanish under the control
of the United States?

' is hoped that the foregoing chapters
It

have proven such an argument weak indeed.
As early as 1786 Jefferson remarked that the
American Confederation was a "nest from which all America,
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North and South is to be peopled." 1

Referring specifically

to Spanish-held territories he expressed hope that His
Catholic Majesty would hold on to them until "our population
can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by
piece."

2

Such remarks, made during the trying times of the

Confederation, and in particular reference to the question
of the use of the Mississippi then under discussion, can
hardly be considered part of a serious expansionist or
imperialistic plan in the true sense.
Another statement by Thonas Jefferson that historians
are wont to quote indicating an expansionist-minded President,
are his words to James Monroe in November, 1801.

In a letter

to Governor Monroe of Virginia, Jefferson noted,
On our western and southern frontiers
Spain holds an immense country, the
occupancy of which, however, is in the
Indian natives, except a few insulated
spots possessed by Spanish subjects.
It is very questionable, indeed, whether
the Indians would sell? whether Spain
would be willing to receive these people?

1

'

Jefferson to A. Stuart, January 25, 1786, Julian P,
Boyd et al (eds.), The Paners of Thomas Jefferson (17 vols.,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950 - ) , IX, 217-18.
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and nearly certain that she would not
alienate the sovereignty. . • • However our present interests may restrain
us within our own limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant
times, when our rapid multiplication
will expand itself beyond those limits,
and cover the whole northern, if not the
southern continent, with a people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws; • • • 3
The action of President Jefferson which has most
branded him an expansionist, of course, was the Louisiana
Purchase.

As developed in Chapters I and II Jefferson had

been interested in the vast Louisiana territory for many
years before the famous Purchase.

The Purchase did, in fact,

extend the boundaries of America far to the west of the
Mississippi.

Perhaps Gilbert Chinard, in his dated but

excellent biography of Thomas Jefferson comes close to the
accurate evaluation of the Purchase vis-a-vis expansionism
when he notes that Jefferson's desire for Louisiana was not
so much a desire of expansion or imperialism as the conviction that colonies such as Louisiana were only pawns in
the game of European poaitics.

3

Thus he concluded that there

Jefferson to James Monroe, November 24, 1801, A. A.
Lipscomb et al (eds.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (19
vols., Washington, 1903-04), X, 295-96.

279
existed a "permanent danger of seeing France recover some day
her former colonies or, still worse, to have them fall into
. . h4
thh
e ands o f h
t e Br1t1s
•
When the necessity for determining the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase presented itself it is true
that President Jefferson, using the more advantagous French
maps as his source of authority, claimed the Rio Grande.
Such a limit would have immediately brought Santa Fe within
the confines of the United States.

Although he doubtless

had little idea of the relationships between the several
major river systems of the Plains such as the Arkansas and
the Platte and their proximity to Santa Fe, he knew well that
the Rio Grande would extend American territory west of the
province of Texas and into New Mexico.

The early French maps

upon which he was relying indicated this.

Certainly after

the return of Zebulon Pike the President knew that Santa Fe
would be ours if the Spanish would only agree to the Rio
Grande as a boundary.

5

Yet, as we have seen, the President

4

Gilbert China;d, Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of
Americanism (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
1966)

I

P• 401.

5John L. Allen, "Geographical Knowledge & American
Images of the Louisiana Territory," The Western Historical
Quarterly, II (April, 1971), 154-58. Allen points out that
while information on Louisiana was voluminous following the
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was not prone to insist upon the Rio Grande as a sine qua non
in our negotiations with the Spanish Government.

He was

more than a little willing to move the boundary line immediately to the Colorado of Texas, and further east if
necessary.

Although Jefferson would continually hold to the

idea that America had "some pretensions" to a more westerly
border he put no barriers in the way of his negotiators by
insisting upon such limits.

There is the strong possibility

that the President figured the land would come to us sooner
or later as Spain lost control, so why fight for it.

Again

such conjecture, while plausible, does not give us a picture
of an active expansionist government greedy for access to
the rich mines of northern New Spain.
That there is early evidence of a type of thinking
which burst forth in the Manifest Destiny movement of midnineteenth century America should perhaps be mentioned.
Chinard has again captured the mood of the times when he
sees Jefferson as laying down the moral foundation of American
imperialism which the biographer calls "a curious mixture of

'
Purchase, most was copied and reprinted from the same few
sources of English, Spanish and French origin, all inaccurate
in varying degrees. Of the Western rivers the Platte and
Arkansas were seldom mentioned or described.
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common sense, practical idealism, and moralizing not to be
found perhaps in any other people, but more permanently
American than typically Jeffersonian. 116
Following the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, remarks of an expansionist nature can be found in the writings
of other leading statesmen of the early nineteenth century.
Nevertheless it is proposed that such remarks were made more
in the line of future hopes and possibilities, than as part
of any systematic plan by the United States Government to
possess what belonged to Spain.

What plans there were seem

to have been in regard to the Floridas.

The whole Florida

issue was in turn directly tied to the Mississippi Question
and the security of America's Gulf Coast.

Santa Fe and the

remainder of the Spanish Southwest were not of immediate concern to official America.

The words and actions of James

Madison and James Monroe offer adequate testimony to this
stand.

Given the problems between the United States and

Great Britain during the administration of James Madison, it
is quite understandable that his attention was turned more

. coast than
' to lands west of the Mississippi.
to the Atlantic
President Monroe's role during the final days of the Adams-

6

chinard, Thomas Jefferson, • • • , p. 398.
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Onls negotiations clearly indicate that he would not let
individual Americans' desires for New Mexico and Texas hinder
or delay the final boundary settlement with Spain.

Although

the evidence is not conclusive, it seems likely that Monroe
would not have even insisted on an access to the Pacific had
it not been for his shrewd and able Secretary of State, John
Quincy Adams.
Another aspect of the United States-Spanish diplomacy,
and American interest in the Southwest, which has borne heavily
on this study has been an evaluation of the cartographic development and the role it played in determining outstanding
issues.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century American

statesmen had to rely on maps of Spanish and French origin to
gain any sort of picture of what lay beyond the Mississippi
and Missouri river basins.

The Spanish and French themselves

were relying in large measure on their own cartographic efforts
of earlier times.

Given Spain's proclivity to keep her carto-

graphic findings a secret from the outside world, and noting
the geographic concepts evidenced by frontier officials, the
Spanish seemed to have 'done a very good job of keeping their
findings from each other as well • . The maps of Spanish origin
on which American and English map makers later based their
own work declined in accuracy as they illustrated areas west
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and south of the Lower Missouri River.

The Arkansas and

Platte river systems were often confused; the headwaters of
the Red and Canadian rivers were continually interchanged, if
not ignored, by the early cartographers.

Descriptions of

the interior mountain ranges were most indefinite.

By the

opening of the nineteenth century, as far as territory west
of the Mississippi was concerned, American (and Spanish)
officials could rely with confidence only on geographic
delineations of the Missouri River up to the Mandan Villages,
the Sabine River course, and the Red River of Texas from its
mouth for a distance of some 300 miles.

While much of the

Great Plains had been charted, details remained quite inaccurate.
Following the Louisiana Purchase President Jefferson
preferred to use maps of French origin in stating his claims
to western limits.
arguing point.

These maps obviously gave him a stronger

The French claimed westward to the Rio Grande,

including the outpost of Santa Fe, based upon the La Salle
landing on the Texas shore and the distances traveled by
their various explorers' and trappers.

The Spanish would

never accept such claims; nevertheless Jefferson, in his
report to Congress following the Purchase, based his claims
almost entirely on the statistics of the Frenchman Le Page
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du Pratz.
The expedition of Lewis and Clark, followed by the
onrush of traders and trappers, greatly reduced the amount
of geographic guesswork as far as the Upper Missouri region
and Pacific Northwest were concerned.

The famous and contra-

versial expedition of Zebulon M. Pike gave the United States
a more accurate view of much of the Great Plains.

This en-

deavor did not, however, alter the paucity of accurate
geographic knowledge of the Lower Rocky Mountain region or
the remaining land of the Spanish Southwest.

As we know

Pike's papers were confiscated by Spanish officials and the
maps in his Journals made use of the famous von Humboldt map
for depicting the approaches of Santa Fe and environs.

It

has been indicated several times in this study that Baron
von Humboldt did not personally make observations in this
region: he relied on earlier and inaccurate maps of Spanish
origin.

Accordingly, geographic misconceptions continued

well into the nineteenth century.
Thus when Spaniards were accusing Americans of en-

'
croaching upon their lands,
and when Americans were asserting
their rights to explore or trap rivers well into the Lower
Rocky Mountains, both people were supporting their claims
with shaky authority.

That Spanish officials truly feared
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American settlements on. the.Upper Missouri as being dangerously
close to Santa Fe, indicates well their concepts of the geography of the region.

That American traders and trappers were

of the same thinking is also significant.

Other misconceptions

such as the notion of a "grand reservoir of snows and fauntains" from which all the major rivers of the continent flowed
was held by all -- Spaniard and American.

When nations try

to determine boundaries and spheres of authority erroneous
geographical concepts become quite significant.
In the decade following the expeditions of Lewis and
Clark and Pike, the many American traders and trappers that
set out for Santa Fe, some reaching their destination, added
considerably to America's knowledge of the approaches to that
attractive region.

By the administration of James .Monroe the

river and overland routes from the Upper Missouri and St.
Louis to Santa Fe became better known and more accurately
charted.

The Arkansas and Platte river highways were no

longer confused; the Red and Canadian rivers, however, still
remained obscure.

They would remain so until the mid-1800's.

'
The Melish map used
by John Quincy Adams and Luis
de Onis in the final days of their deliberations was considerably more accurate as far as the areas north of the Red
River of Texas, the Great Plains and the Upper Rocky Mountains
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were concerned.

That Santa Fe did, in fact, lie quite a

distance from American settlements in the above-mentioned
regions had been determined.

As mentioned in Chapter V,

at no time during the Adams-On!s negotiations did the American
diplomat propose a western limit which would have encompassed any part of the present-day state of New Mexico.
The long-standing claim of the Rio Grande had disappeared
from the hard dealing of the negotiating table; it doubtless
remained in the minds of some Americans as a goal we would
some day realize.
It has been pointed-out that the

w~ole

attitude of

the United States Government vis-a-vis the Spanish Southwest
took a more active, and, if you will; more aggressive turn
following the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819.

The coming cf

John Calhoun to the War Department, his subsequent military
and Indian policies, as well as the successful opening of the
Santa Fe Trail in 1821, were most significant in this more
positive approach.

What might be termed latent feelings

of

Manifest Destiny were awakened, never to come to rest until
America had extended to ' the Pacific.
It is felt that many historians have taken the period
following the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, with all the positive moves by the United States
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Government directed towards the Spanish Southwest, and
have concluded that such was the attitude from the beginning days of this nation.

Quite a case may be made along

these lines for individual Americans desiring land, trade,
wealth or power.
expansionist mold.

The Florida issue fits well into the
It is strongly contended, however, that

the United States Government, especially the executive
leadership, did not as policy systematically press along
the roads to Santa Fe.

The type of Manifest Destiny so

prevalent in mid-nineteenth century America, when Government officials such as James K. Polk took an active role in
expansion, cannot be read back into the first two decades
of the country and applied to men like Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison.

'
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